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[173.164.112.133]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id r76sm38658632pfa.39.2019.04.10.09.16.17 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Wed, 10 Apr 2019 09:16:18 -0700 (PDT) From: Kees Cook To: Masahiro Yamada Cc: Kees Cook , Alexander Potapenko , Nick Desaulniers , Kostya Serebryany , Dmitry Vyukov , Sandeep Patil , Laura Abbott , Randy Dunlap , Alexander Popov , Michal Marek , Emese Revfy , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH 2/3] kbuild: Move stackleak config to Kconfig.hardening Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 09:16:11 -0700 Message-Id: <20190410161612.18545-3-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20190410161612.18545-1-keescook@chromium.org> References: <20190410161612.18545-1-keescook@chromium.org> Sender: linux-kbuild-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP This moves the stackleak plugin options to Kconfig.hardening's memory initialization menu. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig | 51 --------------------------------- security/Kconfig.hardening | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig index 01874ef0f883..50cfcf1ed979 100644 --- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig +++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig @@ -107,57 +107,6 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE in structures. This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT at the cost of weakened randomization. -config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK - bool "Erase the kernel stack before returning from syscalls" - depends on GCC_PLUGINS - depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK - help - This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before - returning from system calls. That reduces the information which - kernel stack leak bugs can reveal and blocks some uninitialized - stack variable attacks. - - The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel - compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary - and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload - before deploying it. - - This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: - * https://grsecurity.net/ - * https://pax.grsecurity.net/ - -config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE - int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK" - default 100 - range 0 4096 - depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK - help - The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking - the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes). - It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with - a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter. - If unsure, leave the default value 100. - -config STACKLEAK_METRICS - bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system" - depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK - depends on PROC_FS - help - If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in - the /proc file system. In particular, /proc//stack_depth - shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and - previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it - can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for - your workloads. - -config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE - bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing" - depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK - help - This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in - runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with - CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK. - config GCC_PLUGIN_ARM_SSP_PER_TASK bool depends on GCC_PLUGINS && ARM diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening index 8223a8ab1a12..9942d9869864 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening @@ -89,6 +89,63 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings. +config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + bool "Poison kernel stack before returning from syscalls" + depends on GCC_PLUGINS + depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK + help + This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before + returning from system calls. This has the effect of leaving + the stack initialized to the poison value, which both reduces + the lifetime of any sensitive stack contents and reduces + potential for uninitialized stack variable exploits or information + exposures (it does not cover functions reaching the same stack + depth as prior functions during the same syscall). This blocks + most uninitialized stack variable attacks, with the performance + impact being driven by the depth of the stack usage, rather than + the function calling complexity. + + The performance impact on a single CPU system kernel compilation + sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you + are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before + deploying it. + + This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: + * https://grsecurity.net/ + * https://pax.grsecurity.net/ + +config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE + int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK" + default 100 + range 0 4096 + depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + help + The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking + the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes). + It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with + a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter. + If unsure, leave the default value 100. + +config STACKLEAK_METRICS + bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system" + depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + depends on PROC_FS + help + If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in + the /proc file system. In particular, /proc//stack_depth + shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and + previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it + can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for + your workloads. + +config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE + bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing" + depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + help + This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in + runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with + CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK. + endmenu endmenu