From patchwork Tue Feb 2 16:26:59 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= X-Patchwork-Id: 12062237 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-21.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C6C58C433E6 for ; Tue, 2 Feb 2021 16:36:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9CFF764F54 for ; Tue, 2 Feb 2021 16:36:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S236596AbhBBQgq (ORCPT ); Tue, 2 Feb 2021 11:36:46 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:53990 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S236532AbhBBQdQ (ORCPT ); Tue, 2 Feb 2021 11:33:16 -0500 Received: from smtp-190d.mail.infomaniak.ch (smtp-190d.mail.infomaniak.ch [IPv6:2001:1600:3:17::190d]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AD92AC061786 for ; Tue, 2 Feb 2021 08:28:12 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp-3-0000.mail.infomaniak.ch (unknown [10.4.36.107]) by smtp-2-3000.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4DVVZr379vzMqQlb; Tue, 2 Feb 2021 17:27:16 +0100 (CET) Received: from localhost (unknown [23.97.221.149]) by smtp-3-0000.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 4DVVZr0C4Mzlh8TJ; Tue, 2 Feb 2021 17:27:16 +0100 (CET) From: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: James Morris , Jann Horn , "Serge E . Hallyn" Cc: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , Al Viro , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Anton Ivanov , Arnd Bergmann , Casey Schaufler , Jeff Dike , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Michael Kerrisk , Richard Weinberger , Shuah Khan , Vincent Dagonneau , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= Subject: [PATCH v28 01/12] landlock: Add object management Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 17:26:59 +0100 Message-Id: <20210202162710.657398-2-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.0 In-Reply-To: <20210202162710.657398-1-mic@digikod.net> References: <20210202162710.657398-1-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Mickaël Salaün A Landlock object enables to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode). A Landlock rule is a set of access rights allowed on an object. Rules are grouped in rulesets that may be tied to a set of processes (i.e. subjects) to enforce a scoped access-control (i.e. a domain). Because Landlock's goal is to empower any process (especially unprivileged ones) to sandbox themselves, we cannot rely on a system-wide object identification such as file extended attributes. Indeed, we need innocuous, composable and modular access-controls. The main challenge with these constraints is to identify kernel objects while this identification is useful (i.e. when a security policy makes use of this object). But this identification data should be freed once no policy is using it. This ephemeral tagging should not and may not be written in the filesystem. We then need to manage the lifetime of a rule according to the lifetime of its objects. To avoid a global lock, this implementation make use of RCU and counters to safely reference objects. A following commit uses this generic object management for inodes. Cc: James Morris Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Serge E. Hallyn Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Reviewed-by: Jann Horn Acked-by: Serge Hallyn --- Changes since v27: * Update Kconfig for landlock_restrict_self(2). * Cosmetic fixes: use 80 columns in Kconfig and align Makefile declarations. Changes since v26: * Update Kconfig for landlock_enforce_ruleset_self(2). * Fix spelling. Changes since v24: * Fix typo in comment (spotted by Jann Horn). * Add Reviewed-by: Jann Horn Changes since v23: * Update landlock_create_object() to return error codes instead of NULL. This help error handling in callers. * When using make oldconfig with a previous configuration already including the CONFIG_LSM variable, no question is asked to update its content. Update the Kconfig help to warn about LSM stacking configuration. * Constify variable (spotted by Vincent Dagonneau). Changes since v22: * Fix spelling (spotted by Jann Horn). Changes since v21: * Update Kconfig help. * Clean up comments. Changes since v18: * Account objects to kmemcg. Changes since v14: * Simplify the object, rule and ruleset management at the expense of a less aggressive memory freeing (contributed by Jann Horn, with additional modifications): - Remove object->list aggregating the rules tied to an object. - Remove landlock_get_object(), landlock_drop_object(), {get,put}_object_cleaner() and landlock_rule_is_disabled(). - Rewrite landlock_put_object() to use a more simple mechanism (no tricky RCU). - Replace enum landlock_object_type and landlock_release_object() with landlock_object_underops->release() - Adjust unions and Sparse annotations. Cf. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez21bEn0wL1bbmTiiu8j9jP5iEWtHOwz4tURUJ+ki0ydYw@mail.gmail.com/ * Merge struct landlock_rule into landlock_ruleset_elem to simplify the rule management. * Constify variables. * Improve kernel documentation. * Cosmetic variable renames. * Remove the "default" in the Kconfig (suggested by Jann Horn). * Only use refcount_inc() through getter helpers. * Update Kconfig description. Changes since v13: * New dedicated implementation, removing the need for eBPF. Previous changes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190721213116.23476-6-mic@digikod.net/ --- MAINTAINERS | 10 +++++ security/Kconfig | 1 + security/Makefile | 2 + security/landlock/Kconfig | 21 +++++++++ security/landlock/Makefile | 3 ++ security/landlock/object.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/landlock/object.h | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 195 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/landlock/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/landlock/Makefile create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.h diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index d3e847f7f3dc..a0e57ade0524 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -9936,6 +9936,16 @@ F: net/core/sock_map.c F: net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c F: net/ipv4/udp_bpf.c +LANDLOCK SECURITY MODULE +M: Mickaël Salaün +L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org +S: Supported +W: https://landlock.io +T: git https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux.git +F: security/landlock/ +K: landlock +K: LANDLOCK + LANTIQ / INTEL Ethernet drivers M: Hauke Mehrtens L: netdev@vger.kernel.org diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 7561f6f99f1d..15a4342b5d01 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ source "security/loadpin/Kconfig" source "security/yama/Kconfig" source "security/safesetid/Kconfig" source "security/lockdown/Kconfig" +source "security/landlock/Kconfig" source "security/integrity/Kconfig" diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index 3baf435de541..47e432900e24 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown subdir-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock # always enable default capabilities obj-y += commoncap.o @@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS) += device_cgroup.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock/ # Object integrity file lists subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..79b7d0c3b11e --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only + +config SECURITY_LANDLOCK + bool "Landlock support" + depends on SECURITY + select SECURITY_PATH + help + Landlock is a safe sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to + restrict themselves (and their future children) by gradually + enforcing tailored access control policies. A security policy is a + set of access rights (e.g. open a file in read-only, make a + directory, etc.) tied to a file hierarchy. Such policy can be + configured and enforced by any processes for themselves thanks to + dedicated system calls: landlock_create_ruleset(), + landlock_add_rule(), and landlock_restrict_self(). + + See Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst for further information. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. Otherwise, + you should also prepend "landlock," to the content of CONFIG_LSM to + enable Landlock at boot time. diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cb6deefbf4c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o + +landlock-y := object.o diff --git a/security/landlock/object.c b/security/landlock/object.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d674fdf9ff04 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/object.c @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Landlock LSM - Object management + * + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "object.h" + +struct landlock_object *landlock_create_object( + const struct landlock_object_underops *const underops, + void *const underobj) +{ + struct landlock_object *new_object; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!underops || !underobj)) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); + new_object = kzalloc(sizeof(*new_object), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!new_object) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + refcount_set(&new_object->usage, 1); + spin_lock_init(&new_object->lock); + new_object->underops = underops; + new_object->underobj = underobj; + return new_object; +} + +/* + * The caller must own the object (i.e. thanks to object->usage) to safely put + * it. + */ +void landlock_put_object(struct landlock_object *const object) +{ + /* + * The call to @object->underops->release(object) might sleep, e.g. + * because of iput(). + */ + might_sleep(); + if (!object) + return; + + /* + * If the @object's refcount cannot drop to zero, we can just decrement + * the refcount without holding a lock. Otherwise, the decrement must + * happen under @object->lock for synchronization with things like + * get_inode_object(). + */ + if (refcount_dec_and_lock(&object->usage, &object->lock)) { + __acquire(&object->lock); + /* + * With @object->lock initially held, remove the reference from + * @object->underobj to @object (if it still exists). + */ + object->underops->release(object); + kfree_rcu(object, rcu_free); + } +} diff --git a/security/landlock/object.h b/security/landlock/object.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..56f17c51df01 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/object.h @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Landlock LSM - Object management + * + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI + */ + +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_OBJECT_H +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_OBJECT_H + +#include +#include +#include + +struct landlock_object; + +/** + * struct landlock_object_underops - Operations on an underlying object + */ +struct landlock_object_underops { + /** + * @release: Releases the underlying object (e.g. iput() for an inode). + */ + void (*release)(struct landlock_object *const object) + __releases(object->lock); +}; + +/** + * struct landlock_object - Security blob tied to a kernel object + * + * The goal of this structure is to enable to tie a set of ephemeral access + * rights (pertaining to different domains) to a kernel object (e.g an inode) + * in a safe way. This implies to handle concurrent use and modification. + * + * The lifetime of a &struct landlock_object depends of the rules referring to + * it. + */ +struct landlock_object { + /** + * @usage: This counter is used to tie an object to the rules matching + * it or to keep it alive while adding a new rule. If this counter + * reaches zero, this struct must not be modified, but this counter can + * still be read from within an RCU read-side critical section. When + * adding a new rule to an object with a usage counter of zero, we must + * wait until the pointer to this object is set to NULL (or recycled). + */ + refcount_t usage; + /** + * @lock: Guards against concurrent modifications. This lock must be + * held from the time @usage drops to zero until any weak references + * from @underobj to this object have been cleaned up. + * + * Lock ordering: inode->i_lock nests inside this. + */ + spinlock_t lock; + /** + * @underobj: Used when cleaning up an object and to mark an object as + * tied to its underlying kernel structure. This pointer is protected + * by @lock. Cf. landlock_release_inodes() and release_inode(). + */ + void *underobj; + union { + /** + * @rcu_free: Enables lockless use of @usage, @lock and + * @underobj from within an RCU read-side critical section. + * @rcu_free and @underops are only used by + * landlock_put_object(). + */ + struct rcu_head rcu_free; + /** + * @underops: Enables landlock_put_object() to release the + * underlying object (e.g. inode). + */ + const struct landlock_object_underops *underops; + }; +}; + +struct landlock_object *landlock_create_object( + const struct landlock_object_underops *const underops, + void *const underobj); + +void landlock_put_object(struct landlock_object *const object); + +static inline void landlock_get_object(struct landlock_object *const object) +{ + if (object) + refcount_inc(&object->usage); +} + +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_OBJECT_H */