From patchwork Fri Aug 5 22:21:21 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jeff Xu X-Patchwork-Id: 12937858 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A4775C25B08 for ; Fri, 5 Aug 2022 22:21:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S241549AbiHEWVd (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Aug 2022 18:21:33 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:35908 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S240503AbiHEWVb (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Aug 2022 18:21:31 -0400 Received: from mail-yw1-x1149.google.com (mail-yw1-x1149.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::1149]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E0D5E1AD90 for ; Fri, 5 Aug 2022 15:21:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-yw1-x1149.google.com with SMTP id 00721157ae682-31f3959ba41so31859387b3.2 for ; Fri, 05 Aug 2022 15:21:30 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20210112; h=date:message-id:mime-version:subject:from:to:cc; bh=vA6JwiPIQ35idH1LwuHfAoXwWih02NenmEQERtaUlQk=; b=jhXFbm4GcOo7tzG+m2t/JAjwLoRiHbKfayX9CRJ+Z1nBjUfj/kt8Ulq1F0LhapnHWU vQlRbYT/RRAr/19sZxiy7+Gw5YKLAuSi4obedsMyt5ePFm2VbgAXa76LqWzI0gy3+k7G auoB2i1RLoWlA1oVdLXZeqvneSg9IDJwiQbvRGCr9hOj2w857WdGRB+BjlL6R4waJY4P UezKtbOhs+xqa+UUczDURSiB9HsJ+jdEiKKrN79HQVMKHizSOYPwBCpveob6fId8+EHN bXZmZjRBWoxEGFljMetZFd/jY81w8X/1pO15hW5wCu1fcpJu1QQ4WMOAumNIK4XDuGno KpcQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:date:message-id:mime-version:subject:from:to:cc; bh=vA6JwiPIQ35idH1LwuHfAoXwWih02NenmEQERtaUlQk=; b=onjbzw9Yw/WLUzJznIGZPL8CMedMOhe37XWelTkIzoB8PaykxbNgHjb2c+BLij9Jvx aa9T4SJbWRWwPDmRs8c2CahtYZNNW5hJYog+Iy+YKAsIepWytX19+FMRVbU4nqsQ4GE3 zXXjwt2JAsbtcq2XoWLwAnHiewdOnU7mCnHP4ARpt6xFuHPx4UTe2/f3KnO9jpABXw9u x4upHDTDmfP90vpAvAn8mh00TPM/sgIlcT1tvFPAVtBv0aCVpmK1gec8/GFe2UpNuUXF o6b31AB1dthWaBOx878Tfhuui2UmmU3HpeOzhYAQkemylQklaJwoSQLJW+5KCtUed6w5 G4Ng== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo3ii9ccydARLZxiuVhPNjPziFRjDca8cJXBEzkqXw64eFQFatEg UpWRKd4IxxYuT3kVTsNgbuLU76hseAc= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR5/FcLDV3dK7SdDaErdRpC2Y/obPbr0lLOpjjFPaMlZeqQoYgCKLv8ONTsUzWRhe9Uj92AsbR6yrYs= X-Received: from jeffxud.c.googlers.com ([fda3:e722:ac3:cc00:20:ed76:c0a8:e37]) (user=jeffxu job=sendgmr) by 2002:a05:6902:13c7:b0:671:7cb2:9a82 with SMTP id y7-20020a05690213c700b006717cb29a82mr7285411ybu.334.1659738090124; Fri, 05 Aug 2022 15:21:30 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 22:21:21 +0000 Message-Id: <20220805222126.142525-1-jeffxu@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.37.1.559.g78731f0fdb-goog Subject: [PATCH v2 0/5] mm/memfd: MFD_NOEXEC for memfd_create From: To: skhan@linuxfoundation.org Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com, dverkamp@chromium.org, hughd@google.com, jeffxu@google.com, jorgelo@chromium.org, keescook@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, mnissler@chromium.org, jannh@google.com, Jeff Xu Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Jeff Xu Hi, This v2 series MFD_NOEXEC, this series includes: 1> address comments in V1 2> add sysctl (vm.mfd_noexec) to change the default file permissions of memfd_create to be non-executable. Below are cover-level for v1: The default file permissions on a memfd include execute bits, which means that such a memfd can be filled with a executable and passed to the exec() family of functions. This is undesirable on systems where all code is verified and all filesystems are intended to be mounted noexec, since an attacker may be able to use a memfd to load unverified code and execute it. Additionally, execution via memfd is a common way to avoid scrutiny for malicious code, since it allows execution of a program without a file ever appearing on disk. This attack vector is not totally mitigated with this new flag, since the default memfd file permissions must remain executable to avoid breaking existing legitimate uses, but it should be possible to use other security mechanisms to prevent memfd_create calls without MFD_NOEXEC on systems where it is known that executable memfds are not necessary. This patch series adds a new MFD_NOEXEC flag for memfd_create(), which allows creation of non-executable memfds, and as part of the implementation of this new flag, it also adds a new F_SEAL_EXEC seal, which will prevent modification of any of the execute bits of a sealed memfd. I am not sure if this is the best way to implement the desired behavior (for example, the F_SEAL_EXEC seal is really more of an implementation detail and feels a bit clunky to expose), so suggestions are welcome for alternate approaches. v1: https://lwn.net/Articles/890096/ Daniel Verkamp (4): mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_EXEC mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC flag to memfd_create selftests/memfd: add tests for F_SEAL_EXEC selftests/memfd: add tests for MFD_NOEXEC Jeff Xu (1): sysctl: add support for mfd_noexec include/linux/mm.h | 4 + include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/memfd.h | 1 + kernel/sysctl.c | 9 ++ mm/memfd.c | 39 ++++- mm/shmem.c | 6 + tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 163 ++++++++++++++++++++- 7 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) base-commit: 9e2f40233670c70c25e0681cb66d50d1e2742829