From patchwork Thu Nov 7 19:53:54 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Joel Fernandes X-Patchwork-Id: 11233695 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 998E014E5 for ; Thu, 7 Nov 2019 19:54:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 76DFB21D7E for ; Thu, 7 Nov 2019 19:54:04 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=joelfernandes.org header.i=@joelfernandes.org header.b="MF2KEhws" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726019AbfKGTyD (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Nov 2019 14:54:03 -0500 Received: from mail-pf1-f195.google.com ([209.85.210.195]:32768 "EHLO mail-pf1-f195.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725818AbfKGTyD (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Nov 2019 14:54:03 -0500 Received: by mail-pf1-f195.google.com with SMTP id c184so3259842pfb.0 for ; Thu, 07 Nov 2019 11:54:03 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=joelfernandes.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=Ghp1ccQ5fcbrX+RPWdRWrW5V+/l6RykYTQKYb1Z+Wp4=; b=MF2KEhwsFOY2JznvdfjXOUNj6W3qYNeau+VKgjLdGcoHKMwypDOQ9+KNmwpoguPBnA 7i/obFhGjyKDKsUMxeH64dpCWx1uMOpGLtazJ2WOFQJj2EgXR2EKcxlrJHXs+HFIxiKU AjzqDaEAAzRnfgvLsssB5KV+gpsE0RcbDcp+E= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=Ghp1ccQ5fcbrX+RPWdRWrW5V+/l6RykYTQKYb1Z+Wp4=; b=h7PLnicgwdhgQnNMg1r8Cb4jQ+FbZp897xlWUHJqosfKfbHbr2oqguBtH6f5PbrOhB kZ9R/6Mou7K95Bcw5pi6J79w/5wxFVhdGxO1ErfERSSTk/iQaf/Wf8xjJUKwVI9CmzzB MHMTfUuB3xMF7pl5Itgvu6pw6wFr6LKtaqgATO3XFfGVPLDcdMrqQqF8DYmhd0sdpEKC iYF8byFMib8bwi87vAOIkrwz569ilmRiBWAiy8vdfHH/F261Bxx2z5MTi6LfCV5Hfylh Hwym84aDRooiqYLpF3xTI5LErfbhnmq7U4i12BDBWzfL3Uz+SLp8GEDyO+xaJwy2vG74 ocuw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAWHHBF3fnxbJ4eoCH5owIG0CNbmbA/H1kL2xpWj+Jxi6tqjunB9 xPdCOASf7ItUuzeB+mi7fSWIKw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxa4V3GDy6MxEr8e4GyHJt30Yq7/f7FjZfuQPYkIlqBQ0ZxitLHpBCbWZAaGGArGLkuPC825w== X-Received: by 2002:a63:f852:: with SMTP id v18mr4706535pgj.71.1573156442796; Thu, 07 Nov 2019 11:54:02 -0800 (PST) Received: from joelaf.cam.corp.google.com ([2620:15c:6:12:9c46:e0da:efbf:69cc]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id y2sm3365870pfe.126.2019.11.07.11.54.01 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 07 Nov 2019 11:54:02 -0800 (PST) From: "Joel Fernandes (Google)" To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nicolas Geoffray , kernel-team@android.com, Joel Fernandes , Andrew Morton , Hugh Dickins , linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, Shuah Khan Subject: [PATCH 1/2] memfd: Fix COW issue on MAP_PRIVATE and F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE mappings Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2019 14:53:54 -0500 Message-Id: <20191107195355.80608-1-joel@joelfernandes.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.24.0.rc1.363.gb1bccd3e3d-goog MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-kselftest-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Nicolas Geoffray F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE has unexpected behavior when used with MAP_PRIVATE: A private mapping created after the memfd file that gets sealed with F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE loses the copy-on-write at fork behavior, meaning children and parent share the same memory, even though the mapping is private. The reason for this is due to the code below: static int shmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) { struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(file_inode(file)); if (info->seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE) { /* * New PROT_WRITE and MAP_SHARED mmaps are not allowed when * "future write" seal active. */ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) return -EPERM; /* * Since the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seals allow for a MAP_SHARED * read-only mapping, take care to not allow mprotect to revert * protections. */ vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE); } ... } And for the mm to know if a mapping is copy-on-write: static inline bool is_cow_mapping(vm_flags_t flags) { return (flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYWRITE)) == VM_MAYWRITE; } The patch fixes the issue by making the mprotect revert protection happen only for shared mappings. For private mappings, using mprotect will have no effect on the seal behavior. Cc: kernel-team@android.com Signed-off-by: Nicolas Geoffray Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) --- Google bug: 143833776 mm/shmem.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c index 447fd575587c..6ac5e867ef13 100644 --- a/mm/shmem.c +++ b/mm/shmem.c @@ -2214,11 +2214,14 @@ static int shmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) return -EPERM; /* - * Since the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seals allow for a MAP_SHARED - * read-only mapping, take care to not allow mprotect to revert - * protections. + * Since an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE sealed memfd can be mapped as + * MAP_SHARED and read-only, take care to not allow mprotect to + * revert protections on such mappings. Do this only for shared + * mappings. For private mappings, don't need to mask VM_MAYWRITE + * as we still want them to be COW-writable. */ - vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE); + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) + vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE); } file_accessed(file);