From patchwork Wed Dec 18 06:31:39 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11299617 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E705817EF for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:38:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C1B7420716 for ; Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:38:48 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="BumC7n+g" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725882AbfLRGis (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:38:48 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:42718 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725797AbfLRGis (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Dec 2019 01:38:48 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E016E8EE18E; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:38:47 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1576651127; bh=Qj8FiwoNkP6qE4ZFNyqt26A4rkvXJSzNBIkuZ2vveQQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=BumC7n+gisrKj5xgungKfXc5bqFWPvhqwX4ivSE7qYtcvDkV+paadzJPkuB8L4cNQ pCKcsKqnfSrP7gV8Xme8AA7CUyTrhRayoFIGtRR1BOaf9DOHzgUN4O3Zz3tHKjEfGw L7dkBVkX1UOxqdvZi5xTz1LuarovoFqSm3+VadfQ= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id mrW0Ky52knug; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:38:47 -0800 (PST) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C51438EE0DF; Tue, 17 Dec 2019 22:38:46 -0800 (PST) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 6/9] security: keys: trusted: add ability to specify arbitrary policy Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 15:31:39 +0900 Message-Id: <20191218063142.23033-7-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.4 In-Reply-To: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org This patch adds a policy= argument to key creation. The policy is the standard tss policymaker format and each separate policy line must have a newline after it. Thus to construct a policy requiring authorized value and pcr 16 locking using a sha256 hash, the policy (policy.txt) file would be two lines: 0000017F00000001000B03000001303095B49BE85E381E5B20E557E46363EF55B0F43B132C2D8E3DE9AC436656F2 0000016b This can be inserted into the key with keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 policy=`cat policy.txt` keyhandle=0x81000001 hash=sha256" @u Note that although a few policies work like this, most require special handling which must be added to the kernel policy construction routine. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley --- Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 16 ++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 13 +++++++ 4 files changed, 76 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index 053344c4df5b..b68d3eb73f00 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ Usage:: policyhandle= handle to an authorization policy session that defines the same policy and with the same hash algorithm as was used to seal the key. + policy= specify an arbitrary set of policies. These must + be in policymaker format with each separate + policy line newline terminated. "keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard TPM_STORED_DATA format. The key length for new keys are always in bytes. @@ -168,6 +171,19 @@ zeros (the value of PCR 16):: $ dd if=/dev/zero bs=1 count=20 2>/dev/null|sha1sum 6768033e216468247bd031a0a2d9876d79818f8f +You can also specify arbitrary policy in policymaker format, so a two +value policy (the pcr example above and authvalue) would look like +this in policymaker format:: + + 0000017F000000010004030000016768033e216468247bd031a0a2d9876d79818f8f + 0000016b + +This can be placed in a file (say policy.txt) and then added to the key as:: + + $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001 hash=sha1 policy=`cat policy.txt`" @u + +The newlines in the file policy.txt will be automatically processed. + Reseal a trusted key under new pcr values:: $ keyctl update 268728824 "update pcrinfo=`cat pcr.blob`" diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c index 8afbe90eed1b..2606d3bb5b82 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c @@ -339,3 +339,49 @@ int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols, } return 0; } + +int tpm2_parse_policies(struct tpm2_policies **ppols, char *str) +{ + struct tpm2_policies *pols; + char *p; + u8 *ptr; + int i = 0, left = PAGE_SIZE, res; + + pols = kmalloc(left, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pols) + return -ENOMEM; + + ptr = (u8 *)(pols + 1); + left -= ptr - (u8 *)pols; + + while ((p = strsep(&str, "\n"))) { + if (*p == '\0' || *p == '\n') + continue; + pols->len[i] = strlen(p)/2; + if (pols->len[i] > left) { + res = -E2BIG; + goto err; + } + res = hex2bin(ptr, p, pols->len[i]); + if (res) + goto err; + /* get command code and skip past */ + pols->code[i] = get_unaligned_be32(ptr); + pols->policies[i] = ptr + 4; + ptr += pols->len[i]; + left -= pols->len[i]; + pols->len[i] -= 4; + /* + * FIXME: this does leave the code embedded in dead + * regions of the memory, but it's easier than + * hexdumping to a temporary or copying over + */ + i++; + } + pols->count = i; + *ppols = pols; + return 0; + err: + kfree(pols); + return res; +} diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h index 152c948743f3..cb804a544ced 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h @@ -28,3 +28,4 @@ int tpm2_generate_policy_digest(struct tpm2_policies *pols, u32 hash, int tpm2_encode_policy(struct tpm2_policies *pols, u8 **data, u32 *len); int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols, u32 *handle); +int tpm2_parse_policies(struct tpm2_policies **ppols, char *str); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index b1b487c2c72e..668cbdc675b8 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ #include +#include "tpm2-policy.h" + static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)"; static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1"; static struct tpm_chip *chip; @@ -709,6 +711,7 @@ enum { Opt_hash, Opt_policydigest, Opt_policyhandle, + Opt_policy, }; static const match_table_t key_tokens = { @@ -724,6 +727,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { {Opt_hash, "hash=%s"}, {Opt_policydigest, "policydigest=%s"}, {Opt_policyhandle, "policyhandle=%s"}, + {Opt_policy, "policy=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -834,6 +838,15 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return -EINVAL; opt->policyhandle = handle; break; + case Opt_policy: + if (pay->policies) + return -EINVAL; + if (!tpm2) + return -EINVAL; + res = tpm2_parse_policies(&pay->policies, args[0].from); + if (res) + return res; + break; default: return -EINVAL; }