Message ID | 378d956adfa3be2a6d95a71391b4bb2f7458ada3.1641555875.git.msuchanek@suse.de (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
Series | KEXEC_SIG with appended signature | expand |
Hi Michal, Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve: [auto build test ERROR on powerpc/next] [also build test ERROR on s390/features linus/master jeyu/modules-next v5.16-rc8 next-20220106] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch] url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Michal-Suchanek/KEXEC_SIG-with-appended-signature/20220107-195818 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux.git next config: hexagon-randconfig-r016-20220107 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220108/202201080202.yy2w2Wmg-lkp@intel.com/config) compiler: clang version 14.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project f3a344d2125fa37e59bae1b0874442c650a19607) reproduce (this is a W=1 build): wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross # https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/c59400c94a653abe5a5fbfd5bc166bd3ac1ebb41 git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux git fetch --no-tags linux-review Michal-Suchanek/KEXEC_SIG-with-appended-signature/20220107-195818 git checkout c59400c94a653abe5a5fbfd5bc166bd3ac1ebb41 # save the config file to linux build tree mkdir build_dir COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=hexagon SHELL=/bin/bash If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> All errors (new ones prefixed by >>): >> kernel/module.c:2898:40: error: incompatible pointer types passing 'unsigned long *' to parameter of type 'size_t *' (aka 'unsigned int *') [-Werror,-Wincompatible-pointer-types] err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len, ^~~~~~~~~~ include/linux/verification.h:63:57: note: passing argument to parameter 'len' here int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len, struct key *trusted_keys, ^ kernel/module.c:4804:6: warning: no previous prototype for function 'module_layout' [-Wmissing-prototypes] void module_layout(struct module *mod, ^ kernel/module.c:4804:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit void module_layout(struct module *mod, ^ static 1 warning and 1 error generated. vim +2898 kernel/module.c 2880 2881 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG 2882 static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) 2883 { 2884 int err = -ENODATA; 2885 const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; 2886 const char *reason; 2887 const void *mod = info->hdr; 2888 2889 /* 2890 * Require flags == 0, as a module with version information 2891 * removed is no longer the module that was signed 2892 */ 2893 if (flags == 0 && 2894 info->len > markerlen && 2895 memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) { 2896 /* We truncate the module to discard the signature */ 2897 info->len -= markerlen; > 2898 err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len, 2899 VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module"); 2900 if (!err) { 2901 info->sig_ok = true; 2902 return 0; 2903 } 2904 } 2905 2906 /* 2907 * We don't permit modules to be loaded into the trusted kernels 2908 * without a valid signature on them, but if we're not enforcing, 2909 * certain errors are non-fatal. 2910 */ 2911 switch (err) { 2912 case -ENODATA: 2913 reason = "unsigned module"; 2914 break; 2915 case -ENOPKG: 2916 reason = "module with unsupported crypto"; 2917 break; 2918 case -ENOKEY: 2919 reason = "module with unavailable key"; 2920 break; 2921 2922 default: 2923 /* 2924 * All other errors are fatal, including lack of memory, 2925 * unparseable signatures, and signature check failures -- 2926 * even if signatures aren't required. 2927 */ 2928 return err; 2929 } 2930 2931 if (is_module_sig_enforced()) { 2932 pr_notice("Loading of %s is rejected\n", reason); 2933 return -EKEYREJECTED; 2934 } 2935 2936 return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE); 2937 } 2938 #else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ 2939 static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) 2940 { 2941 return 0; 2942 } 2943 #endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ 2944 --- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org
Hi Michal, Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve: [auto build test ERROR on powerpc/next] [also build test ERROR on s390/features linus/master jeyu/modules-next v5.16-rc8 next-20220107] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch] url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Michal-Suchanek/KEXEC_SIG-with-appended-signature/20220107-195818 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux.git next config: arc-randconfig-r043-20220107 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220108/202201082218.opQ7qKfJ-lkp@intel.com/config) compiler: arceb-elf-gcc (GCC) 11.2.0 reproduce (this is a W=1 build): wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross # https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/c59400c94a653abe5a5fbfd5bc166bd3ac1ebb41 git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux git fetch --no-tags linux-review Michal-Suchanek/KEXEC_SIG-with-appended-signature/20220107-195818 git checkout c59400c94a653abe5a5fbfd5bc166bd3ac1ebb41 # save the config file to linux build tree mkdir build_dir COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-11.2.0 make.cross O=build_dir ARCH=arc SHELL=/bin/bash If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> All errors (new ones prefixed by >>): kernel/module.c: In function 'module_sig_check': >> kernel/module.c:2898:54: error: passing argument 2 of 'verify_appended_signature' from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types] 2898 | err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len, | ^~~~~~~~~~ | | | long unsigned int * In file included from kernel/module.c:60: include/linux/verification.h:63:57: note: expected 'size_t *' {aka 'unsigned int *'} but argument is of type 'long unsigned int *' 63 | int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len, struct key *trusted_keys, | ~~~~~~~~^~~ cc1: some warnings being treated as errors vim +/verify_appended_signature +2898 kernel/module.c 2880 2881 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG 2882 static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) 2883 { 2884 int err = -ENODATA; 2885 const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; 2886 const char *reason; 2887 const void *mod = info->hdr; 2888 2889 /* 2890 * Require flags == 0, as a module with version information 2891 * removed is no longer the module that was signed 2892 */ 2893 if (flags == 0 && 2894 info->len > markerlen && 2895 memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) { 2896 /* We truncate the module to discard the signature */ 2897 info->len -= markerlen; > 2898 err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len, 2899 VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module"); 2900 if (!err) { 2901 info->sig_ok = true; 2902 return 0; 2903 } 2904 } 2905 2906 /* 2907 * We don't permit modules to be loaded into the trusted kernels 2908 * without a valid signature on them, but if we're not enforcing, 2909 * certain errors are non-fatal. 2910 */ 2911 switch (err) { 2912 case -ENODATA: 2913 reason = "unsigned module"; 2914 break; 2915 case -ENOPKG: 2916 reason = "module with unsupported crypto"; 2917 break; 2918 case -ENOKEY: 2919 reason = "module with unavailable key"; 2920 break; 2921 2922 default: 2923 /* 2924 * All other errors are fatal, including lack of memory, 2925 * unparseable signatures, and signature check failures -- 2926 * even if signatures aren't required. 2927 */ 2928 return err; 2929 } 2930 2931 if (is_module_sig_enforced()) { 2932 pr_notice("Loading of %s is rejected\n", reason); 2933 return -EKEYREJECTED; 2934 } 2935 2936 return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE); 2937 } 2938 #else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ 2939 static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) 2940 { 2941 return 0; 2942 } 2943 #endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ 2944 --- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig index 1cde9b6c5987..4092187474ff 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig @@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY config KEXEC_SIG bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" - depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG help This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for the kexec_file_load() syscall. diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c index 98d1cb5135b4..9442666ca69d 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include <linux/of_fdt.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/verification.h> #include <linux/module_signature.h> static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, @@ -153,12 +154,10 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, } #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG -int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) +int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long length) { + size_t kernel_len = length; const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; - struct module_signature *ms; - unsigned long sig_len; - int ret; if (marker_len > kernel_len) return -EKEYREJECTED; @@ -168,19 +167,8 @@ int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) return -EKEYREJECTED; kernel_len -= marker_len; - ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms); - ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec"); - if (ret) - return ret; - - sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len); - kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len; - - return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len, - kernel + kernel_len, sig_len, - VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, - VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, - NULL, NULL); + return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, + "kexec_file"); } #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */ diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig index 2a5bb4f29cfe..cece7152ea35 100644 --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig @@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY config KEXEC_SIG bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" - depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG help This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for the kexec_file_load() syscall. diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c index c944d71316c7..75e0c17cf0eb 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c @@ -26,12 +26,10 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = { }; #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG -int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) +int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long length) { + size_t kernel_len = length; const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; - struct module_signature *ms; - unsigned long sig_len; - int ret; /* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */ if (!ipl_secure_flag) @@ -45,19 +43,8 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) return -EKEYREJECTED; kernel_len -= marker_len; - ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms); - ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec"); - if (ret) - return ret; - - sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len); - kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len; - - return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len, - kernel + kernel_len, sig_len, - VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, - VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, - NULL, NULL); + return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, + "kexec_file"); } #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */ diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h index a655923335ae..c1cf0582012a 100644 --- a/include/linux/verification.h +++ b/include/linux/verification.h @@ -60,5 +60,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, enum key_being_used_for usage); #endif +int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len, struct key *trusted_keys, + const char *what); + #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */ #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */ diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h index 33783abc377b..80461e14bf29 100644 --- a/kernel/module-internal.h +++ b/kernel/module-internal.h @@ -27,5 +27,3 @@ struct load_info { unsigned int sym, str, mod, vers, info, pcpu; } index; }; - -extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info); diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index 84a9141a5e15..8481933dfa92 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ #include <linux/bsearch.h> #include <linux/dynamic_debug.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/verification.h> #include <uapi/linux/module.h> #include "module-internal.h" @@ -2894,7 +2895,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) { /* We truncate the module to discard the signature */ info->len -= markerlen; - err = mod_verify_sig(mod, info); + err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len, + VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module"); if (!err) { info->sig_ok = true; return 0; diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c index 8723ae70ea1f..f492e410564d 100644 --- a/kernel/module_signing.c +++ b/kernel/module_signing.c @@ -14,13 +14,19 @@ #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include "module-internal.h" -/* - * Verify the signature on a module. +/** + * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the + * signature marker stripped. + * @data: The data to be verified + * @len: Size of @data. + * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification + * @what: Informational string for log messages */ -int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info) +int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len, + struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what) { struct module_signature ms; - size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len; + size_t sig_len, modlen = *len; int ret; pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen); @@ -28,18 +34,18 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info) if (modlen <= sizeof(ms)) return -EBADMSG; - memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms)); + memcpy(&ms, data + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms)); - ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "module"); + ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, what); if (ret) return ret; sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len); modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms); - info->len = modlen; + *len = modlen; - return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len, - VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, + return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len, + trusted_keys, VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL); }
Module verification already implements appeded signature verification. Reuse it for kexec_file. Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de> --- v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the dependency on MODULE_SIG_FORMAT to MODULE_SIG - Include linux/verification.h - previously added in earlier patch --- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 22 +++++----------------- arch/s390/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 21 ++++----------------- include/linux/verification.h | 3 +++ kernel/module-internal.h | 2 -- kernel/module.c | 4 +++- kernel/module_signing.c | 24 +++++++++++++++--------- 8 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)