From patchwork Tue May 18 07:20:31 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 12263941 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-19.4 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 62429C43461 for ; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 44D9461185 for ; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1347123AbhERHXH (ORCPT ); Tue, 18 May 2021 03:23:07 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:52376 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1347124AbhERHW4 (ORCPT ); Tue, 18 May 2021 03:22:56 -0400 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 751D161360; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:27 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1621322498; bh=4z1NOptCcNImOA4y+p4M8GjPPJf9b9wzlwosak+jq8Y=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=evzHCPxw5BwtRbUqo4xU1QwSGYJK6zBC+wJKKE+NEUAexkHNz6UhKIdbf6ENcjyra vc85ACXLyhV/GM6gkBzRZWVL+kNSHKNHqIqnXjXPkCC8eOLmQ5QbfAPvaTDUmk46O3 rbU2e5J/dCEWRid36bQbwLGx6O7B8bETSpqdtOHWnzqbkCHVpsoj3tKUSbgy+5MfVg oygWs0R+D+3MONwEN1LyuBR+/A6aIVOtpb18sIuYYD1hn0638BapM5z14JXPPqhTmC XD9DjCMYj0mOXddiZJgB82ewJzV0KR/UNuOegJPMrKfR68LuAx9TD4QUk5WTQ8+Ayy 4v1eCEUQVT3/A== From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Hagen Paul Pfeifer , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , James Bottomley , Kees Cook , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Matthew Garrett , Mark Rutland , Michal Hocko , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shakeel Butt , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , Yury Norov , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v20 4/7] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 10:20:31 +0300 Message-Id: <20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Mike Rapoport Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer Acked-by: James Bottomley Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Christopher Lameter Cc: Dan Williams Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Elena Reshetova Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: James Bottomley Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Michael Kerrisk Cc: Palmer Dabbelt Cc: Palmer Dabbelt Cc: Paul Walmsley Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Rick Edgecombe Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Shakeel Butt Cc: Shuah Khan Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Tycho Andersen Cc: Will Deacon --- include/linux/secretmem.h | 48 ++++++++ include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 5 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/gup.c | 12 ++ mm/mlock.c | 3 +- mm/secretmem.c | 239 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c diff --git a/include/linux/secretmem.h b/include/linux/secretmem.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e617b4afcc62 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/secretmem.h @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +#ifndef _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H +#define _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECRETMEM + +extern const struct address_space_operations secretmem_aops; + +static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page) +{ + struct address_space *mapping; + + /* + * Using page_mapping() is quite slow because of the actual call + * instruction and repeated compound_head(page) inside the + * page_mapping() function. + * We know that secretmem pages are not compound and LRU so we can + * save a couple of cycles here. + */ + if (PageCompound(page) || !PageLRU(page)) + return false; + + mapping = (struct address_space *) + ((unsigned long)page->mapping & ~PAGE_MAPPING_FLAGS); + + if (mapping != page->mapping) + return false; + + return mapping->a_ops == &secretmem_aops; +} + +bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma); + +#else + +static inline bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + return false; +} + +static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page) +{ + return false; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */ + +#endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h index f3956fc11de6..35687dcb1a42 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h @@ -97,5 +97,6 @@ #define DEVMEM_MAGIC 0x454d444d /* "DMEM" */ #define Z3FOLD_MAGIC 0x33 #define PPC_CMM_MAGIC 0xc7571590 +#define SECRETMEM_MAGIC 0x5345434d /* "SECM" */ #endif /* __LINUX_MAGIC_H__ */ diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c index 0ea8128468c3..4d7e377a74f3 100644 --- a/kernel/sys_ni.c +++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c @@ -358,6 +358,8 @@ COND_SYSCALL(pkey_mprotect); COND_SYSCALL(pkey_alloc); COND_SYSCALL(pkey_free); +/* memfd_secret */ +COND_SYSCALL(memfd_secret); /* * Architecture specific weak syscall entries. diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig index 02d44e3420f5..6d0972db7278 100644 --- a/mm/Kconfig +++ b/mm/Kconfig @@ -901,4 +901,9 @@ config KMAP_LOCAL # struct io_mapping based helper. Selected by drivers that need them config IO_MAPPING bool + +config SECRETMEM + def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED + select STRICT_DEVMEM + endmenu diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile index bf71e295e9f6..7bb6ed5e42e8 100644 --- a/mm/Makefile +++ b/mm/Makefile @@ -125,3 +125,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS) += mapping_dirty_helpers.o obj-$(CONFIG_PTDUMP_CORE) += ptdump.o obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_REPORTING) += page_reporting.o obj-$(CONFIG_IO_MAPPING) += io-mapping.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECRETMEM) += secretmem.o diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c index 0697134b6a12..6515f82b0f32 100644 --- a/mm/gup.c +++ b/mm/gup.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -816,6 +817,9 @@ struct page *follow_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, struct follow_page_context ctx = { NULL }; struct page *page; + if (vma_is_secretmem(vma)) + return NULL; + page = follow_page_mask(vma, address, foll_flags, &ctx); if (ctx.pgmap) put_dev_pagemap(ctx.pgmap); @@ -949,6 +953,9 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags) if ((gup_flags & FOLL_LONGTERM) && vma_is_fsdax(vma)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (vma_is_secretmem(vma)) + return -EFAULT; + if (write) { if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) { if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE)) @@ -2077,6 +2084,11 @@ static int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, if (!head) goto pte_unmap; + if (unlikely(page_is_secretmem(page))) { + put_compound_head(head, 1, flags); + goto pte_unmap; + } + if (unlikely(pte_val(pte) != pte_val(*ptep))) { put_compound_head(head, 1, flags); goto pte_unmap; diff --git a/mm/mlock.c b/mm/mlock.c index df590fda5688..5e9f4dea4e96 100644 --- a/mm/mlock.c +++ b/mm/mlock.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "internal.h" @@ -503,7 +504,7 @@ static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **prev, if (newflags == vma->vm_flags || (vma->vm_flags & VM_SPECIAL) || is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma) || vma == get_gate_vma(current->mm) || - vma_is_dax(vma)) + vma_is_dax(vma) || vma_is_secretmem(vma)) /* don't set VM_LOCKED or VM_LOCKONFAULT and don't count */ goto out; diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..972cd1bbc3cc --- /dev/null +++ b/mm/secretmem.c @@ -0,0 +1,239 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright IBM Corporation, 2021 + * + * Author: Mike Rapoport + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include + +#include "internal.h" + +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "secretmem: " fmt + +/* + * Define mode and flag masks to allow validation of the system call + * parameters. + */ +#define SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK (0x0) +#define SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK + +static bool secretmem_enable __ro_after_init; +module_param_named(enable, secretmem_enable, bool, 0400); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(secretmem_enable, + "Enable secretmem and memfd_secret(2) system call"); + +static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) +{ + struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file); + pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff; + gfp_t gfp = vmf->gfp_mask; + unsigned long addr; + struct page *page; + int err; + + if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode)) + return vmf_error(-EINVAL); + +retry: + page = find_lock_page(mapping, offset); + if (!page) { + page = alloc_page(gfp | __GFP_ZERO); + if (!page) + return VM_FAULT_OOM; + + err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page); + if (err) { + put_page(page); + return vmf_error(err); + } + + __SetPageUptodate(page); + err = add_to_page_cache_lru(page, mapping, offset, gfp); + if (unlikely(err)) { + put_page(page); + /* + * If a split of large page was required, it + * already happened when we marked the page invalid + * which guarantees that this call won't fail + */ + set_direct_map_default_noflush(page); + if (err == -EEXIST) + goto retry; + + return vmf_error(err); + } + + addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page); + flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE); + } + + vmf->page = page; + return VM_FAULT_LOCKED; +} + +static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = { + .fault = secretmem_fault, +}; + +static int secretmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; + + if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE)) == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + if (mlock_future_check(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_flags | VM_LOCKED, len)) + return -EAGAIN; + + vma->vm_flags |= VM_LOCKED | VM_DONTDUMP; + vma->vm_ops = &secretmem_vm_ops; + + return 0; +} + +bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + return vma->vm_ops == &secretmem_vm_ops; +} + +static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = { + .mmap = secretmem_mmap, +}; + +static bool secretmem_isolate_page(struct page *page, isolate_mode_t mode) +{ + return false; +} + +static int secretmem_migratepage(struct address_space *mapping, + struct page *newpage, struct page *page, + enum migrate_mode mode) +{ + return -EBUSY; +} + +static void secretmem_freepage(struct page *page) +{ + set_direct_map_default_noflush(page); + clear_highpage(page); +} + +const struct address_space_operations secretmem_aops = { + .freepage = secretmem_freepage, + .migratepage = secretmem_migratepage, + .isolate_page = secretmem_isolate_page, +}; + +static struct vfsmount *secretmem_mnt; + +static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags) +{ + struct file *file = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + struct inode *inode; + + inode = alloc_anon_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb); + if (IS_ERR(inode)) + return ERR_CAST(inode); + + file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, secretmem_mnt, "secretmem", + O_RDWR, &secretmem_fops); + if (IS_ERR(file)) + goto err_free_inode; + + mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_HIGHUSER); + mapping_set_unevictable(inode->i_mapping); + + inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &secretmem_aops; + + /* pretend we are a normal file with zero size */ + inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG; + inode->i_size = 0; + + return file; + +err_free_inode: + iput(inode); + return file; +} + +SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned int, flags) +{ + struct file *file; + int fd, err; + + /* make sure local flags do not confict with global fcntl.h */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK & O_CLOEXEC); + + if (!secretmem_enable) + return -ENOSYS; + + if (flags & ~(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK | O_CLOEXEC)) + return -EINVAL; + + fd = get_unused_fd_flags(flags & O_CLOEXEC); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + file = secretmem_file_create(flags); + if (IS_ERR(file)) { + err = PTR_ERR(file); + goto err_put_fd; + } + + file->f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE; + + fd_install(fd, file); + return fd; + +err_put_fd: + put_unused_fd(fd); + return err; +} + +static int secretmem_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc) +{ + return init_pseudo(fc, SECRETMEM_MAGIC) ? 0 : -ENOMEM; +} + +static struct file_system_type secretmem_fs = { + .name = "secretmem", + .init_fs_context = secretmem_init_fs_context, + .kill_sb = kill_anon_super, +}; + +static int secretmem_init(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (!secretmem_enable) + return ret; + + secretmem_mnt = kern_mount(&secretmem_fs); + if (IS_ERR(secretmem_mnt)) + ret = PTR_ERR(secretmem_mnt); + + /* prevent secretmem mappings from ever getting PROT_EXEC */ + secretmem_mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_NOEXEC; + + return ret; +} +fs_initcall(secretmem_init);