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[198.145.64.163]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id y65sm7420401pfb.75.2020.07.24.14.36.48 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 24 Jul 2020 14:36:53 -0700 (PDT) From: Kees Cook To: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Kees Cook , Scott Branden , Mimi Zohar , Luis Chamberlain , Jessica Yu , SeongJae Park , KP Singh , linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 14/19] LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 14:36:35 -0700 Message-Id: <20200724213640.389191-15-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20200724213640.389191-1-keescook@chromium.org> References: <20200724213640.389191-1-keescook@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-kselftest-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls. For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents, it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all existing LSMs to retain existing behavior. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- fs/kernel_read_file.c | 2 +- include/linux/ima.h | 6 ++++-- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +++ include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 10 +++++++++- security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- security/security.c | 7 ++++--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 +++-- 9 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/kernel_read_file.c b/fs/kernel_read_file.c index 2e29c38eb4df..d73bc3fa710a 100644 --- a/fs/kernel_read_file.c +++ b/fs/kernel_read_file.c @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, if (ret) return ret; - ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id); + ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id, true); if (ret) goto out; diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 502e36ad7804..259023039dc9 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot); extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents); extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_load_data_id id); -extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id); +extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, + bool contents); extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id); extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry); @@ -91,7 +92,8 @@ static inline int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, return 0; } -static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) +static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, + bool contents) { return 0; } diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index aaa2916bbae7..c2ded57c5d9b 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_load_data, enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_post_load_data, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_read_file, struct file *file, - enum kernel_read_file_id id) + enum kernel_read_file_id id, bool contents) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_post_read_file, struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_fix_setuid, struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 812d626195fc..b66433b5aa15 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -650,6 +650,7 @@ * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read * by the kernel. * @id kernel read file identifier + * @contents if a subsequent @kernel_post_read_file will be called. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @kernel_post_read_file: * Read a file specified by userspace. @@ -658,6 +659,8 @@ * @buf pointer to buffer containing the file contents. * @size length of the file contents. * @id kernel read file identifier + * This must be paired with a prior @kernel_read_file call that had + * @contents set to true. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_fix_setuid: * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index e748974c707b..a5d66b89cd6c 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -390,7 +390,8 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents); int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_load_data_id id); -int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id); +int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, + bool contents); int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id); int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, @@ -1028,7 +1029,8 @@ static inline int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, } static inline int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, - enum kernel_read_file_id id) + enum kernel_read_file_id id, + bool contents) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 1a7bc4c7437d..dc4f90660aa6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -602,6 +602,7 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) * ima_read_file - pre-measure/appraise hook decision based on policy * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit * @read_id: caller identifier + * @contents: whether a subsequent call will be made to ima_post_read_file() * * Permit reading a file based on policy. The policy rules are written * in terms of the policy identifier. Appraising the integrity of @@ -609,8 +610,15 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) * * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES. */ -int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) +int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, + bool contents) { + /* Reject all partial reads during appraisal. */ + if (!contents) { + if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) + return -EACCES; + } + /* * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the * firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c index db320a43f42e..a1778ebef137 100644 --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c @@ -117,11 +117,21 @@ static void loadpin_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb) } } -static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) +static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, + bool contents) { struct super_block *load_root; const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id); + /* + * If we will not know that we'll be seeing the full contents + * then we cannot trust a load will be complete and unchanged + * off disk. Treat all contents=false hooks as if there were + * no associated file struct. + */ + if (!contents) + file = NULL; + /* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */ if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) && ignore_read_file_id[id]) { @@ -178,7 +188,7 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) { - return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id); + return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents); } static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 090674f1197a..800af5403176 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1657,14 +1657,15 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); } -int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) +int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, + bool contents) { int ret; - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id); + ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents); if (ret) return ret; - return ima_read_file(file, id); + return ima_read_file(file, id, contents); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 1a5c68196faf..6d183bbc12a6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4004,13 +4004,14 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) } static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, - enum kernel_read_file_id id) + enum kernel_read_file_id id, + bool contents) { int rc = 0; switch (id) { case READING_MODULE: - rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(file); + rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL); break; default: break;