diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 48abe1a281f2..36a28c132133 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -11304,8 +11304,10 @@ S:	Supported
 T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git for-next/hardening
 F:	Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count
 F:	Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count
+F:	arch/*/configs/hardening.config
 F:	include/linux/overflow.h
 F:	include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
+F:	kernel/configs/hardening.config
 F:	mm/usercopy.c
 K:	\b(add|choose)_random_kstack_offset\b
 K:	\b__check_(object_size|heap_object)\b
diff --git a/arch/arm/configs/hardening.config b/arch/arm/configs/hardening.config
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..327349ce6377
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm/configs/hardening.config
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Basic kernel hardening options (specific to arm)
+
+# Make sure PXN/PAN emulation is enabled.
+CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN=y
+
+# Dangerous; old interfaces and needless additional attack surface.
+# CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT is not set
diff --git a/arch/arm64/configs/hardening.config b/arch/arm64/configs/hardening.config
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b0e795208998
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm64/configs/hardening.config
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Basic kernel hardening options (specific to arm64)
+
+# Make sure PAN emulation is enabled.
+CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN=y
+
+# Software Shadow Stack or PAC
+CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK=y
+
+# Pointer authentication (ARMv8.3 and later). If hardware actually supports
+# it, one can turn off CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG with this enabled.
+CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH=y
+CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL=y
+
+# Available in ARMv8.5 and later.
+CONFIG_ARM64_BTI=y
+CONFIG_ARM64_BTI_KERNEL=y
+CONFIG_ARM64_MTE=y
+CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS=y
+CONFIG_ARM64_E0PD=y
+
+# Available in ARMv8.7 and later.
+CONFIG_ARM64_EPAN=y
diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/hardening.config b/arch/x86/configs/hardening.config
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..19bb0c7a7669
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/configs/hardening.config
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Basic kernel hardening options (specific to x86)
+
+# Modern libc no longer needs a fixed-position mapping in userspace, remove
+# it as a possible target.
+CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE=y
+
+# Enable chip-specific IOMMU support.
+CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU=y
+CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU_DEFAULT_ON=y
+CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU_SVM=y
+CONFIG_AMD_IOMMU=y
+CONFIG_AMD_IOMMU_V2=y
+
+# Enable CET Shadow Stack for userspace.
+CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK=y
diff --git a/kernel/configs/hardening.config b/kernel/configs/hardening.config
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..dbeecdfca917
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/configs/hardening.config
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+# Basic kernel hardening options
+#
+# These are considered the basic kernel hardening, self-protection, and
+# attack surface reduction options. They are expected to have low (or
+# no) performance impact on most workloads, and have a reasonable level
+# of legacy API removals.
+
+# Make sure reporting of various hardening actions is possible.
+CONFIG_BUG=y
+
+# Basic kernel memory permission enforcement.
+CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX=y
+CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=y
+CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y
+
+# Kernel image and memory ASLR.
+CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y
+CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY=y
+
+# Randomize allocator freelists, harden metadata.
+CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y
+CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y
+CONFIG_SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR=y
+CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES=y
+
+# Randomize kernel stack offset on syscall entry.
+CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT=y
+
+# Basic stack frame overflow protection.
+CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y
+CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
+
+# Basic buffer length bounds checking.
+CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y
+CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y
+
+# Basic array index bounds checking.
+CONFIG_UBSAN=y
+CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP=y
+CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS=y
+# CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT is not set
+# CONFIG_UBSAN_DIV_ZERO
+# CONFIG_UBSAN_UNREACHABLE
+# CONFIG_UBSAN_BOOL
+# CONFIG_UBSAN_ENUM
+# CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT
+CONFIG_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL=y
+
+# Linked list integrity checking.
+CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED=y
+
+# Initialize all heap variables to zero on allocation.
+CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON=y
+
+# Initialize all stack variables to zero on function entry.
+CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y
+
+# Wipe all caller-used registers on exit from functions: reduces available
+# ROP gadgets and minimizes stale data in registers usable in side channels.
+CONFIG_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS=y
+
+# Wipe RAM at reboot via EFI. For more details, see:
+# https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-work-group-platform-reset-attack-mitigation-specification/
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1532058
+CONFIG_RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION=y
+
+# Disable DMA between EFI hand-off and the kernel's IOMMU setup.
+CONFIG_EFI_DISABLE_PCI_DMA=y
+
+# Force IOMMU TLB invalidation so devices will never be able to access stale
+# data content.
+CONFIG_IOMMU_SUPPORT=y
+CONFIG_IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT=y
+
+# Do not allow direct physical memory access to non-device memory.
+CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM=y
+CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM=y
+
+# Provide userspace with seccomp BPF API for syscall attack surface reduction.
+CONFIG_SECCOMP=y
+CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER=y
+
+# Provides some protections against SYN flooding.
+CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES=y
+
+# Attack surface reduction: do not autoload TTY line disciplines.
+# CONFIG_LDISC_AUTOLOAD is not set
+
+# Dangerous; enabling this disables userspace brk ASLR.
+# CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK is not set
+
+# Dangerous; exposes kernel text image layout.
+# CONFIG_PROC_KCORE is not set
+
+# Dangerous; enabling this disables userspace VDSO ASLR.
+# CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO is not set
+
+# Attack surface reduction: Use the modern PTY interface (devpts) only.
+# CONFIG_LEGACY_PTYS is not set
