From patchwork Wed Nov 11 09:23:00 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 11897243 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 165C9921 for ; Wed, 11 Nov 2020 09:25:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F0C3A20759 for ; Wed, 11 Nov 2020 09:25:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727138AbgKKJZi (ORCPT ); Wed, 11 Nov 2020 04:25:38 -0500 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com ([185.176.79.56]:2090 "EHLO frasgout.his.huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726893AbgKKJZR (ORCPT ); Wed, 11 Nov 2020 04:25:17 -0500 Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.206]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4CWK630vF5z67JkG; Wed, 11 Nov 2020 17:23:23 +0800 (CST) Received: from roberto-HP-EliteDesk-800-G2-DM-65W.huawei.com (10.204.65.161) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.1913.5; Wed, 11 Nov 2020 10:25:15 +0100 From: Roberto Sassu To: , CC: , , , , , Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH v3 09/11] ima: Allow imasig requirement to be satisfied by EVM portable signatures Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 10:23:00 +0100 Message-ID: <20201111092302.1589-10-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.GIT In-Reply-To: <20201111092302.1589-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20201111092302.1589-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [10.204.65.161] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml735-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.86) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org System administrators can require that all accessed files have a signature by specifying appraise_type=imasig in a policy rule. Currently, IMA signatures satisfy this requirement. Appended signatures may also satisfy this requirement, but are not applicable as IMA signatures. IMA/appended signatures ensure data source authentication for file content and prevent any change. EVM signatures instead ensure data source authentication for file metadata. Given that the digest or signature of the file content must be included in the metadata, EVM signatures provide the same file data guarantees of IMA signatures, as well as providing file metadata guarantees. This patch lets systems protected with EVM signatures pass appraisal verification if the appraise_type=imasig requirement is specified in the policy. This facilitates deployment in the scenarios where only EVM signatures are available. The patch makes the following changes: file xattr types: security.ima: IMA_XATTR_DIGEST/IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG security.evm: EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG execve(), mmap(), open() behavior (with appraise_type=imasig): before: denied (file without IMA signature, imasig requirement not met) after: allowed (file with EVM portable signature, imasig requirement met) open(O_WRONLY) behavior (without appraise_type=imasig): before: allowed (file without IMA signature, not immutable) after: denied (file with EVM portable signature, immutable) In addition, similarly to IMA signatures, this patch temporarily allows new files without or with incomplete metadata to be opened so that content can be written. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 57a252f8c724..00b038941a10 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -241,12 +241,16 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, hash_start = 1; fallthrough; case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: - if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { - *cause = "IMA-signature-required"; - *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; - break; + if (*status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) { + if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { + *cause = "IMA-signature-required"; + *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; + break; + } + clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); + } else { + set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); } - clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >= iint->ima_hash->length) /* @@ -416,6 +420,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, cause = "missing-HMAC"; goto out; case INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE: + set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); fallthrough; case INTEGRITY_FAIL: /* Invalid HMAC/signature. */ cause = "invalid-HMAC"; @@ -460,9 +465,12 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } - /* Permit new files with file signatures, but without data. */ + /* + * Permit new files with file/EVM portable signatures, but + * without data. + */ if (inode->i_size == 0 && iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE && - xattr_value && xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) { + test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags)) { status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } @@ -592,6 +600,8 @@ void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, xattr_value_len); if (result == 1) digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); + if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) && xattr_value_len > 0) + digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG); if (result == 1 || evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); }