From patchwork Mon Sep 5 07:05:55 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 12965626 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4F74BECAAD5 for ; Mon, 5 Sep 2022 07:08:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S237362AbiIEHIW (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Sep 2022 03:08:22 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:46646 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237232AbiIEHHU (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Sep 2022 03:07:20 -0400 Received: from mail-ej1-x635.google.com (mail-ej1-x635.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::635]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0CC843F1F0; Mon, 5 Sep 2022 00:06:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ej1-x635.google.com with SMTP id cu2so15232716ejb.0; Mon, 05 Sep 2022 00:06:49 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date; bh=74+6RKOeD3QnYDoe9HbO1jvM/A1aI0nHjrlAm2sa2+8=; b=gghYKEw/nyGr1NVCJLIk9y72zzR1rIxx9WBFmEoVGw5MAUq7uIeH/kaowd+AkMcGRp iQ5Ohws17RXwIUOZ7T+lg6w3824myxtLGWKkUZYHkD/TU3ZhcnTAxI3AQly9THSYZY+V 8G3z0GBD1im1ETenPF4WNrUvKQ/Couc4OZC2WjsE7/i3aOIBr+3HcPjLfcKLxFIwvBKa SdgVqQ96kNrOGTZAO9c/8tOuiUonWGIVrfCl1y5K8wPBow5EghjJanphjJyBrBmCCm1o VU5P/PsfPw0RXDYh/uAA11ceBgUVNawz0XlAfz9eS4we7mBC7CfCPHUm4WDHLbwF8loN TayA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date; bh=74+6RKOeD3QnYDoe9HbO1jvM/A1aI0nHjrlAm2sa2+8=; b=ZBYE2XBhPwmRT0yL4L+DXmXjUo3GOTKup4QEdwOkSrqcDc8IP4rcyarLHjiieThrL4 jjo63UKvD2+aqR1mp80jkJlZwUZ8fBd1WrgtI+0aNMTQVVcQdXerJI8anHO8chxXTEnL EJwpjo4+Y3xnm+WbTrXML2zV7kJ3g2Av4qIJ4BwX11+RTGlTfYk07FLMIOuyy1phdf2+ MXJhMITZwrez9fPOre4Rs1aF+cU3TRHmjIL9H29p93GXki0oSzCquKGHY8Xt//HPk185 WOyJcYrRCtiZ9pucKKfw+lfikQUH6cmUOhCOOAaobIxUGN4LIqUCYpgZsqYSfhSdHZ1R FvDg== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo1EK8Q5vRvNcUd7t/vXCyfxY8hO+AEwqxxSUfg9Pv7wqRN88cqb olUuN1kGKZU7QJfz09NQXRA= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR7QlynEeoqSHvhKlIyexNfHVT+mO2pk3+H4+/kkFce+8/8AjbBWk36TXvCHy+LnEtya7TlydQ== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:5a64:b0:741:3586:92f with SMTP id my36-20020a1709065a6400b007413586092fmr30692208ejc.721.1662361608601; Mon, 05 Sep 2022 00:06:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:a080:40ec:9f50:387:3cfb]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id n27-20020a056402515b00b0043cf2e0ce1csm5882775edd.48.2022.09.05.00.06.46 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 05 Sep 2022 00:06:48 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Salam Noureddine , Philip Paeps , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v8 19/26] tcp: authopt: Add /proc/net/tcp_authopt listing all keys Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2022 10:05:55 +0300 Message-Id: <0fb9caada66b79fcf8eb1d267db8c65d4885e1aa.1662361354.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org This provides a very brief summary of all keys for debugging purposes. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 10 +++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst index 5631750cc3f7..2bceefe6fe1d 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst @@ -76,10 +76,20 @@ management. It also tries to behave predictably in all scenarios therefore it breaks ties by numeric IDs. A userspace daemon can use the "lock" flags to implement different key management and key rotation policies. +Proc interface +-------------- + +The ``/proc/net/tcp_authopt`` file contains a tab-separated table of keys. The +first line contains column names. The number of columns might increase in the +future if more matching criteria are added. Here is an example of the table:: + + flags send_id recv_id alg addr l3index + 0x44 0 0 1 10.10.2.2/31 0 + ABI Reference ============= .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/tcp.h :identifiers: tcp_authopt tcp_authopt_flag tcp_authopt_key tcp_authopt_key_flag tcp_authopt_alg diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 28c10a916fb3..ba16b8c50565 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -5,10 +5,11 @@ #include #include #include #include #include +#include /* This is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through * a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced. */ int sysctl_tcp_authopt; @@ -1810,26 +1811,125 @@ int __tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, save_inbound_key_info(info, opt); return 1; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tcp_authopt_inbound_check); +#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS +struct tcp_authopt_iter_state { + struct seq_net_private p; +}; + +static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_get_key_index(struct netns_tcp_authopt *net, + int index) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + + hlist_for_each_entry(key, &net->head, node) { + if (--index < 0) + return key; + } + + return NULL; +} + +static void *tcp_authopt_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) + __acquires(RCU) +{ + struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &seq_file_net(seq)->tcp_authopt; + + rcu_read_lock(); + if (*pos == 0) + return SEQ_START_TOKEN; + else + return tcp_authopt_get_key_index(net, *pos - 1); +} + +static void tcp_authopt_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) + __releases(RCU) +{ + rcu_read_unlock(); +} + +static void *tcp_authopt_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos) +{ + struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &seq_file_net(seq)->tcp_authopt; + void *ret; + + ret = tcp_authopt_get_key_index(net, *pos); + ++*pos; + + return ret; +} + +static int tcp_authopt_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key = v; + + /* FIXME: Document somewhere */ + /* Key is deliberately inaccessible */ + if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) { + seq_puts(seq, "flags\tsend_id\trecv_id\talg\taddr\tl3index\n"); + return 0; + } + + seq_printf(seq, "0x%x\t%d\t%d\t%d", + key->flags, key->send_id, key->recv_id, (int)key->alg_id); + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) { + if (key->addr.ss_family == AF_INET6) + seq_printf(seq, "\t%pI6", &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr)->sin6_addr); + else + seq_printf(seq, "\t%pI4", &((struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr)->sin_addr); + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) + seq_printf(seq, "/%d", key->prefixlen); + } else { + seq_puts(seq, "\t*"); + } + seq_printf(seq, "\t%d", key->l3index); + seq_puts(seq, "\n"); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct seq_operations tcp_authopt_seq_ops = { + .start = tcp_authopt_seq_start, + .next = tcp_authopt_seq_next, + .stop = tcp_authopt_seq_stop, + .show = tcp_authopt_seq_show, +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ + +static int __net_init tcp_authopt_proc_init_net(struct net *net) +{ + if (!proc_create_net("tcp_authopt", 0400, net->proc_net, + &tcp_authopt_seq_ops, + sizeof(struct tcp_authopt_iter_state))) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +static void __net_exit tcp_authopt_proc_exit_net(struct net *net) +{ + remove_proc_entry("tcp_authopt", net->proc_net); +} + static int tcp_authopt_init_net(struct net *full_net) { struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &full_net->tcp_authopt; mutex_init(&net->mutex); INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&net->head); - return 0; + return tcp_authopt_proc_init_net(full_net); } static void tcp_authopt_exit_net(struct net *full_net) { struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &full_net->tcp_authopt; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; struct hlist_node *n; + tcp_authopt_proc_exit_net(full_net); mutex_lock(&net->mutex); hlist_for_each_entry_safe(key, n, &net->head, node) { hlist_del_rcu(&key->node); tcp_authopt_key_put(key);