From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:52 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 12947797 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6B4BBC00140 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:02:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345844AbiHRUCb (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:02:31 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55496 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345725AbiHRUBE (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:01:04 -0400 Received: from mail-ed1-x532.google.com (mail-ed1-x532.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::532]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BE20BD1254; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ed1-x532.google.com with SMTP id b16so3209164edd.4; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:50 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc; bh=xUwlz5tV2pDmzkwueTqVMNi0VVgFLaQtoJ1cuBHIFlg=; b=G3b1ziIgi6OjKq7ncGmGQzIi8TOKyW//qmLb7qYKwzfpty1jelTczOj4n+wnmzcm2S bTSXs6MsELu1OVQsViT304UEXbsjwDRBYwvqk6GyFIvmfyMng1LRjAtve9P9oGOEeB2T pqiTdZY66tnOh5Xh+g+21hluiZvVmlfz6Ae32illSKhSynmxXNncbM8FiLT4Yn1b8+ge orcPmdUtkHM60+zfLSxxKNDHwB5o3WPUSOPem3nsHIFr9SsyKFgXSDvZoAgSYV3hvuUu HHgP9L4R8t1Nsa3GFuMzPdaKwKPDywDS6zlokD7I1YhWHOj9b0lRv6MufX4cLSL6xARY 266A== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc; bh=xUwlz5tV2pDmzkwueTqVMNi0VVgFLaQtoJ1cuBHIFlg=; b=h5cOLzSLP5y1YuyevPOUs8kujtfhsmtgq1fexFDYSkk/NCd6OQ9R8IXXAY9uroUwY4 BehTLZHC8ZZoWf+ZFxGkqvrGZSm/BeWTbfRpGoefsUvoUHCAUiO4HVdMVKQHvMH4WNIk hR8Ie8G9YbZaKs37SG0kRhUVroZE37xcmH2ocXD2AEt+0b0D9H+LOFhBlj8I4VmqZRX8 HcZuI20nFqiquEQ3mMuWs1TS2wCiZjzVUOlk+lAiBxsym667D0WLIksgodFXSKbhXkXF JaDeW25On0fkO/HePmk0hNBZ4AEgnsmB8aVxgWTJketGAW8S0knpCVWPCNGR8/fhSqYq L0wQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo02SRRkmsnZMeyU30lkNucshLIEOIkGf4l2Ty4CfnX01sj6oK4q mFomIf56HP7jNhjxa1Ldb1k= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR4R8q8t5lOgVLkeGXZPq1wSJdDWADc5Pm+sXIDX4pY/5bqGqjJE6RqJTWnEz6Logo26pvUWfQ== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:500d:b0:440:9bc5:d0c1 with SMTP id p13-20020a056402500d00b004409bc5d0c1mr3491968eda.202.1660852850223; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:a080:17c8:ba1c:b6f3:3fe0]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id fw30-20020a170907501e00b00722e4bab163sm1215087ejc.200.2022.08.18.13.00.48 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:49 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 18/26] tcp: authopt: Add /proc/net/tcp_authopt listing all keys Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:52 +0300 Message-Id: <07670e63c786e9e46ba52aaecb81ad7e1418767e.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org This provides a very brief summary of all keys for debugging purposes. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 10 +++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst index 6520c6d02755..eaf389f99139 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst @@ -69,10 +69,20 @@ The rnextkeyid value sent on the wire is usually the recv_id of the current key used for sending. If the TCP_AUTHOPT_LOCK_RNEXTKEY flag is set in `tcp_authopt.flags` the value of `tcp_authopt.send_rnextkeyid` is send instead. This can be used to implement smooth rollover: the peer will switch its keyid to the received rnextkeyid when it is available. +Proc interface +-------------- + +The ``/proc/net/tcp_authopt`` file contains a tab-separated table of keys. The +first line contains column names. The number of columns might increase in the +future if more matching criteria are added. Here is an example of the table:: + + flags send_id recv_id alg addr l3index + 0x44 0 0 1 10.10.2.2/31 0 + ABI Reference ============= .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/tcp.h :identifiers: tcp_authopt tcp_authopt_flag tcp_authopt_key tcp_authopt_key_flag tcp_authopt_alg diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 06f8df1d80c9..0a273ad239ec 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -5,10 +5,11 @@ #include #include #include #include #include +#include /* This is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through * a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced. */ int sysctl_tcp_authopt; @@ -1731,26 +1732,125 @@ int __tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, return 1; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tcp_authopt_inbound_check); +#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS +struct tcp_authopt_iter_state { + struct seq_net_private p; +}; + +static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_get_key_index(struct netns_tcp_authopt *net, + int index) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + + hlist_for_each_entry(key, &net->head, node) { + if (--index < 0) + return key; + } + + return NULL; +} + +static void *tcp_authopt_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) + __acquires(RCU) +{ + struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &seq_file_net(seq)->tcp_authopt; + + rcu_read_lock(); + if (*pos == 0) + return SEQ_START_TOKEN; + else + return tcp_authopt_get_key_index(net, *pos - 1); +} + +static void tcp_authopt_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) + __releases(RCU) +{ + rcu_read_unlock(); +} + +static void *tcp_authopt_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos) +{ + struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &seq_file_net(seq)->tcp_authopt; + void *ret; + + ret = tcp_authopt_get_key_index(net, *pos); + ++*pos; + + return ret; +} + +static int tcp_authopt_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key = v; + + /* FIXME: Document somewhere */ + /* Key is deliberately inaccessible */ + if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) { + seq_puts(seq, "flags\tsend_id\trecv_id\talg\taddr\tl3index\n"); + return 0; + } + + seq_printf(seq, "0x%x\t%d\t%d\t%d", + key->flags, key->send_id, key->recv_id, (int)key->alg_id); + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) { + if (key->addr.ss_family == AF_INET6) + seq_printf(seq, "\t%pI6", &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr)->sin6_addr); + else + seq_printf(seq, "\t%pI4", &((struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr)->sin_addr); + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) + seq_printf(seq, "/%d", key->prefixlen); + } else { + seq_puts(seq, "\t*"); + } + seq_printf(seq, "\t%d", key->l3index); + seq_puts(seq, "\n"); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct seq_operations tcp_authopt_seq_ops = { + .start = tcp_authopt_seq_start, + .next = tcp_authopt_seq_next, + .stop = tcp_authopt_seq_stop, + .show = tcp_authopt_seq_show, +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ + +static int __net_init tcp_authopt_proc_init_net(struct net *net) +{ + if (!proc_create_net("tcp_authopt", 0400, net->proc_net, + &tcp_authopt_seq_ops, + sizeof(struct tcp_authopt_iter_state))) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +static void __net_exit tcp_authopt_proc_exit_net(struct net *net) +{ + remove_proc_entry("tcp_authopt", net->proc_net); +} + static int tcp_authopt_init_net(struct net *full_net) { struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &full_net->tcp_authopt; mutex_init(&net->mutex); INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&net->head); - return 0; + return tcp_authopt_proc_init_net(full_net); } static void tcp_authopt_exit_net(struct net *full_net) { struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &full_net->tcp_authopt; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; struct hlist_node *n; + tcp_authopt_proc_exit_net(full_net); mutex_lock(&net->mutex); hlist_for_each_entry_safe(key, n, &net->head, node) { hlist_del_rcu(&key->node); tcp_authopt_key_put(key);