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Hermes SMTP Server) with ESMTPA ID a7e77129a0d9b2a8b8a48f1f6322a7dc; Wed, 09 Oct 2024 17:34:09 +0000 (UTC) From: Casey Schaufler To: casey@schaufler-ca.com, paul@paul-moore.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, mic@digikod.net, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, audit@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v4 07/13] LSM: Use lsm_prop in security_current_getsecid Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2024 10:32:15 -0700 Message-ID: <20241009173222.12219-8-casey@schaufler-ca.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.46.0 In-Reply-To: <20241009173222.12219-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> References: <20241009173222.12219-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Change the security_current_getsecid_subj() and security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in a lsm_prop structure instead of a u32 secid. Audit interfaces will need to collect all possible security data for possible reporting. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 6 +-- include/linux/security.h | 13 +++--- kernel/audit.c | 11 +++-- kernel/auditfilter.c | 3 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 22 ++++++---- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 ++- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 ++- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 20 ++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 +-- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 6 +-- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 59 ++++++++++++++------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 +++---- security/security.c | 28 ++++++------- security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 +++++--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 25 +++++++----- 16 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 108 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 6ef2a345ea03..8a90fd9ff3c8 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -235,9 +235,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_fix_setgroups, struct cred *new, const struct cred * old) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setpgid, struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getpgid, struct task_struct *p) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getsid, struct task_struct *p) -LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, current_getsecid_subj, u32 *secid) -LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_obj, - struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, current_getlsmprop_subj, struct lsm_prop *prop) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getlsmprop_obj, + struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setnice, struct task_struct *p, int nice) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setioprio, struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getioprio, struct task_struct *p) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 15aef5f68e77..9bc8153f4e8b 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -507,8 +507,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p); int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p); -void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid); -void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); +void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop); +void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop); int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice); int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio); int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p); @@ -1305,14 +1305,15 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) return 0; } -static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) +static inline void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop) { - *secid = 0; + lsmprop_init(prop); } -static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +static inline void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, + struct lsm_prop *prop) { - *secid = 0; + lsmprop_init(prop); } static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 47c41e6f9ea9..d2797e8fe182 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -2179,16 +2179,16 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key) int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) { + struct lsm_prop prop; char *ctx = NULL; unsigned len; int error; - u32 sid; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid); - if (!sid) + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + if (!lsmprop_is_set(&prop)) return 0; - error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len); + error = security_lsmprop_to_secctx(&prop, &ctx, &len); if (error) { if (error != -EINVAL) goto error_path; @@ -2405,8 +2405,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; - /* scaffolding */ - security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_sig_lsm.scaffold.secid); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&audit_sig_lsm); } return audit_signal_info_syscall(t); diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 288a2092fd0d..a7de3dabe6e1 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1371,8 +1371,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: if (f->lsm_rule) { /* scaffolding */ - security_current_getsecid_subj( - &prop.scaffold.secid); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); result = security_audit_rule_match( &prop, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 5019eb32a97f..6b2b2a8d5647 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -470,7 +470,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, { const struct cred *cred; int i, need_sid = 1; - u32 sid; struct lsm_prop prop = { }; unsigned int sessionid; @@ -675,15 +674,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, * fork()/copy_process() in which case * the new @tsk creds are still a dup * of @current's creds so we can still - * use security_current_getsecid_subj() + * use + * security_current_getlsmprop_subj() * here even though it always refs * @current's creds */ - security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); need_sid = 0; } - /* scaffolding */ - prop.scaffold.secid = sid; result = security_audit_rule_match(&prop, f->type, f->op, @@ -2730,12 +2728,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) { struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); + struct lsm_prop prop; context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t); context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); context->target_uid = task_uid(t); context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid); + security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &prop); + /* scaffolding */ + context->target_sid = prop.scaffold.secid; memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); } @@ -2751,6 +2752,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t); + struct lsm_prop prop; if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) return 0; @@ -2762,7 +2764,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid); + security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &prop); + /* scaffolding */ + ctx->target_sid = prop.scaffold.secid; memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); return 0; } @@ -2783,7 +2787,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); + security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &prop); + /* scaffolding */ + axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = prop.scaffold.secid; memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); axp->pid_count++; diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c index 9996883bf2b7..5925f48a3ade 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c @@ -1534,11 +1534,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void) int ret_val; struct netlbl_dom_map *entry; struct netlbl_audit audit_info; + struct lsm_prop prop; /* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */ - security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info.secid); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + /* scaffolding */ + audit_info.secid = prop.scaffold.secid; audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; audit_info.sessionid = 0; diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h index d6c5b31eb4eb..39f4f6df5f51 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h @@ -32,7 +32,11 @@ */ static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { - security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info->secid); + struct lsm_prop prop; + + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + /* scaffolding */ + audit_info->secid = prop.scaffold.secid; audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index a58b72ed246c..6331bcb35ec0 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -982,17 +982,24 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) return; } -static void apparmor_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) +static void apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop) { struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); - *secid = label->secid; + + prop->apparmor.label = label; + /* scaffolding */ + prop->scaffold.secid = label->secid; __end_current_label_crit_section(label); } -static void apparmor_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +static void apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, + struct lsm_prop *prop) { struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p); - *secid = label->secid; + + prop->apparmor.label = label; + /* scaffolding */ + prop->scaffold.secid = label->secid; aa_put_label(label); } @@ -1503,8 +1510,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, apparmor_current_getsecid_subj), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid_obj), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, + apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill), LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, apparmor_userns_create), diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index cdfe8c8c7bac..c0d3b716d11f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {} /* LIM API function definitions */ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos); @@ -400,8 +400,8 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename); /* IMA policy related functions */ int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, - int mask, int flags, int *pcr, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, + enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos); void ima_init_policy(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 984e861f6e33..c35ea613c9f8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate - * @secid: secid of the task being validated + * @prop: properties of the task being validated * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC, * MAY_APPEND) * @func: caller identifier @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * */ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos) @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, flags &= ima_policy_flag; - return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, secid, func, mask, + return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, prop, func, mask, flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data, allowed_algos); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 656c709b974f..884a3533f7af 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -73,13 +73,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; if (!ima_appraise) return 0; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, current_cred(), secid, + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, current_cred(), &prop, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 06132cf47016..553a6f54a1e2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ static void ima_file_free(struct file *file) } static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, - u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, - enum ima_hooks func) + struct lsm_prop *prop, char *buf, loff_t size, + int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { struct inode *real_inode, *inode = file_inode(file); struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL; @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. * Included is the appraise submask. */ - action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, secid, + action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, prop, mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL, &allowed_algos); violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK || @@ -443,23 +443,23 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; int ret; if (!file) return 0; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); if (reqprot & PROT_EXEC) { - ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, + ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT); if (ret) return ret; } if (prot & PROT_EXEC) - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); return 0; @@ -488,9 +488,9 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, char *pathbuf = NULL; const char *pathname = NULL; struct inode *inode; + struct lsm_prop prop; int result = 0; int action; - u32 secid; int pcr; /* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */ @@ -498,13 +498,13 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) return 0; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file); action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode, - current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, + current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL); action |= ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode, - current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, + current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT, &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL); @@ -542,15 +542,18 @@ static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int ret; u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop = { }; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), + &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) return ret; security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid); - return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0, + /* scaffolding */ + prop.scaffold.secid = secid; + return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); } @@ -566,10 +569,10 @@ static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); } @@ -768,7 +771,7 @@ static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, bool contents) { enum ima_hooks func; - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; /* * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the @@ -788,9 +791,9 @@ static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, /* Read entire file for all partial reads. */ func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, - 0, MAY_READ, func); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0, + MAY_READ, func); } const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { @@ -818,7 +821,7 @@ static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { enum ima_hooks func; - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; /* permit signed certs */ if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) @@ -831,8 +834,8 @@ static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, } func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, buf, size, MAY_READ, func); } @@ -967,7 +970,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]; int violation = 0; int action = 0; - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len) return -EINVAL; @@ -990,9 +993,9 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * buffer measurements. */ if (func) { - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); action = ima_get_action(idmap, inode, current_cred(), - secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template, + &prop, 0, func, &pcr, &template, func_data, NULL); if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest) return -ENOENT; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 22a62e675ebc..a96dc3ff6aa0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from * @inode: a pointer to an inode * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation - * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated + * @prop: LSM properties of the task to be validated * @func: LIM hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL @@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, - u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, + struct lsm_prop *prop, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, const char *func_data) { int i; @@ -658,8 +658,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - /* scaffolding */ - prop.scaffold.secid = secid; rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&prop, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule); @@ -723,7 +721,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is * being made - * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated + * @prop: LSM properties of the task to be validated * @func: IMA hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @flags: IMA actions to consider (e.g. IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE) @@ -740,8 +738,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. */ int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, - int mask, int flags, int *pcr, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, + enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos) { @@ -759,7 +757,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, if (!(entry->action & actmask)) continue; - if (!ima_match_rules(entry, idmap, inode, cred, secid, + if (!ima_match_rules(entry, idmap, inode, cred, prop, func, mask, func_data)) continue; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index f269421c2d72..5cdb5b171ff2 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -3492,33 +3492,33 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) } /** - * security_current_getsecid_subj() - Get the current task's subjective secid - * @secid: secid value + * security_current_getlsmprop_subj() - Current task's subjective LSM data + * @prop: lsm specific information * * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the current task and return - * it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. + * it in @prop. */ -void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) +void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop) { - *secid = 0; - call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid); + lsmprop_init(prop); + call_void_hook(current_getlsmprop_subj, prop); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getlsmprop_subj); /** - * security_task_getsecid_obj() - Get a task's objective secid + * security_task_getlsmprop_obj() - Get a task's objective LSM data * @p: target task - * @secid: secid value + * @prop: lsm specific information * * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p and - * return it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. + * return it in @prop. */ -void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop) { - *secid = 0; - call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid); + lsmprop_init(prop); + call_void_hook(task_getlsmprop_obj, p, prop); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getlsmprop_obj); /** * security_task_setnice() - Check if setting a task's nice value is allowed diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 1d43367009ed..7d6ffd3483a8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4169,14 +4169,19 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL); } -static void selinux_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) +static void selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop) { - *secid = current_sid(); + prop->selinux.secid = current_sid(); + /* scaffolding */ + prop->scaffold.secid = prop->selinux.secid; } -static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +static void selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, + struct lsm_prop *prop) { - *secid = task_sid_obj(p); + prop->selinux.secid = task_sid_obj(p); + /* scaffolding */ + prop->scaffold.secid = prop->selinux.secid; } static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) @@ -7203,8 +7208,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, selinux_current_getsecid_subj), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio), diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index fed44b4fc73d..e74e22c4232f 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2239,30 +2239,35 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) } /** - * smack_current_getsecid_subj - get the subjective secid of the current task - * @secid: where to put the result + * smack_current_getlsmprop_subj - get the subjective secid of the current task + * @prop: where to put the result * * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's subjective smack label. */ -static void smack_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) +static void smack_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop) { struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); - *secid = skp->smk_secid; + prop->smack.skp = skp; + /* scaffolding */ + prop->scaffold.secid = skp->smk_secid; } /** - * smack_task_getsecid_obj - get the objective secid of the task + * smack_task_getlsmprop_obj - get the objective data of the task * @p: the task - * @secid: where to put the result + * @prop: where to put the result * * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's objective smack label. */ -static void smack_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +static void smack_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, + struct lsm_prop *prop) { struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p); - *secid = skp->smk_secid; + prop->smack.skp = skp; + /* scaffolding */ + prop->scaffold.secid = skp->smk_secid; } /** @@ -5130,8 +5135,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, smack_current_getsecid_subj), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, smack_task_getsecid_obj), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, smack_current_getlsmprop_subj), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, smack_task_getlsmprop_obj), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),