tpm: Remove illict WARN's from tpm2-sessions.c

Commit Message

Jarkko Sakkinen May 29, 2024, 3:38 p.m. UTC

Sprinkling all over the place is just plain wrong so drop all of them
before the TPM bus encryption feature hits a release.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[e-mail]/
Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[e-mail]>
---
I have had to literally fight for so many other cosmetic things such as
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/[e-mail]/T/#u
so that I must have missed this. 

If I contribute to any subsystem, I just plain do all that is asked,
no questions asked. Only reason I left a review unaddressed is when
I see some intersection with the architecture.

And lastly, not introducing new WARN's should be dead obvious, unless
per-WARN explicitly reasoned in the commit message near to the level
that it could be proven at court. Unless this care, I will simply not
review patch with something like this embedded.
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

Patch

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index 907ac9956a78..371cf28a2b6a 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@  void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 		/* we're not the first session */
 		len = get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[auth->session]);
 		if (4 + len + auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
-			WARN(1, "session length mismatch, cannot append");
+			pr_warn("tpm: session length mismatch, cannot append");
 			return;
 		}
 
@@ -644,8 +644,10 @@  void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 		dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n");
 		return;
 	}
-	WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf),
-	     "name added in wrong place\n");
+	if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
+		pr_warn("tpm: name added in wrong place\n");
+		return;
+	}
 	tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
 	auth->session += 4;
 
@@ -706,8 +708,8 @@  int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 	int parm_len, len, i, handles;
 
 	if (auth->session >= TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
-		WARN(1, "tpm session not filled correctly\n");
-		goto out;
+		pr_warn("tpm session not filled correctly\n");
+		return;
 	}
 
 	if (rc != 0)