From patchwork Sun Nov 1 22:26:22 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Tushar Sugandhi X-Patchwork-Id: 11872723 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A539A15E6 for ; Sun, 1 Nov 2020 22:27:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 81C3922282 for ; Sun, 1 Nov 2020 22:27:03 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="fTDqpbD+" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727280AbgKAW06 (ORCPT ); Sun, 1 Nov 2020 17:26:58 -0500 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:42006 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727359AbgKAW0j (ORCPT ); Sun, 1 Nov 2020 17:26:39 -0500 Received: from tusharsu-Ubuntu.lan (c-71-197-163-6.hsd1.wa.comcast.net [71.197.163.6]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D7A1220B36E7; Sun, 1 Nov 2020 14:26:36 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com D7A1220B36E7 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1604269597; bh=ykK8xizKxPwawSU0A4Yf3HkpQD34UbP8niKQC8VOGaA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=fTDqpbD++mQJd8/E7aT0dnt2AQTzITTdMcq7LW1EN4i/YdIN8St6OTkU6Kf70hIoy PpT/KJ0/y4/K2j02b2C92JJkJlAKiWqnG3EdiEfsHHcm5fWQdKLQFkpMIqOmG5y4kY +gzhDMFOjHT7Cb7I4qF8FtHwUKmIuAUtXLkg+jg0= From: Tushar Sugandhi To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com Subject: [PATCH v5 3/7] IMA: add hook to measure critical data Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2020 14:26:22 -0800 Message-Id: <20201101222626.6111-4-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20201101222626.6111-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> References: <20201101222626.6111-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Currently, IMA does not provide a generic function for kernel subsystems to measure their critical data. Examples of critical data in this context could be kernel in-memory r/o structures, hash of the memory structures, or data that represents a linux kernel subsystem state change. The critical data, if accidentally or maliciously altered, can compromise the integrity of the system. A generic function provided by IMA to measure critical data would enable various subsystems with easier and faster on-boarding to use IMA infrastructure and would also avoid code duplication. Add a new IMA func CRITICAL_DATA and a corresponding IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() to support measuring critical data for various kernel subsystems. Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi --- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +- include/linux/ima.h | 8 ++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 ++ 6 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index cd572912c593..3de6c774c37e 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Description: base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK] [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] - [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] + [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [CRITICAL_DATA] mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] [[^]MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 8fa7bcfb2da2..60ba073f1575 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry); extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size); extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size); +extern void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_data_source, + const char *event_name, + const void *buf, int buf_len, + bool measure_buf_hash); #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); @@ -116,6 +120,10 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) } static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {} +static inline void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_data_source, + const char *event_name, + const void *buf, int buf_len, + bool measure_buf_hash) {} #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 0f77e0b697a3..c1acf88e1b5d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ + hook(CRITICAL_DATA, critical_data) \ hook(MAX_CHECK, none) #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index af218babd198..9917e1730cb6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK - * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK + * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | CRITICAL_DATA * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 4485d87c0aa5..6e1b11dcba53 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -921,6 +921,44 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) fdput(f); } +/** + * ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel subsystem data + * critical to integrity of the kernel + * @event_data_source: name of the data source being measured; + * typically it should be the name of the kernel subsystem that is sending + * the data for measurement + * @event_name: name of an event from the kernel subsystem that is sending + * the data for measurement + * @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure + * @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes) + * @measure_buf_hash: if set to true - will measure hash of the buf, + * instead of buf + * + * A given kernel subsystem (event_data_source) may send + * data (buf) to be measured when the data or the subsystem state changes. + * The state/data change can be described by event_name. + * Examples of critical data (buf) could be kernel in-memory r/o structures, + * hash of the memory structures, or data that represents subsystem + * state change. + * measure_buf_hash can be used to save space, if the data being measured + * is too large. + * The data (buf) can only be measured, not appraised. + */ +void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_data_source, + const char *event_name, + const void *buf, int buf_len, + bool measure_buf_hash) +{ + if (!event_name || !event_data_source || !buf || !buf_len) { + pr_err("Invalid arguments passed to %s().\n", __func__); + return; + } + + process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name, + CRITICAL_DATA, 0, event_data_source, + measure_buf_hash); +} + static int __init init_ima(void) { int error; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 4edc9be62048..f48e82450fe1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -1251,6 +1251,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) && strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = KEY_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "CRITICAL_DATA") == 0) + entry->func = CRITICAL_DATA; else result = -EINVAL; if (!result)