From patchwork Wed Nov 27 21:36:56 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Casey Schaufler X-Patchwork-Id: 11264933 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7D07D112B for ; Wed, 27 Nov 2019 21:37:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 52ED82075C for ; Wed, 27 Nov 2019 21:37:35 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=yahoo.com header.i=@yahoo.com header.b="CByKdgj9" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728203AbfK0Vhe (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Nov 2019 16:37:34 -0500 Received: from sonic313-15.consmr.mail.ne1.yahoo.com ([66.163.185.38]:36599 "EHLO sonic313-15.consmr.mail.ne1.yahoo.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727768AbfK0Vhd (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Nov 2019 16:37:33 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=yahoo.com; s=s2048; t=1574890653; bh=FxnCQxjFzK/30a/DWvCMMePbAXkF7qoEi76eerowyV4=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From:Subject; b=CByKdgj9+UZp4uLhXyH+z16ZfIqatRbMfUDTy0n7xAWOteoJJDy7p4ZgNchgE2vCHNpJm/yNHeTLRDcLV+6uSRMoEdmaBgDUI7GjLwGrdHiMHnUIUfYQscSExUEx85GWOvcQWPyZCABppZAaW0IwDdzxwUs8JqkP0XW8Ns8eXKKnJ4dUEeGb9anheyCnsdeZkn8d/htKAUFe3OrtuMk9p3A9Nr4Ogai8ET53izstd11CM0PLMfkPymBZTAjkXSLNVTwvPI7CLrHpKEJVXq2Ah1GfH8v17hT/5WAx98Co0DGI4hi8/pJOnPuGSFUezLHr6hQ06AX4SnEXZ3C9Dghssg== X-YMail-OSG: 1.nB6fkVM1kIgtgW01XDZFxIBlgIUp1Wv9Y8H5.ENBb15relLpcwmxOOXz33auk ka4xaXHNFjJhTsEXYu.TDxng482_55Iyh1cYwyG1vGv1AOzJwjyvB5hMZ20RnMjCJ.0R9eZnbNIq Ta0.bN7dGx4d4DgYc.akzAISiyNR9Z5eYAU1Ck9jyVOF6kt9LVV4SROtQl3I9odkk1qiDNjdmGo6 aM3jscL6dkSWO62im9GW2g522APWzyJIvihviaDcrN5.N9wHe2VZngiLNvD0hW0igXX2jdsWHMRp f6XKfgbVFftkvH81cpbpH.ycveIzhrHEqV7yiKwYdS6XrFrxtU8kbBh162n14VvXtuu1D.YHUsKH 36mthRx56nCzL7AOBhhIZyolFIatxrttY3Jv4FKWKRAzNroljotSq5krqHaySfmSczzzXO6uVjsB oBlYvPBDHcnyx0KQfS0dCOGI91wDf5lAnzbNowkgwEEu_3omjhgJlKuh4exd6Be2xjYXHKcqBTsA OTgiFE8nU6L7bPn1nKelsa5pVgGpRaQjjDb7oQ5ob8GBfiFdwT50OUv7vmQuy70Cdtu713AvZC36 WEZ1Y9zZ.hUxxjyxYmbF8CXSw7RpCquB1kRs_5NHi6uO3Q9q8zJLbBo3Z5DBQPWc5TUbxxce27am yH4AddDMCd5PwfdnKOxXTnjqICbz09eJOtPN94DiQXG.rM_hlSZkzMqKo5GMdr8Zygyly0uQQiVO 1XqWck1DKjGqFSYfFnILc4aRoWiBmRsuw21D0ojheXkMvJ8R7K2jcOceLEAwj0AEEeVPcwLSxL6R .L_xJwheHo.LhnuLvzVV8DGfQmuxBgzfCgbHAi.8z88fSvgKQoAXXvK9KDeQCExtsosWharOGnRx s7AXP_O5nB6JW0hXCUp9XmhxDvrVHaXST1a8u2hNzOgJafobsk2do4dk799Cg3TaKATqXm2pwkMa mHjgxHQjQQL.iX5G1lS48hhkiez9UFVE0gFLtx31k08hkM2dKbKqGzc_rjyH7jV34VdlsOZ9bLB5 vP.KMhGiECyHr8KZHnxEou.Za.dQe8u2fgI1dzVVy5vvP8yymgbzuTtCmdd5FIVunx2PWefSEcuJ XxLsYj96uCagL72UdmKOT1ZYHz8raOj3VsU3okajXoJy0fZd8gX12IXFAVRza5vnyWpdtZMVDOrw zLGwUPVRd7Me1L_t4k7TQsubRL57Iy10I7rCNp8HIPasNaGCZDhboAPj5edfuv3up4TUsv0tpv7k zqqI9LXldhZx1oPAU7uEhn5Y458foJ3HvljW4dTo3XB0dDijPYeJq7bFc1EgN2kRPJMVpF20HS24 jlrlmyU9jNygjT8Y2mTZg415PZKrYeMNAL9mTGfoxCSBCaysHvCS9DVyTTLhPe94iCA_E3gzi_ub sXGBJ9_GvRJvtjqy4PFiA_hunr4pkkY5X6e3hv3pHjwYhvw-- Received: from sonic.gate.mail.ne1.yahoo.com by sonic313.consmr.mail.ne1.yahoo.com with HTTP; Wed, 27 Nov 2019 21:37:33 +0000 Received: by smtp418.mail.bf1.yahoo.com (Oath Hermes SMTP Server) with ESMTPA ID 7ae6d5325a27611baf4cae658f88f94c; Wed, 27 Nov 2019 21:37:29 +0000 (UTC) From: Casey Schaufler To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com Subject: [v11-ima PATCH 03/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2019 13:36:56 -0800 Message-Id: <20191127213718.18267-4-casey@schaufler-ca.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20191127213718.18267-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> References: <20191127213718.18267-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook. Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the lsmblob instead of a u32. In some cases this requires a temporary conversion using lsmblob_init() that will go away when other interfaces get converted. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditfilter.c | 7 +++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++-- security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 4942a3af46a8..ef936b608865 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1834,7 +1834,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op, + void *lsmrule); void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); #else @@ -1850,8 +1851,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) return 0; } -static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void *lsmrule) +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, + u32 op, void *lsmrule) { return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index b0126e9c0743..356db1dd276c 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1325,6 +1325,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; pid_t pid; u32 sid; + struct lsmblob blob; switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_PID: @@ -1355,8 +1356,10 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: if (f->lsm_rule) { security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, - f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match( + &blob, f->type, + f->op, f->lsm_rule); } break; case AUDIT_EXE: diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 4effe01ebbe2..7566e5b1c419 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred; int i, need_sid = 1; u32 sid; + struct lsmblob blob; unsigned int sessionid; cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation); @@ -643,7 +644,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); need_sid = 0; } - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob, + f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); } @@ -658,15 +661,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, if (f->lsm_rule) { /* Find files that match */ if (name) { + lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid); result = security_audit_rule_match( - name->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid); if (security_audit_rule_match( - n->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule)) { @@ -678,7 +683,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, /* Find ipc objects that match */ if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) break; - if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, + lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid); + if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule)) ++result; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index df4ca482fb53..d95b0ece7434 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -381,8 +381,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, return -EINVAL; } -static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void *lsmrule) +static inline int security_filter_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, + u32 op, void *lsmrule) { return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index f19a895ad7cd..193ddd55420b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -414,6 +414,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { int rc = 0; u32 osid; + struct lsmblob blob; if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) continue; @@ -423,7 +424,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); - rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid, + lsmblob_init(&blob, osid); + rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule); @@ -431,7 +433,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid, + lsmblob_init(&blob, secid); + rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 5f503cadf7f3..7c386cbe4cf3 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result) /* * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list. */ -static int lsm_slot __initdata; +static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init; /** * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. @@ -2412,9 +2412,21 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); } -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op, + void *lsmrule) { - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + int rc; + + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) { + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) + continue; + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], + field, op, lsmrule); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + } + return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */