From patchwork Tue Aug 13 06:09:22 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Knut Omang X-Patchwork-Id: 11091161 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 69C77746 for ; Tue, 13 Aug 2019 06:11:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5A61A28438 for ; Tue, 13 Aug 2019 06:11:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 4E048284CE; Tue, 13 Aug 2019 06:11:57 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, UNPARSEABLE_RELAY autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D9EB028438 for ; Tue, 13 Aug 2019 06:11:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727677AbfHMGLl (ORCPT ); Tue, 13 Aug 2019 02:11:41 -0400 Received: from aserp2120.oracle.com ([141.146.126.78]:59186 "EHLO aserp2120.oracle.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727667AbfHMGLj (ORCPT ); Tue, 13 Aug 2019 02:11:39 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (aserp2120.oracle.com [127.0.0.1]) by aserp2120.oracle.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x7D68qlv039282; Tue, 13 Aug 2019 06:11:20 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=oracle.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id : in-reply-to : references : mime-version : content-transfer-encoding; s=corp-2019-08-05; bh=MkGlaRzfhOaspuCgCSxv0mcumwSprFHBy9GelM51bZI=; b=cXO/RaN4hhWyYwTI/ANiRV7dNU7drhUyZyVr/adYVTkP1RuK4WkzvjLB9Peeg7ZhR9zd PlKH+Ohmmmw/buNLkc0XHTBvHzXjG+42G6e7y806+teV5g8PeHT+wrO6ID+gyTkoAtYo JaawzE9cJ0iYQKE0ozcSThhlM/bhPDG2AKaKKq9mWRr8+e9XQ7nAxAWwMpPTWoKbUr2r bf0qOs8/ata9OtLbulu/KzU+2ImgEgV3qItogvtV1LuSGRg1wuyFCGuVBbYnUcdf5jtR ndz66saasOvb7skjWTuXO9E5FzRxnsVZECSdx1xd/4sC2CzFMHYyqxR8/1IxG7hN/bxF 4A== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=oracle.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id : in-reply-to : references : mime-version : content-transfer-encoding; s=corp-2018-07-02; bh=MkGlaRzfhOaspuCgCSxv0mcumwSprFHBy9GelM51bZI=; b=aCt6nQ319nkZ7IZwz8tkum/s1PGwUPj9v8VbBEz7OnEBWLqoiR8KLw7xTVJHnDwe3uz0 0a+N0xPESPrvVcjL6EQhMDSDwZFZqK7uyIF/7Zia3HC69ziDE9IskQ7m6WBhy4uvpeZC mfL3z4p3+Cet93Ye8wK2yw+lZAMXqRSbkUN+rDW2Fa6Rn+vPjYudlwk186So+3/txj9l ezSK5M4Jdd9h44ur22jRqBGn7SOhpMmhbviGU/zuYhA+KoLfNhaqsEv8d/4JOFY9nhjj dLFzWCXxi0+DLaKXM4bBVpbJE2cWyfZQxidpEenO9lEepn4cnEgvHElgi+f0fkHK8enL Ig== Received: from aserp3030.oracle.com (aserp3030.oracle.com [141.146.126.71]) by aserp2120.oracle.com with ESMTP id 2u9nvp41g6-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 13 Aug 2019 06:11:19 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (aserp3030.oracle.com [127.0.0.1]) by aserp3030.oracle.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x7D67Rqj096715; Tue, 13 Aug 2019 06:11:19 GMT Received: from aserv0121.oracle.com (aserv0121.oracle.com [141.146.126.235]) by aserp3030.oracle.com with ESMTP id 2u9m0aydx7-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 13 Aug 2019 06:11:19 +0000 Received: from abhmp0019.oracle.com (abhmp0019.oracle.com [141.146.116.25]) by aserv0121.oracle.com (8.14.4/8.13.8) with ESMTP id x7D6BIs8026626; Tue, 13 Aug 2019 06:11:18 GMT Received: from abi.no.oracle.com (/10.172.144.123) by default (Oracle Beehive Gateway v4.0) with ESMTP ; Mon, 12 Aug 2019 23:11:17 -0700 From: Knut Omang To: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org, Shuah Khan , Jonathan Corbet , Masahiro Yamada , Michal Marek , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Shreyans Devendra Doshi <0xinfosect0r@gmail.com>, Alan Maguire , Brendan Higgins , Kevin Hilman , Hidenori Yamaji , Frank Rowand , Timothy Bird , Luis Chamberlain , "Theodore Ts'o" , Daniel Vetter , Stephen Boyd , Knut Omang Subject: [RFC 07/19] ktf: Simple coverage support Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2019 08:09:22 +0200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=nai engine=6000 definitions=9347 signatures=668685 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 suspectscore=2 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 mlxscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1906280000 definitions=main-1908130067 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=nai engine=6000 definitions=9347 signatures=668685 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=2 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1906280000 definitions=main-1908130067 Sender: linux-kbuild-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Alan Maguire Allows reports of code coverage and memory allocation. ktf_cov.c: Code coverage support implementation for KTF. ktf_cov.h: Code coverage support interface for KTF. Signed-off-by: Alan Maguire Signed-off-by: Knut Omang --- tools/testing/selftests/ktf/kernel/ktf_cov.c | 690 ++++++++++++++++++++- tools/testing/selftests/ktf/kernel/ktf_cov.h | 94 +++- 2 files changed, 784 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/ktf/kernel/ktf_cov.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/ktf/kernel/ktf_cov.h diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ktf/kernel/ktf_cov.c b/tools/testing/selftests/ktf/kernel/ktf_cov.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f917994 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ktf/kernel/ktf_cov.c @@ -0,0 +1,690 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2009, 2017, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + * Author: Alan Maguire + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + * + * ktf_cov.c: Code coverage support implementation for KTF. + */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef CONFIG_SLUB +#include +#endif /* CONFIG_SLUB */ +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include "ktf.h" +#include "ktf_map.h" +#include "ktf_cov.h" + +/* It may seem odd that we use a refcnt field in ktf_cov_entry structures + * in addition to using krefcount management via the ktf_map. The reasoning + * here is that if we enable and then disable coverage, we do not want to + * purge the entry data as we likely want to examine counts after disabling + * coverage. So the first enable will add entries to the cov_entry map and + * subsequent disable/enables will simply update the entry's refcnt. The + * free function below should only be called therefore from cleanup context + * when the cov entries are finally removed from the cov_entry map. + */ +static void ktf_cov_entry_free(struct ktf_map_elem *elem) +{ + struct ktf_cov_entry *entry = container_of(elem, struct ktf_cov_entry, + kmap); + if (entry->refcnt > 0) + unregister_kprobe(&entry->kprobe); + kfree(entry); +} + +/* Comparison function is subtle. We want to be able to compare key1 + * and key2 here, where key1 may either be an existing object, in which + * case it has an address and size; or it may be an object offset, in which + * case k1's address will be the address with offset of size 0. In both + * cases for the -1 case we can simply check if k1's address is less than + * k2's. For the 1 case, we need to ensure that the address is >= + * k2's address and it's size, since this ensures the address does not + * fall within the object bounds. Finally we are left with the case + * that k1.address >= k2.address _and_ it falls within the bounds of k2, + * which we consider a match. For a concrete example of how this matching + * is used, see how we walk the stack of functions within the kmalloc + * kretprobe below: we will have a function + offset on the stack, and we + * want to see if this offset falls within a function in our coverage entry + * map. If it does, we track the allocation. The implicit assumption is + * no overlap between different objects. + */ +static int ktf_cov_obj_compare(const char *key1, const char *key2) +{ + struct ktf_cov_obj_key *k1 = (struct ktf_cov_obj_key *)key1; + struct ktf_cov_obj_key *k2 = (struct ktf_cov_obj_key *)key2; + + if (k1->address < k2->address) + return -1; + if (k1->address >= (k2->address + k2->size)) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +void ktf_cov_entry_get(struct ktf_cov_entry *entry) +{ + ktf_map_elem_get(&entry->kmap); +} + +void ktf_cov_entry_put(struct ktf_cov_entry *entry) +{ + ktf_map_elem_put(&entry->kmap); +} + +/* Global map for address-> symbol/module mapping. Sort via symbol address + * and size combination, see ktf_cov_obj_compare() above for comparison + * logic. + */ +static DEFINE_KTF_MAP(cov_entry_map, ktf_cov_obj_compare, ktf_cov_entry_free); + +struct ktf_cov_entry *ktf_cov_entry_find(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size) +{ + struct ktf_cov_obj_key k; + + k.address = addr; + k.size = size; + + return ktf_map_find_entry(&cov_entry_map, (char *)&k, + struct ktf_cov_entry, kmap); +} + +static void ktf_cov_free(struct ktf_map_elem *elem) +{ + struct ktf_cov *cov = container_of(elem, struct ktf_cov, kmap); + + kfree(cov); +} + +void ktf_cov_put(struct ktf_cov *cov) +{ + ktf_map_elem_put(&cov->kmap); +} + +/* Coverage object map. Just modules supported for now, sort by name. */ +static DEFINE_KTF_MAP(cov_map, NULL, ktf_cov_free); + +struct ktf_cov *ktf_cov_find(const char *module) +{ + return ktf_map_find_entry(&cov_map, module, struct ktf_cov, kmap); +} + +/* cache for memory objects used to track allocations */ +static struct kmem_cache *cov_mem_cache; + +static void ktf_cov_mem_free(struct ktf_map_elem *elem) +{ + struct ktf_cov_mem *m = container_of(elem, struct ktf_cov_mem, + kmap); + + kmem_cache_free(cov_mem_cache, m); +} + +/* Global map for tracking memory allocations */ +DEFINE_KTF_MAP(cov_mem_map, ktf_cov_obj_compare, ktf_cov_mem_free); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(cov_mem_map); + +struct ktf_cov_mem *ktf_cov_mem_find(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size) +{ + struct ktf_cov_obj_key k; + + k.address = addr; + k.size = size; + + return ktf_map_find_entry(&cov_mem_map, (char *)&k, + struct ktf_cov_mem, kmap); +} + +void ktf_cov_mem_get(struct ktf_cov_mem *m) +{ + ktf_map_elem_get(&m->kmap); +} + +void ktf_cov_mem_put(struct ktf_cov_mem *m) +{ + ktf_map_elem_put(&m->kmap); +} + +static void ktf_cov_mem_remove(struct ktf_cov_mem *m) +{ + ktf_map_remove_elem(&cov_mem_map, &m->kmap); +} + +/* Do not use ktf_cov_entry_find() here as we can get entry directly + * from probe address (as probe is first field in struct ktf_cov_entry). + * No reference counting issues should apply as when entry refcnt drops + * to 0 we unregister the kprobe prior to freeing the entry. + */ +static int ktf_cov_handler(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + struct ktf_cov_entry *entry = (struct ktf_cov_entry *)p; + + /* Make sure probe is ours... */ + if (!entry || entry->magic != KTF_COV_ENTRY_MAGIC) + return 0; + entry->count++; + if (entry->count == 1 && entry->cov) + entry->cov->count++; + return 0; +} + +static int ktf_cov_init_symbol(void *data, const char *name, + struct module *mod, unsigned long addr) +{ + struct ktf_cov_entry *entry; + struct ktf_cov *cov = data; + char buf[256]; + + if (!mod || !cov) + return 0; + + if (!try_module_get(mod)) + return 0; + + /* module_mutex is grabbed by register_kprobe() */ + mutex_unlock(&module_mutex); + + /* We only care about symbols for cov-specified module. */ + if (strcmp(mod->name, cov->kmap.key)) + goto out; + + /* We don't probe ourselves and functions called within probe ctxt. */ + if (strncmp(name, "ktf_cov", strlen("ktf_cov")) == 0 || + strcmp(name, "ktf_map_find") == 0) + goto out; + + /* Check if we're already covered for this module/symbol. */ + entry = ktf_cov_entry_find(addr, 0); + if (entry) { + tlog(T_DEBUG, "%s already present in coverage: %s", + name, entry->name); + ktf_cov_entry_put(entry); + goto out; + } + entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); + (void)strlcpy(entry->name, name, sizeof(entry->name)); + entry->magic = KTF_COV_ENTRY_MAGIC; + entry->cov = cov; + entry->refcnt = 1; + + entry->kprobe.pre_handler = ktf_cov_handler; + entry->kprobe.symbol_name = entry->name; + + /* Ugh - we try to register a kprobe as a means of determining + * if the symbol is a function. + */ + if (register_kprobe(&entry->kprobe) < 0) { + /* not a probe-able function */ + kfree(entry); + goto out; + } + entry->key.address = addr; + entry->key.size = ktf_symbol_size(addr); + (void)sprint_symbol(buf, entry->key.address); + if (ktf_map_elem_init(&entry->kmap, (char *)&entry->key) < 0 || + ktf_map_insert(&cov_entry_map, &entry->kmap) < 0) { + unregister_kprobe(&entry->kprobe); + kfree(entry); + goto out; + } + tlog(T_DEBUG, "Added %s/%s (%p, size %lu) to coverage: %s", + mod->name, entry->name, (void *)entry->kprobe.addr, + entry->key.size, buf); + + cov->total++; + ktf_cov_entry_put(entry); + +out: + mutex_lock(&module_mutex); + module_put(mod); + return 0; +} + +static int ktf_cov_kmem_cache_alloc_handler(struct kretprobe_instance *, + struct pt_regs *); + +static unsigned long register_kretprobe_size; + +/* Handler tracking allocations. Determine if any functions we are + * tracking coverage for (coverage entries) are on the stack; if so + * we track the allocation. + */ +static int ktf_cov_kmem_alloc_entry(struct ktf_cov_mem *m, unsigned long bytes) +{ + struct ktf_cov_entry *entry = NULL; + int n; + + /* We don't care about 0-length allocations. */ + if (!bytes) + return 0; + + /* Find first cov entry on stack to allow us to attribute traced + * allocation to first coverage entry we come across. + */ + m->nr_entries = stack_trace_save(m->stack_entries, KTF_COV_MAX_STACK_DEPTH, 1); + for (n = 0; n < m->nr_entries; n++) { + /* avoid recursive enter when allocating cov mem */ + if (m->stack_entries[n] == + (unsigned long)ktf_cov_kmem_cache_alloc_handler) + break; + /* ignore allocs as a result of registering probes */ + if (m->stack_entries[n] > + (unsigned long)register_kretprobe && + m->stack_entries[n] < ((unsigned long)register_kretprobe + + register_kretprobe_size)) + break; + entry = ktf_cov_entry_find(m->stack_entries[n], 0); + if (entry) + break; + } + if (!entry) { + m->nr_entries = 0; + return 0; + } + ktf_cov_entry_put(entry); + + m->key.size = bytes; + /* Have to wait until alloc returns to get key.address */ + + return 0; +} + +/* Handler tracking kmalloc allocations. */ +static int ktf_cov_kmalloc_entry_handler(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, + struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + struct ktf_cov_mem *m = (struct ktf_cov_mem *)ri->data; + unsigned long bytes = (unsigned long)KTF_ENTRY_PROBE_ARG0; + + return ktf_cov_kmem_alloc_entry(m, bytes); +} + +static int ktf_cov_kmem_cache_alloc_entry_handler(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, + struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + struct kmem_cache *cache = + (struct kmem_cache *)KTF_ENTRY_PROBE_ARG0; + struct ktf_cov_mem *m = (struct ktf_cov_mem *)ri->data; + unsigned long bytes; + + if (!cache) + return 0; + + bytes = cache->object_size; + if (cache == cov_mem_cache) + return 0; + return ktf_cov_kmem_alloc_entry(m, bytes); +} + +static int ktf_cov_kmem_alloc_return(struct ktf_cov_mem *m, + unsigned long ret) +{ + struct ktf_cov_mem *mm; + + m->key.address = ret; + mm = kmem_cache_alloc(cov_mem_cache, GFP_NOWAIT); + if (!mm) + return 0; + memcpy(mm, m, sizeof(*mm)); + if (ktf_map_elem_init(&mm->kmap, (char *)&mm->key) < 0 || + ktf_map_insert(&cov_mem_map, &mm->kmap) < 0) { + /* This can happen as inexplicably the same probe + * can fire twice for _kmalloc; this results in + * us attempting to add the same address twice, with + * the result that we get -EEXIST from ktf_map_insert() + * the second time. Annoying but the end result is + * we track the allocation once, which is what we want. + */ + terr("Failed to insert cov_mem %p", (void *)ret); + kmem_cache_free(cov_mem_cache, mm); + } + tlog(T_DEBUG, "cov_mem: tracking allocation %p", (void *)m->key.address); + m->nr_entries = 0; + return 0; +} + +static int ktf_cov_kmalloc_handler(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, + struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + struct ktf_cov_mem *m = (struct ktf_cov_mem *)ri->data; + unsigned long ret = regs_return_value(regs); + + if (m->nr_entries) + return ktf_cov_kmem_alloc_return(m, ret); + return 0; +} + +static int ktf_cov_kmem_cache_alloc_handler(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, + struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + struct kmem_cache *cache = + (struct kmem_cache *)KTF_ENTRY_PROBE_ARG0; + struct ktf_cov_mem *m = (struct ktf_cov_mem *)ri->data; + unsigned long ret = regs_return_value(regs); + + if (cache == cov_mem_cache) + return 0; + + if (m->nr_entries) + return ktf_cov_kmem_alloc_return(m, ret); + return 0; +} + +static int ktf_cov_kmem_free_entry(unsigned long tofree) +{ + struct ktf_cov_mem *m; + + if (!tofree) + return 0; + + m = ktf_cov_mem_find(tofree, 0); + if (m) { + tlog(T_DEBUG, "cov_mem: freeing allocation %p", + (void *)m->key.address); + ktf_cov_mem_remove(m); + ktf_cov_mem_put(m); + } + return 0; +} + +static int ktf_cov_kfree_entry_handler(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, + struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + unsigned long tofree = (unsigned long)KTF_ENTRY_PROBE_ARG0; + + if (!tofree) + return 0; + + return ktf_cov_kmem_free_entry(tofree); +} + +static int ktf_cov_kmem_cache_free_entry_handler(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, + struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + struct kmem_cache *cache = + (struct kmem_cache *)KTF_ENTRY_PROBE_ARG0; + unsigned long tofree = (unsigned long)KTF_ENTRY_PROBE_ARG1; + + if (!tofree || cache == cov_mem_cache) + return 0; + + return ktf_cov_kmem_free_entry(tofree); +} + +static struct kretprobe cov_mem_probes[] = { + { .kp = { .symbol_name = "__kmalloc" }, + .handler = ktf_cov_kmalloc_handler, + .entry_handler = ktf_cov_kmalloc_entry_handler, + .data_size = sizeof(struct ktf_cov_mem), + .maxactive = 0, /* assumes default value */ + }, + { .kp = { .symbol_name = "kmem_cache_alloc" }, + .handler = ktf_cov_kmem_cache_alloc_handler, + .entry_handler = ktf_cov_kmem_cache_alloc_entry_handler, + .data_size = sizeof(struct ktf_cov_mem), + .maxactive = 0, /* assumes default value */ + }, + { .kp = { .symbol_name = "kfree" }, + .handler = NULL, + .entry_handler = ktf_cov_kfree_entry_handler, + .data_size = 0, + .maxactive = 0, /* assumes default value */ + }, + { .kp = { .symbol_name = "kmem_cache_free" }, + .handler = NULL, + .entry_handler = ktf_cov_kmem_cache_free_entry_handler, + .data_size = 0, + .maxactive = 0, /* assumes default value */ + } +}; + +static int cov_opt_mem_cnt; + +static int ktf_cov_init_opts(struct ktf_cov *cov) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + + if (cov->opts & KTF_COV_OPT_MEM && ++cov_opt_mem_cnt == 1) { + if (!cov_mem_cache) { + cov_mem_cache = + kmem_cache_create("ktf_cov_mem_cache", + sizeof(struct ktf_cov_mem), 0, + SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC, + NULL); + + if (!cov_mem_cache) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cov_mem_probes); i++) { + /* reset in case we're re-registering */ + cov_mem_probes[i].kp.addr = NULL; + cov_mem_probes[i].kp.flags = 0; + ret = register_kretprobe(&cov_mem_probes[i]); + if (ret) { + tlog(T_DEBUG, + "%d: failed to register retprobe for %s", + ret, cov_mem_probes[i].kp.symbol_name); + return ret; + } + } + } + + return ret; +} + +static void ktf_cov_cleanup_opts(struct ktf_cov *cov) +{ + int i; + + if (cov->opts & KTF_COV_OPT_MEM && --cov_opt_mem_cnt == 0) { + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cov_mem_probes); i++) { + if (cov_mem_probes[i].nmissed > 0) { + tlog(T_INFO, "%s: retprobe missed %d.", + cov_mem_probes[i].kp.symbol_name, + cov_mem_probes[i].nmissed); + } + if (cov_mem_probes[i].kp.addr) + unregister_kretprobe(&cov_mem_probes[i]); + } + } +} + +/* If the module we are monitoring coverage for was unloaded/reloaded + * while coverage was disabled, we can end up re-enabling kprobes at + * different addresses for the same function. The problem is however + * we reference coverage entries by their address in the coverage + * entry map, so we need to clean it up to reflect the new locations + * of the probes. So we remove/re-add the entries with the updated + * addresses. It would obviously be easier to just remove the entries + * on coverage disable, but that limits our ability to examine coverage + * data - a common pattern is enable coverage, run test(s), disable + * coverage, check coverage data. + */ +static void ktf_cov_update_entries(const char *name, struct ktf_cov *cov) +{ + struct ktf_cov_entry *entry = ktf_map_first_entry(&cov_entry_map, + struct ktf_cov_entry, + kmap); + + while (entry) { + if (entry->cov != cov || + (unsigned long)entry->kprobe.addr == entry->key.address) { + entry = ktf_map_next_entry(entry, kmap); + continue; + } + + /* Address has changed; remove entry with old address as key + * and re-add with new address/size as key (size may have + * changed if module was re-compiled). + */ + ktf_map_remove_elem(&cov_entry_map, &entry->kmap); + entry->key.address = (unsigned long)entry->kprobe.addr; + entry->key.size = ktf_symbol_size(entry->key.address); + if (ktf_map_elem_init(&entry->kmap, (char *)&entry->key) < 0 || + ktf_map_insert(&cov_entry_map, &entry->kmap) < 0) { + tlog(T_DEBUG, "Failed to add %s/%s", name, entry->name); + unregister_kprobe(&entry->kprobe); + entry->refcnt--; + entry = ktf_map_next_entry(entry, kmap); + } else { + tlog(T_DEBUG, "Added %s/%s (%p, size %lu) to coverage", + name, entry->name, (void *)entry->key.address, + entry->key.size); + /* Map has changed, reset to root. */ + entry = ktf_map_first_entry(&cov_entry_map, + struct ktf_cov_entry, kmap); + } + } +} + +int ktf_cov_enable(const char *name, unsigned int opts) +{ + struct ktf_cov *cov = ktf_cov_find(name); + struct ktf_cov_entry *entry; + int ret = 0; + +#ifndef KTF_PROBE_SUPPORT + return -ENOTSUPP; +#endif + if (!cov) { + cov = kzalloc(sizeof(*cov), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!cov) + return -ENOMEM; + + cov->type = KTF_COV_TYPE_MODULE; + cov->opts = opts; + if (ktf_map_elem_init(&cov->kmap, name) < 0 || + ktf_map_insert(&cov_map, &cov->kmap) < 0) { + tlog(T_DEBUG, "cov %s already present", cov->kmap.key); + kfree(cov); + return -EEXIST; + } + register_kretprobe_size = + ktf_symbol_size((unsigned long)register_kretprobe); + mutex_lock(&module_mutex); + kallsyms_on_each_symbol(ktf_cov_init_symbol, cov); + mutex_unlock(&module_mutex); + } else { + ktf_map_for_each_entry(entry, &cov_entry_map, kmap) { + if (entry->cov != cov) + continue; + if (++entry->refcnt == 1) { + /* reset kprobe as we're re-registering */ + memset(&entry->kprobe, 0, + sizeof(entry->kprobe)); + entry->kprobe.pre_handler = ktf_cov_handler; + entry->kprobe.symbol_name = entry->name; + ret = register_kprobe(&entry->kprobe); + if (ret) { + tlog(T_DEBUG, "Failed to add %s/%s", + name, entry->name); + entry->refcnt--; + } + } + } + /* Probe addresses/function sizes for functions may have + * changed if module was unloaded/reloaded - entry map + * needs to be updated to use new address/size as key. + */ + ktf_cov_update_entries(name, cov); + } + + ret = ktf_cov_init_opts(cov); + + ktf_cov_put(cov); + + return ret; +} + +void ktf_cov_disable(const char *module) +{ + struct ktf_cov *cov = ktf_cov_find(module); + struct ktf_cov_entry *entry; + +#ifndef KTF_PROBE_SUPPORT + return; +#endif + + if (!cov) + return; + + ktf_map_for_each_entry(entry, &cov_entry_map, kmap) { + if (entry->cov == cov) { + if (--entry->refcnt == 0) { + unregister_kprobe(&entry->kprobe); + tlog(T_DEBUG, "Removed coverage %s/%s", + cov->kmap.key, entry->name); + } + } + } + ktf_cov_cleanup_opts(cov); + ktf_cov_put(cov); +} + +static void ktf_cov_mem_seq_print(struct seq_file *seq) +{ + struct ktf_cov_mem *m; + char buf[256]; + int n; + + seq_puts(seq, "\nMemory in use allocated by covered functions:\n\n"); + seq_printf(seq, "%44s %16s %10s\n", "ALLOCATION STACK", "ADDRESS", + "SIZE"); + ktf_for_each_cov_mem(m) { + for (n = 0; n < m->nr_entries; n++) { + sprint_symbol(buf, m->stack_entries[n]); + seq_printf(seq, "%44s", buf); + if (n == 0) + seq_printf(seq, " %16p %10lu", + (void *)m->key.address, + m->key.size); + seq_puts(seq, "\n"); + } + seq_puts(seq, "\n"); + } +} + +void ktf_cov_seq_print(struct seq_file *seq) +{ + struct ktf_cov_entry *entry; + struct ktf_cov *cov; + + seq_printf(seq, "%10s %44s %10s\n", "MODULE", "#FUNCTIONS", + "#CALLED"); + ktf_map_for_each_entry(cov, &cov_map, kmap) + seq_printf(seq, "%10s %44d %10d\n", + cov->kmap.key, cov->total, cov->count); + + seq_printf(seq, "\n%10s %44s %10s\n", "MODULE", "FUNCTION", "COUNT"); + ktf_map_for_each_entry(entry, &cov_entry_map, kmap) + seq_printf(seq, "%10s %44s %10d\n", + entry->cov ? entry->cov->kmap.key : "-", + entry->name, entry->count); + + ktf_cov_mem_seq_print(seq); +} + + +void ktf_cov_cleanup(void) +{ + struct ktf_cov *cov; + char name[KTF_MAX_KEY]; + + ktf_map_for_each_entry(cov, &cov_map, kmap) { + ktf_cov_disable(ktf_map_elem_name(&cov->kmap, name)); + } + ktf_map_delete_all(&cov_map); + ktf_map_delete_all(&cov_entry_map); + ktf_map_delete_all(&cov_mem_map); + kmem_cache_destroy(cov_mem_cache); +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ktf/kernel/ktf_cov.h b/tools/testing/selftests/ktf/kernel/ktf_cov.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..56ae753 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ktf/kernel/ktf_cov.h @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + * Author: Alan Maguire + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + * + * ktf_cov.h: Code coverage support interface for KTF. + */ + +#ifndef KTF_COV_H +#define KTF_COV_H + +#include +#include +#include +#include "ktf.h" +#include "ktf_map.h" + +enum ktf_cov_type { + KTF_COV_TYPE_MODULE, + KTF_COV_TYPE_MAX, +}; + +struct ktf_cov { + struct ktf_map_elem kmap; + enum ktf_cov_type type; /* only modules supported for now. */ + int count; /* number of unique functions called */ + int total; /* total number of functions */ + unsigned int opts; +}; + +/* Key for coverage entries (functions) consists in function address _and_ + * size - this allows us to find offsets in function on stack. Also used + * to track allocated memory - allocated address + size. + */ +struct ktf_cov_obj_key { + unsigned long address; + unsigned long size; +}; + +#define KTF_COV_ENTRY_MAGIC 0xc07e8a5e +struct ktf_cov_entry { + struct kprobe kprobe; + int magic; /* magic number identifying entry */ + struct ktf_map_elem kmap; + char name[KTF_MAX_KEY]; + struct ktf_cov_obj_key key; + struct ktf_cov *cov; + struct ktf_map cov_mem; + int refcnt; + int count; +}; + +#define KTF_COV_MAX_STACK_DEPTH 32 + +struct ktf_cov_mem { + struct ktf_map_elem kmap; + struct ktf_cov_obj_key key; + unsigned long flags; + unsigned int nr_entries; + unsigned long stack_entries[KTF_COV_MAX_STACK_DEPTH]; +}; + +#define KTF_COV_MEM_IGNORE 0x1 /* avoid recursive enter */ + +struct ktf_cov_mem_probe { + const char *name; + struct kretprobe kretprobe; +}; + +extern struct ktf_map cov_mem_map; + +#define ktf_for_each_cov_mem(pos) \ + ktf_map_for_each_entry(pos, &cov_mem_map, kmap) + +struct ktf_cov_entry *ktf_cov_entry_find(unsigned long, unsigned long); +void ktf_cov_entry_put(struct ktf_cov_entry *); +void ktf_cov_entry_get(struct ktf_cov_entry *); + +struct ktf_cov *ktf_cov_find(const char *); +void ktf_cov_put(struct ktf_cov *); +void ktf_cov_get(struct ktf_cov *); + +struct ktf_cov_mem *ktf_cov_mem_find(unsigned long, unsigned long); +void ktf_cov_mem_put(struct ktf_cov_mem *); +void ktf_cov_mem_get(struct ktf_cov_mem *); + +void ktf_cov_seq_print(struct seq_file *); +void ktf_cov_cleanup(void); + +int ktf_cov_enable(const char *, unsigned int); +void ktf_cov_disable(const char *); + +#endif