From patchwork Thu Jul 11 11:18:53 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Xu Kuohai X-Patchwork-Id: 13730490 Received: from dggsgout11.his.huawei.com (dggsgout11.his.huawei.com [45.249.212.51]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 635D415CD60; Thu, 11 Jul 2024 11:14:00 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=45.249.212.51 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1720696442; cv=none; b=CoxrBPdtlHZ1fs1K8TdigvkdVAJ3y/aqjAPdSYP5lLKJlQPWC2QlQCmCTJlW+7pblTqDst+9ksHDBsoX074sQRQeaig8tSai3ri+T2IYaCjjM2cOzhWY3NXUp2esBziyG4j4J38rMIbDCGhM6GxE6y/dkeBKXKDmzGqIbn4w+44= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1720696442; c=relaxed/simple; bh=4bixJwGuTWgSqOvL6zwccNF+B7ZssgQCR776AYlaV+M=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=Qsi8POpOA004fBnWVw3B93FheoRkkXHq9njUEyjYtTq1fhcCsJT5B5g9t8pAlVAc9jhjUtskP/cYcmifBAGkC7AGtE16hiYycKnqgPuhvwTtYVTP0/L+P/GVxd7iHFTe4CY4VQSZiHPYCF82urM8qkXFbTZfrZTZ4zYyHmWRjIw= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=huaweicloud.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=huaweicloud.com; arc=none smtp.client-ip=45.249.212.51 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=huaweicloud.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=huaweicloud.com Received: from mail.maildlp.com (unknown [172.19.163.216]) by dggsgout11.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4WKXCx55ZQz4f3kK5; Thu, 11 Jul 2024 19:13:49 +0800 (CST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [10.116.40.128]) by mail.maildlp.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 59B001A0170; Thu, 11 Jul 2024 19:13:57 +0800 (CST) Received: from k01.huawei.com (unknown [10.67.174.197]) by APP4 (Coremail) with SMTP id gCh0CgCHjPVxvo9mulQgBw--.25300S7; Thu, 11 Jul 2024 19:13:56 +0800 (CST) From: Xu Kuohai To: bpf@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: Alexei Starovoitov , Andrii Nakryiko , Daniel Borkmann , Martin KaFai Lau , Eduard Zingerman , Song Liu , Yonghong Song , John Fastabend , KP Singh , Stanislav Fomichev , Hao Luo , Jiri Olsa , Matt Bobrowski , Brendan Jackman , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Khadija Kamran , Casey Schaufler , Ondrej Mosnacek , Kees Cook , John Johansen , Lukas Bulwahn , Roberto Sassu , Shung-Hsi Yu , Edward Cree , Alexander Viro , Christian Brauner , Trond Myklebust , Anna Schumaker , Eric Dumazet , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni , Stephen Smalley Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v4 05/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_copy_up_xattr Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2024 19:18:53 +0800 Message-Id: <20240711111908.3817636-6-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: <20240711111908.3817636-1-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240711111908.3817636-1-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: gCh0CgCHjPVxvo9mulQgBw--.25300S7 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxAw1kXF4DJFWkXFWrJF1fJFb_yoWruw4fpa 1Dtan2qr1rJFy7ZFykJF47ua1F93yfGFWUCa9xuw12yFZ3Xrn3Wryayr12gr45Wry8JF4k tanFvrs8C3WYy3DanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBqb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW7JVWDJwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_GcCE3s1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E 14v26rxl6s0DM2AIxVAIcxkEcVAq07x20xvEncxIr21l5I8CrVACY4xI64kE6c02F40Ex7 xfMcIj6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r1j6r18McIj6I8E87Iv67AKxVWUJVW8JwAm72CE4IkC6x0Y z7v_Jr0_Gr1lF7xvr2IYc2Ij64vIr41lFIxGxcIEc7CjxVA2Y2ka0xkIwI1l42xK82IYc2 Ij64vIr41l4I8I3I0E4IkC6x0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lx2IqxVAqx4xG67AKxVWUJVWUGwC20s02 6x8GjcxK67AKxVWUGVWUWwC2zVAF1VAY17CE14v26rWY6r4UJwCIc40Y0x0EwIxGrwCI42 IY6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r1I6r4UMIIF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UMIIF 0xvE42xK8VAvwI8IcIk0rVWUJVWUCwCI42IY6I8E87Iv67AKxVWUJVW8JwCI42IY6I8E87 Iv6xkF7I0E14v26r4UJVWxJrUvcSsGvfC2KfnxnUUI43ZEXa7IU13l1DUUUUU== X-CM-SenderInfo: 50xn30hkdlqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/ From: Xu Kuohai To be consistent with most LSM hooks, convert the return value of hook inode_copy_up_xattr to 0 or a negative error code. Before: - Hook inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 when accepting xattr, 1 when discarding xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know xattr, or any other negative error code otherwise. After: - Hook inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 when accepting xattr, *-ECANCELED* when discarding xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know xattr, or any other negative error code otherwise. Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai --- fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 6 +++--- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 2 +- security/security.c | 12 ++++++------ security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++-- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 +++--- 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c index a5ef2005a2cc..337a5be99ac9 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c @@ -115,12 +115,12 @@ int ovl_copy_xattr(struct super_block *sb, const struct path *oldpath, struct de continue; error = security_inode_copy_up_xattr(old, name); - if (error < 0 && error != -EOPNOTSUPP) - break; - if (error == 1) { + if (error == -ECANCELED) { error = 0; continue; /* Discard */ } + if (error < 0 && error != -EOPNOTSUPP) + break; if (is_posix_acl_xattr(name)) { error = ovl_copy_acl(OVL_FS(sb), oldpath, new, name); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 62fe66dd53ce..6924ed508ebd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -1000,7 +1000,7 @@ static int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *name) case EVM_XATTR_HMAC: case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: default: - rc = 1; /* discard */ + rc = -ECANCELED; /* discard */ } kfree(xattr_data); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 26eea8f4cd74..12215ca286af 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2675,18 +2675,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up); * lower layer to the union/overlay layer. The caller is responsible for * reading and writing the xattrs, this hook is merely a filter. * - * Return: Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP - * if the security module does not know about attribute, or a negative - * error code to abort the copy up. + * Return: Returns 0 to accept the xattr, -ECANCELED to discard the xattr, + * -EOPNOTSUPP if the security module does not know about attribute, + * or a negative error code to abort the copy up. */ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *name) { int rc; /* - * The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), 1 (discard the - * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or - * any other error code in case of an error. + * The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), -ECANCELED + * (discard the xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything + * about the xattr or any other error code in case of an error. */ rc = call_int_hook(inode_copy_up_xattr, src, name); if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr)) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 5dedd3917d57..f9a6637dfd78 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3528,8 +3528,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) * xattrs up. Instead, filter out SELinux-related xattrs following * policy load. */ - if (selinux_initialized() && strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0) - return 1; /* Discard */ + if (selinux_initialized() && !strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) + return -ECANCELED; /* Discard */ /* * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported * by selinux. diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 6f73906bf7ea..ae8f1c2d0ca6 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -4893,10 +4893,10 @@ static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new) static int smack_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *name) { /* - * Return 1 if this is the smack access Smack attribute. + * Return -ECANCELED if this is the smack access Smack attribute. */ - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) - return 1; + if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK)) + return -ECANCELED; return -EOPNOTSUPP; }