| Message ID | 20201101222626.6111-5-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | IMA: Infrastructure for measurement of critical kernel data | expand |
Hi Tushar, On Sun, 2020-11-01 at 14:26 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: > System administrators should be able to choose which kernel subsystems > they want to measure the critical data for. To enable that, an IMA policy > option to choose specific kernel subsystems is needed. This policy option > would constrain the measurement of the critical data to the given kernel > subsystems. Measuring critical data should not be dependent on the source of the critical data. This patch needs to be split up. The "data sources" should be move to it's own separate patch. This patch should be limited to adding the policy code needed for measuring criticial data. Limiting critical data sources should be the last patch in this series. thanks, Mimi > > Add a new IMA policy option - "data_sources:=" to the IMA func > CRITICAL_DATA to allow measurement of various kernel subsystems. This > policy option would enable the system administrators to limit the > measurement to the subsystems listed in "data_sources:=", if the > subsystem measures its data by calling ima_measure_critical_data(). > > Limit the measurement to the subsystems that are specified in the IMA > policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"data_sources:=". If "data_sources:=" is not > provided with the func CRITICAL_DATA, measure the data from all the > supported kernel subsystems. > > Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
On 2020-11-06 5:43 a.m., Mimi Zohar wrote: > Hi Tushar, > > On Sun, 2020-11-01 at 14:26 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: >> System administrators should be able to choose which kernel subsystems >> they want to measure the critical data for. To enable that, an IMA policy >> option to choose specific kernel subsystems is needed. This policy option >> would constrain the measurement of the critical data to the given kernel >> subsystems. > > Measuring critical data should not be dependent on the source of the > critical data. This patch needs to be split up. The "data sources" > should be move to it's own separate patch. This patch should be > limited to adding the policy code needed for measuring criticial data. > Limiting critical data sources should be the last patch in this series. > > thanks, > > Mimi > Thanks Mimi. Ok. I will split the patches as you suggested. Patch #1 (this patch) will have the policy code needed for measuring critical data. patch #2 Limiting the critical “data_sources”. *Question 1* Since you said patch #2 should be the last patch in this series, do you mean merging patch #2 with the SeLinux patch? (patch 7/7 of this series) Or a separate patch before 7/7? *Question 2* If I understand it correctly, the following code should be moved from this patch to patch #2. Did I miss anything? static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -957,6 +971,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, {Opt_template, "template=%s"}, {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"}, + {Opt_data_sources, "data_sources=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; + case Opt_data_sources: + ima_log_string(ab, "data_sources", + args[0].from); + + if (entry->data_sources) { + result = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + entry->data_sources = ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(args); + if (IS_ERR(entry->data_sources)) { + result = PTR_ERR(entry->data_sources); + entry->data_sources = NULL; + break; + } + + entry->flags |= IMA_DATA_SOURCES; + break; + if (entry->flags & IMA_DATA_SOURCES) { + seq_puts(m, "data_sources="); + ima_show_rule_opt_list(m, entry->data_sources); + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + ~Tushar >> >> Add a new IMA policy option - "data_sources:=" to the IMA func >> CRITICAL_DATA to allow measurement of various kernel subsystems. This >> policy option would enable the system administrators to limit the >> measurement to the subsystems listed in "data_sources:=", if the >> subsystem measures its data by calling ima_measure_critical_data(). >> >> Limit the measurement to the subsystems that are specified in the IMA >> policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"data_sources:=". If "data_sources:=" is not >> provided with the func CRITICAL_DATA, measure the data from all the >> supported kernel subsystems. >> >> Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index 3de6c774c37e..15be8b16f6f3 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ Description: template:= name of a defined IMA template type (eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure". pcr:= decimal value + data_sources:= list of kernel subsystems that contain + kernel in-memory data critical to the integrity of the kernel. + Only valid when action is "measure" and func is + CRITICAL_DATA. default policy: # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index f48e82450fe1..ec99e0bb6c6f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #define IMA_PCR 0x0100 #define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200 #define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400 +#define IMA_DATA_SOURCES 0x0800 #define UNKNOWN 0 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ @@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES]; char *fsname; struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */ + struct ima_rule_opt_list *data_sources; /* Measure data from these sources */ struct ima_template_desc *template; }; @@ -479,6 +481,12 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, else opt_list = rule->keyrings; break; + case CRITICAL_DATA: + if (!rule->data_sources) + return true; + else + opt_list = rule->data_sources; + break; default: break; } @@ -518,13 +526,19 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, { int i; - if (func == KEY_CHECK) { - return (rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func) && - ima_match_rule_data(rule, func_data, cred); - } if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR)) return false; + + switch (func) { + case KEY_CHECK: + case CRITICAL_DATA: + return ((rule->func == func) && + ima_match_rule_data(rule, func_data, cred)); + default: + break; + } + if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR)) return false; @@ -920,7 +934,7 @@ enum { Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings, - Opt_err + Opt_data_sources, Opt_err }; static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -957,6 +971,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, {Opt_template, "template=%s"}, {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"}, + {Opt_data_sources, "data_sources=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -1119,6 +1134,19 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) return false; + break; + case CRITICAL_DATA: + if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) + return false; + + if (!(entry->flags & IMA_DATA_SOURCES) || + (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR | + IMA_DATA_SOURCES))) + return false; + + if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) + return false; + break; default: return false; @@ -1323,6 +1351,24 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->flags |= IMA_KEYRINGS; break; + case Opt_data_sources: + ima_log_string(ab, "data_sources", + args[0].from); + + if (entry->data_sources) { + result = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + entry->data_sources = ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(args); + if (IS_ERR(entry->data_sources)) { + result = PTR_ERR(entry->data_sources); + entry->data_sources = NULL; + break; + } + + entry->flags |= IMA_DATA_SOURCES; + break; case Opt_fsuuid: ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from); @@ -1703,6 +1749,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) seq_puts(m, " "); } + if (entry->flags & IMA_DATA_SOURCES) { + seq_puts(m, "data_sources="); + ima_show_rule_opt_list(m, entry->data_sources); + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) { snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr); seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf);
System administrators should be able to choose which kernel subsystems they want to measure the critical data for. To enable that, an IMA policy option to choose specific kernel subsystems is needed. This policy option would constrain the measurement of the critical data to the given kernel subsystems. Add a new IMA policy option - "data_sources:=" to the IMA func CRITICAL_DATA to allow measurement of various kernel subsystems. This policy option would enable the system administrators to limit the measurement to the subsystems listed in "data_sources:=", if the subsystem measures its data by calling ima_measure_critical_data(). Limit the measurement to the subsystems that are specified in the IMA policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"data_sources:=". If "data_sources:=" is not provided with the func CRITICAL_DATA, measure the data from all the supported kernel subsystems. Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> --- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 4 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)