| Message ID | 20201209194212.5131-7-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data | expand |
On 2020-12-09 11:42:10, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: > The IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() does not support a way to > specify the source of the critical data provider. Thus, the data > measurement cannot be constrained based on the data source label > in the IMA policy. > > Extend the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() to support passing > the data source label as an input parameter, so that the policy rule can > be used to limit the measurements based on the label. > > Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> Tyler > --- > include/linux/ima.h | 6 ++++-- > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 11 ++++++++--- > 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h > index 675f54db6264..6434287a81cd 100644 > --- a/include/linux/ima.h > +++ b/include/linux/ima.h > @@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry); > extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size); > extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size); > -extern void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, > +extern void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_data_source, > + const char *event_name, > const void *buf, int buf_len, > bool measure_buf_hash); > > @@ -125,7 +126,8 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) > } > > static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {} > -static inline void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, > +static inline void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_data_source, > + const char *event_name, > const void *buf, int buf_len, > bool measure_buf_hash) {} > #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > index ae59f4a4dd70..7c633901f441 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -924,6 +924,7 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) > > /** > * ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data > + * @event_data_source: kernel data source being measured > * @event_name: event name to be used for the buffer entry > * @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure > * @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes) > @@ -932,6 +933,9 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) > * Measure the kernel subsystem data, critical to the integrity of the kernel, > * into the IMA log and extend the @pcr. > * > + * Use @event_data_source to describe the kernel data source for the buffer > + * being measured. > + * > * Use @event_name to describe the state/buffer data change. > * Examples of critical data (buf) could be kernel in-memory r/o structures, > * hash of the memory structures, or data that represents subsystem state > @@ -944,17 +948,18 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) > * > * The data (buf) can only be measured, not appraised. > */ > -void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, > +void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_data_source, > + const char *event_name, > const void *buf, int buf_len, > bool measure_buf_hash) > { > - if (!event_name || !buf || !buf_len) { > + if (!event_name || !event_data_source || !buf || !buf_len) { > pr_err("Invalid arguments passed to %s().\n", __func__); > return; > } > > process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name, > - CRITICAL_DATA, 0, NULL, > + CRITICAL_DATA, 0, event_data_source, > measure_buf_hash); > } > > -- > 2.17.1 >
On 2020-12-10 3:19 p.m., Tyler Hicks wrote: > On 2020-12-09 11:42:10, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: >> The IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() does not support a way to >> specify the source of the critical data provider. Thus, the data >> measurement cannot be constrained based on the data source label >> in the IMA policy. >> >> Extend the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() to support passing >> the data source label as an input parameter, so that the policy rule can >> be used to limit the measurements based on the label. >> >> Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> > > Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> > > Tyler > Thanks for the review. ~Tushar
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 675f54db6264..6434287a81cd 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry); extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size); extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size); -extern void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, +extern void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_data_source, + const char *event_name, const void *buf, int buf_len, bool measure_buf_hash); @@ -125,7 +126,8 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) } static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {} -static inline void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, +static inline void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_data_source, + const char *event_name, const void *buf, int buf_len, bool measure_buf_hash) {} #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index ae59f4a4dd70..7c633901f441 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -924,6 +924,7 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) /** * ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data + * @event_data_source: kernel data source being measured * @event_name: event name to be used for the buffer entry * @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure * @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes) @@ -932,6 +933,9 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) * Measure the kernel subsystem data, critical to the integrity of the kernel, * into the IMA log and extend the @pcr. * + * Use @event_data_source to describe the kernel data source for the buffer + * being measured. + * * Use @event_name to describe the state/buffer data change. * Examples of critical data (buf) could be kernel in-memory r/o structures, * hash of the memory structures, or data that represents subsystem state @@ -944,17 +948,18 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) * * The data (buf) can only be measured, not appraised. */ -void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, +void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_data_source, + const char *event_name, const void *buf, int buf_len, bool measure_buf_hash) { - if (!event_name || !buf || !buf_len) { + if (!event_name || !event_data_source || !buf || !buf_len) { pr_err("Invalid arguments passed to %s().\n", __func__); return; } process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name, - CRITICAL_DATA, 0, NULL, + CRITICAL_DATA, 0, event_data_source, measure_buf_hash); }
The IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() does not support a way to specify the source of the critical data provider. Thus, the data measurement cannot be constrained based on the data source label in the IMA policy. Extend the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() to support passing the data source label as an input parameter, so that the policy rule can be used to limit the measurements based on the label. Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> --- include/linux/ima.h | 6 ++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)