From patchwork Thu May 23 21:25:05 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 13672290 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C9437129E8F; Thu, 23 May 2024 21:25:42 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1716499542; cv=none; b=mYkQv2H1A9k7xyaPYWkwlLl9H1wLXQzpVI78Wx0rnUXBP0FHwfZxcgva7zXmQbbP8eyw/vfAiFBKRIxvdrxODvLcS3vVQwzOkJeKC2tC36sJYOAjGxOGGa3VIGhqImXgo217yMahiFL3WSSe5OiZRT1pu5J4M/T/SWFTiZsfDXc= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1716499542; c=relaxed/simple; bh=bwx46fyxi21f4lcvrvEJTqeSya2jS+B+m4IM+zxLp1E=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=h+aY1VY6MywZ3NbYMzoTMHc45LpiwTXBKtZJU5ItEhl4s5GHEsSYNfGfeHnbcvSobsf5mSowdrkCPAFrGa/meAYwmRo9rJ0EYVQiFmOVOkSab6PhNsbi3e0hjfCCo/lJeuOdz4ZE6pDW0X+sCyANX4aIVLpArIQPQtHDo2gHJGI= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=Dqz8ifPL; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Dqz8ifPL" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 06DF3C2BD10; Thu, 23 May 2024 21:25:41 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1716499542; bh=bwx46fyxi21f4lcvrvEJTqeSya2jS+B+m4IM+zxLp1E=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Dqz8ifPLdAC3GfGmk+iFUDIJYQqDFZKz/rHwVow7krDMeCSi92Z3jvuJnR5ceYxj1 DHv9R1+hOfYxsGuV2ZrmOaE5rD+6NiD8KJS9yfkSS3sJJ+vILaZbFZgDwlUHjdIxu0 vDvImru48Z+xuT0jf2SFL5Ykhy4ujTInzztBw6VIVopGF53MjuECGB4hFB1tqmco+y oMr9tmZO7Bp55qDHTzprKeGKMCCC/vXLP1eym3eRqKoMJmEXhfbrLK1srcUCASIKdk oUulJ0Ow1p2ZXao4JBOuFtARibYlFAOJEZp542NuhQ7lWf8G1ouQHviuYtQVUos4gv Ry3+u3YepTBvg== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Herbert Xu Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Andreas.Fuchs@infineon.com, James Prestwood , David Woodhouse , Eric Biggers , James Bottomley , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , "David S. Miller" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list), Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM) Subject: [PATCH v5 4/5] tpm: tpm2_key: Extend parser to TPM_LoadableKey Date: Fri, 24 May 2024 00:25:05 +0300 Message-ID: <20240523212515.4875-5-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.45.1 In-Reply-To: <20240523212515.4875-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20240523212515.4875-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Extend parser to TPM_LoadableKey. Add field for oid to struct tpm2_key so that callers can differentiate different key types. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v3: * Fixup klog messages: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/SN7PR18MB53140F4341BC441C1C11586EE3EA2@SN7PR18MB5314.namprd18.prod.outlook.com/ --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2_key.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- include/crypto/tpm2_key.h | 2 ++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2_key.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2_key.c index 7662b2cb85bf..b5c07288eff5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2_key.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2_key.c @@ -32,16 +32,23 @@ int tpm2_key_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen, const void *value, size_t vlen) { enum OID oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); - - if (oid != OID_TPMSealedData) { + struct tpm2_key *key = context; + + switch (oid) { + case OID_TPMSealedData: + pr_debug("TPMSealedData\n"); + break; + case OID_TPMLoadableKey: + pr_debug("TPMLodableKey\n"); + break; + default: char buffer[50]; - sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); - pr_debug("OID is \"%s\" which is not TPMSealedData\n", - buffer); + pr_debug("Unknown OID \"%s\"\n", buffer); return -EINVAL; } + key->oid = oid; return 0; } diff --git a/include/crypto/tpm2_key.h b/include/crypto/tpm2_key.h index acf41b2e0c92..2d2434233000 100644 --- a/include/crypto/tpm2_key.h +++ b/include/crypto/tpm2_key.h @@ -2,12 +2,14 @@ #ifndef __LINUX_TPM2_KEY_H__ #define __LINUX_TPM2_KEY_H__ +#include #include /* * TPM2 ASN.1 key */ struct tpm2_key { + enum OID oid; u32 parent; const u8 *blob; u32 blob_len; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index e0bd1a2fc2ca..5b4555dd13e5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -303,6 +303,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, payload->old_format = 1; } else { blob = key.blob; + if (key.oid != OID_TPMSealedData) { + tpm2_key_destroy(&key); + return -EINVAL; + } } if (!blob)