[v11,4/5] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs

Message ID	20200912172643.9063-5-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com (mailing list archive)
State	New, archived
Headers	show Return-Path: <SRS0=E5nz=CV=vger.kernel.org=linux-integrity-owner@kernel.org> From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Subject: [PATCH v11 4/5] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs Date: Sat, 12 Sep 2020 10:26:42 -0700 Message-Id: <20200912172643.9063-5-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> In-Reply-To: <20200912172643.9063-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20200912172643.9063-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk
Series	TPM 2.0 trusted key rework \| expand [v11,0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework [v11,1/5] lib: add ASN.1 encoder [v11,2/5] oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys [v11,3/5] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations [v11,4/5] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs [v11,5/5] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable

diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index 9483a7425ad5..eb639bb24fcc 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -208,3 +208,61 @@ about the usage can be found in the file Another new format 'enc32' has been defined in order to support encrypted keys with payload size of 32 bytes. This will initially be used for nvdimm security but may expand to other usages that require 32 bytes payload. + + +TPM 2.0 ASN.1 Key Format +------------------------ + +The TPM 2.0 ASN.1 key format is designed to be easily recognisable, +even in binary form (fixing a problem we had with the TPM 1.2 ASN.1 +format) and to be extensible for additions like importable keys and +policy:: + + TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE { + type OBJECT IDENTIFIER + emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL + parent INTEGER + pubkey OCTET STRING + privkey OCTET STRING + } + +type is what distinguishes the key even in binary form since the OID +is provided by the TCG to be unique and thus forms a recognizable +binary pattern at offset 3 in the key. The OIDs currently made +available are:: + + 2.23.133.10.1.3 TPM Loadable key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually + RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a + TPM2_Load() operation. + + 2.23.133.10.1.4 TPM Importable Key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually + RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a + TPM2_Import() operation. + + 2.23.133.10.1.5 TPM Sealed Data. This is a set of data (up to 128 + bytes) which is sealed by the TPM. It usually + represents a symmetric key and must be unsealed before + use. + +The trusted key code only uses the TPM Sealed Data OID. + +emptyAuth is true if the key has well known authorization "". If it +is false or not present, the key requires an explicit authorization +phrase. This is used by most user space consumers to decide whether +to prompt for a password. + +parent represents the parent key handle, either in the 0x81 MSO space, +like 0x81000001 for the RSA primary storage key. Userspace programmes +also support specifying the primary handle in the 0x40 MSO space. If +this happens the Elliptic Curve variant of the primary key using the +TCG defined template will be generated on the fly into a volatile +object and used as the parent. The current kernel code only supports +the 0x81 MSO form. + +pubkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PRIVATE excluding the +initial TPM2B header, which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octet +string length. + +privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the +initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed +string length. diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index b2ed3481c6a0..b2d87ad21714 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ struct trusted_key_payload { unsigned int key_len; unsigned int blob_len; unsigned char migratable; + unsigned char old_format; unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1]; unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE]; }; diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index 83bc23409164..8fbfedf6d1cc 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS select CRYPTO_HMAC select CRYPTO_SHA1 select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO + select ASN1_ENCODER help This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index 7b73cebbb378..e0198641eff2 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -5,4 +5,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o -trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o +trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o tpm2key.asn1.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3f6a9d01d1e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +--- +--- ASN.1 for for TPM 2.0 keys +--- + +TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE { + type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({tpm2_key_type}), + emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, + parent INTEGER ({tpm2_key_parent}), + pubkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_pub}), + privkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_priv}) + } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index dfb3e8ee8de1..0f026656d635 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, goto out; } - if (!options->keyhandle) { + if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index b4a5058107c2..e8dcc47b3388 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ * Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation */ +#include <linux/asn1_encoder.h> +#include <linux/oid_registry.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/tpm.h> @@ -12,6 +14,10 @@ #include <keys/trusted-type.h> #include <keys/trusted_tpm.h> +#include <asm/unaligned.h> + +#include "tpm2key.asn1.h" + static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1}, {HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256}, @@ -20,6 +26,165 @@ static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256}, }; +static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2,23,133,10,1,5 }; + +static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options, + u8 *src, u32 len) +{ + const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE; + u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + u8 *work = scratch, *work1; + u8 *end_work = scratch + SCRATCH_SIZE; + u8 *priv, *pub; + u16 priv_len, pub_len; + + priv_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2; + priv = src; + + src += priv_len; + + pub_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2; + pub = src; + + if (!scratch) + return -ENOMEM; + + work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid, + asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid)); + + if (options->blobauth_len == 0) { + unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool; + /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */ + w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true); + if (WARN(IS_ERR(w), "BUG: Boolean failed to encode")) + return PTR_ERR(w); + work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 0, bool, w - bool); + } + + /* + * Assume both octet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length + * + * Note: For a well behaved TPM, this warning should never + * trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on + */ + if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 14 > SCRATCH_SIZE, + "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) + return -EINVAL; + + work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle); + work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len); + work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len); + + work1 = payload->blob; + work1 = asn1_encode_sequence(work1, work1 + sizeof(payload->blob), + scratch, work - scratch); + if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed")) + return PTR_ERR(work1); + + return work1 - payload->blob; +} + +struct tpm2_key_context { + u32 parent; + const u8 *pub; + u32 pub_len; + const u8 *priv; + u32 priv_len; +}; + +static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options, + u8 **buf) +{ + int ret; + struct tpm2_key_context ctx; + u8 *blob; + + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + + ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&tpm2key_decoder, &ctx, payload->blob, + payload->blob_len); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!blob) + return -ENOMEM; + + *buf = blob; + options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; + + memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); + blob += ctx.priv_len; + + memcpy(blob, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len); + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_parent(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; + const u8 *v = value; + int i; + + ctx->parent = 0; + for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) { + ctx->parent <<= 8; + ctx->parent |= v[i]; + } + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + enum OID oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); + + if (oid != OID_TPMSealedData) { + char buffer[50]; + + sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + pr_debug("OID is \"%s\" which is not TPMSealedData\n", + buffer); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_pub(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->pub = value; + ctx->pub_len = vlen; + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->priv = value; + ctx->priv_len = vlen; + + return 0; +} + /** * tpm_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer. * @@ -79,6 +244,9 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map)) return -EINVAL; + if (!options->keyhandle) + return -EINVAL; + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE); if (rc) return rc; @@ -146,8 +314,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - memcpy(payload->blob, &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], blob_len); - payload->blob_len = blob_len; + payload->blob_len = + tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, + &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], + blob_len); out: tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); @@ -158,6 +328,8 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, else rc = -EPERM; } + if (payload->blob_len < 0) + return payload->blob_len; return rc; } @@ -184,13 +356,34 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, unsigned int private_len; unsigned int public_len; unsigned int blob_len; + u8 *blob; int rc; - private_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[0]); - if (private_len > (payload->blob_len - 2)) + rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob); + if (rc) { + /* old form */ + blob = payload->blob; + payload->old_format = 1; + } + + /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ + if (!options->keyhandle) + return -EINVAL; + + /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */ + if (payload->blob_len < 4) + return -EINVAL; + + private_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob); + + /* must be big enough for following public_len */ + if (private_len + 2 + 2 > (payload->blob_len)) + return -E2BIG; + + public_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob + 2 + private_len); + if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len) return -E2BIG; - public_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[2 + private_len]); blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4; if (blob_len > payload->blob_len) return -E2BIG; @@ -206,7 +399,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, options->keyauth /* hmac */, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->blob, blob_len); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len); if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { rc = -E2BIG; @@ -219,6 +412,8 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); out: + if (blob != payload->blob) + kfree(blob); tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); if (rc > 0)

[v11,4/5] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs

Commit Message

Comments

Patch