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Fri, 24 Sep 2021 18:05:59 +0000 Received: by kubenode586.mail-prod1.omega.bf1.yahoo.com (VZM Hermes SMTP Server) with ESMTPA ID 8b07f85760cbc40cb575fb1fa28abcbd; Fri, 24 Sep 2021 18:05:55 +0000 (UTC) From: Casey Schaufler To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-audit@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Stephen Smalley , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v29 10/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Date: Fri, 24 Sep 2021 10:54:23 -0700 Message-Id: <20210924175441.7943-11-casey@schaufler-ca.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.31.1 In-Reply-To: <20210924175441.7943-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> References: <20210924175441.7943-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Change the security_task_getsecid_subj() and security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all possible secids for possible reporting. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: John Johansen Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Acked-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org --- drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +----- include/linux/security.h | 14 ++++--- kernel/audit.c | 16 +++----- kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 25 ++++++------ net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 ++- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 12 +++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 55 +++++++++++++++------------ security/security.c | 25 +++++++++--- 10 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index 42bcf22d1e50..d17a34445dcd 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -2710,7 +2710,6 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->priority = task_nice(current); if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) { - u32 secid; struct lsmblob blob; size_t added_size; @@ -2723,16 +2722,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, * here; however, it isn't clear that binder would handle that * case well anyway. */ - security_task_getsecid_obj(proc->tsk, &secid); - /* - * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will - * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init - * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob - * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(), - * which means that the one expected by - * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set. - */ - lsmblob_init(&blob, secid); + security_task_getsecid_obj(proc->tsk, &blob); ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz); if (ret) { return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY; diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index e674a6cdab46..de70742c30d6 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -501,8 +501,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p); int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p); -void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); -void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); +void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob); +void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob); int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice); int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio); int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p); @@ -1198,14 +1198,16 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) return 0; } -static inline void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +static inline void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, + struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid = 0; + lsmblob_init(blob, 0); } -static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, + struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid = 0; + lsmblob_init(blob, 0); } static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 22286163e93e..d92c7b894183 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -2139,19 +2139,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) char *ctx = NULL; unsigned len; int error; - u32 sid; struct lsmblob blob; - security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &sid); - if (!sid) + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); + if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob)) return 0; - /* - * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid. - * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted - * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set. - */ - lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len); if (error) { if (error != -EINVAL) @@ -2359,6 +2352,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) { kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid; + struct lsmblob blob; if (auditd_test_task(t) && (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || @@ -2369,7 +2363,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; - security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_sig_sid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */ + audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0]; } return audit_signal_info_syscall(t); diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 6a04d762d272..1ba14a7a38f7 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1330,7 +1330,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; pid_t pid; - u32 sid; struct lsmblob blob; switch (f->type) { @@ -1362,8 +1361,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: if (f->lsm_isset) { security_task_getsecid_subj(current, - &sid); - lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + &blob); result = security_audit_rule_match( &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index b4d214b21b97..50e3f2f4cb49 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -477,7 +477,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, { const struct cred *cred; int i, need_sid = 1; - u32 sid; struct lsmblob blob; unsigned int sessionid; @@ -674,17 +673,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, logged upon error */ if (f->lsm_isset) { if (need_sid) { - security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &sid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &blob); need_sid = 0; } - /* - * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob - * to sid. This is temporary until - * security_task_getsecid() is converted to - * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in - * this patch set. - */ - lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); @@ -2439,12 +2430,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) { struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); + struct lsmblob blob; context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t); context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); context->target_uid = task_uid(t); context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid); + security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob); + /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */ + context->target_sid = blob.secid[0]; memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); } @@ -2460,6 +2454,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t); + struct lsmblob blob; if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) return 0; @@ -2471,7 +2466,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid); + security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob); + /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ + ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0]; memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); return 0; } @@ -2492,7 +2489,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); + security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob); + /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ + axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0]; memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); axp->pid_count++; diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c index 51cb4fce5edf..15b53fc4e83f 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c @@ -1562,11 +1562,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void) int ret_val; struct netlbl_dom_map *entry; struct netlbl_audit audit_info; + struct lsmblob blob; /* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */ - security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info.secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */ + audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0]; audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; audit_info.sessionid = 0; diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h index 6190cbf94bf0..aa31f7bf79ee 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h @@ -32,7 +32,11 @@ */ static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { - security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info->secid); + struct lsmblob blob; + + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding until secid is converted */ + audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0]; audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index dbba51583e7c..2fedda131a39 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -71,15 +71,17 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; if (!ima_appraise) return 0; - security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); - return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, - func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, - NULL, NULL, NULL); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding the .secid[0] */ + return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), + blob.secid[0], func, mask, + IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL); } static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 465865412100..c327f93d3962 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -405,12 +405,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, */ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) { - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { - security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, - 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */ + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], + NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); } return 0; @@ -436,9 +437,9 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) char *pathbuf = NULL; const char *pathname = NULL; struct inode *inode; + struct lsmblob blob; int result = 0; int action; - u32 secid; int pcr; /* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */ @@ -446,11 +447,11 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) return 0; - security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file); action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode, - current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, - &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL); + current_cred(), blob.secid[0], MAY_EXEC, + MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL); /* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */ if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK))) @@ -486,10 +487,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int ret; u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; - security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); - ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ + ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], + NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) return ret; @@ -510,10 +513,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; - security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); } @@ -689,7 +693,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, bool contents) { enum ima_hooks func; - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; /* * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the @@ -709,8 +713,9 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, /* Read entire file for all partial reads. */ func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; - security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */ + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0, MAY_READ, func); } @@ -739,7 +744,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { enum ima_hooks func; - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; /* permit signed certs */ if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) @@ -752,9 +757,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, } func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; - security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, - MAY_READ, func); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf, + size, MAY_READ, func); } /** @@ -882,7 +888,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]; int violation = 0; int action = 0; - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len) return -EINVAL; @@ -905,9 +911,10 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, * buffer measurements. */ if (func) { - security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding */ action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), - secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template, + blob.secid[0], 0, func, &pcr, &template, func_data, NULL); if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest) return -ENOENT; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index f6760b25fed0..74a7fb981904 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1905,17 +1905,30 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p); } -void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid = 0; - call_void_hook(task_getsecid_subj, p, secid); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + + lsmblob_init(blob, 0); + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid_subj, + list) { + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) + continue; + hp->hook.task_getsecid_subj(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_subj); -void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid = 0; - call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + + lsmblob_init(blob, 0); + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid_obj, list) { + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) + continue; + hp->hook.task_getsecid_obj(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);