| Message ID | 20220719171647.3574253-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | lockdown: Fix kexec lockdown bypass with ima policy | expand |
> On 19 Jul 2022, at 18:16, Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> wrote: > > The lockdown LSM is primarily used in conjunction with UEFI Secure Boot. > This LSM may also be used on machines without UEFI. It can also be enabled > when UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. One of lockdown's features is to prevent > kexec from loading untrusted kernels. Lockdown can be enabled through a > bootparam or after the kernel has booted through securityfs. > > If IMA appraisal is used with the "ima_appraise=log" boot param, > lockdown can be defeated with kexec on any machine when Secure Boot is > disabled or unavailable. IMA prevents setting "ima_appraise=log" > from the boot param when Secure Boot is enabled, but this does not cover > cases where lockdown is used without Secure Boot. > > To defeat lockdown, boot without Secure Boot and add ima_appraise=log > to the kernel command line; then: > > $ echo "integrity" > /sys/kernel/security/lockdown > $ echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" > \ > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy > $ kexec -ls unsigned-kernel > > Add a call to verify ima appraisal is set to "enforce" whenever lockdown > is enabled. This fixes CVE-2022-21505. > > Fixes: 29d3c1c8dfe7 ("kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down") > Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> > Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: John Haxby <john.haxby@oracle.com> > --- > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 ++++ > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index 73917413365b..a8802b8da946 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -2247,6 +2247,10 @@ bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id) > if (id >= READING_MAX_ID) > return false; > > + if (id == READING_KEXEC_IMAGE && !(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) > + && security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC)) > + return false; > + > func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK; > > rcu_read_lock(); > -- > 2.27.0 > >
On Tue, Jul 19, 2022 at 01:16:47PM -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote: > The lockdown LSM is primarily used in conjunction with UEFI Secure Boot. > This LSM may also be used on machines without UEFI. It can also be enabled > when UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. One of lockdown's features is to prevent > kexec from loading untrusted kernels. Lockdown can be enabled through a > bootparam or after the kernel has booted through securityfs. > > If IMA appraisal is used with the "ima_appraise=log" boot param, > lockdown can be defeated with kexec on any machine when Secure Boot is > disabled or unavailable. IMA prevents setting "ima_appraise=log" > from the boot param when Secure Boot is enabled, but this does not cover > cases where lockdown is used without Secure Boot. > > To defeat lockdown, boot without Secure Boot and add ima_appraise=log > to the kernel command line; then: > > $ echo "integrity" > /sys/kernel/security/lockdown > $ echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" > \ > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy > $ kexec -ls unsigned-kernel > > Add a call to verify ima appraisal is set to "enforce" whenever lockdown > is enabled. This fixes CVE-2022-21505. > > Fixes: 29d3c1c8dfe7 ("kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down") > Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> > Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> > --- > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 ++++ > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index 73917413365b..a8802b8da946 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -2247,6 +2247,10 @@ bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id) > if (id >= READING_MAX_ID) > return false; > > + if (id == READING_KEXEC_IMAGE && !(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) > + && security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC)) > + return false; > + > func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK; > > rcu_read_lock(); > -- > 2.27.0 > <formletter> This is not the correct way to submit patches for inclusion in the stable kernel tree. Please read: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/stable-kernel-rules.html for how to do this properly. </formletter>
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 73917413365b..a8802b8da946 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -2247,6 +2247,10 @@ bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id) if (id >= READING_MAX_ID) return false; + if (id == READING_KEXEC_IMAGE && !(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) + && security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC)) + return false; + func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK; rcu_read_lock();
The lockdown LSM is primarily used in conjunction with UEFI Secure Boot. This LSM may also be used on machines without UEFI. It can also be enabled when UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. One of lockdown's features is to prevent kexec from loading untrusted kernels. Lockdown can be enabled through a bootparam or after the kernel has booted through securityfs. If IMA appraisal is used with the "ima_appraise=log" boot param, lockdown can be defeated with kexec on any machine when Secure Boot is disabled or unavailable. IMA prevents setting "ima_appraise=log" from the boot param when Secure Boot is enabled, but this does not cover cases where lockdown is used without Secure Boot. To defeat lockdown, boot without Secure Boot and add ima_appraise=log to the kernel command line; then: $ echo "integrity" > /sys/kernel/security/lockdown $ echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" > \ /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy $ kexec -ls unsigned-kernel Add a call to verify ima appraisal is set to "enforce" whenever lockdown is enabled. This fixes CVE-2022-21505. Fixes: 29d3c1c8dfe7 ("kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down") Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)