diff mbox series

[v1,14/23] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs()

Message ID 20231108183003.5981-15-xin3.li@intel.com (mailing list archive)
State New
Headers show
Series Enable FRED with KVM VMX | expand

Commit Message

Li, Xin3 Nov. 8, 2023, 6:29 p.m. UTC 
Add FRED related VMCS fields to dump_vmcs() to have it dump FRED context.

Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

Comments

Nikolay Borisov Nov. 14, 2023, 2:36 p.m. UTC | #1 
On 8.11.23 г. 20:29 ч., Xin Li wrote:
> Add FRED related VMCS fields to dump_vmcs() to have it dump FRED context.
> 
> Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>   1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 518e68ee5a0d..b826dc188fc7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -6429,7 +6429,7 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
>   	u32 vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl;
>   	u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl, pin_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control;
> -	u64 tertiary_exec_control;
> +	u64 tertiary_exec_control, secondary_vmexit_ctl;
>   	unsigned long cr4;
>   	int efer_slot;
>   
> @@ -6440,6 +6440,8 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   
>   	vmentry_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS);
>   	vmexit_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS);
> +	secondary_vmexit_ctl = cpu_has_secondary_vmexit_ctrls() ?
> +			       vmcs_read64(SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS) : 0;
>   	cpu_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
>   	pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
>   	cr4 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4);
> @@ -6486,6 +6488,19 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   	vmx_dump_sel("LDTR:", GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR);
>   	vmx_dump_dtsel("IDTR:", GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
>   	vmx_dump_sel("TR:  ", GUEST_TR_SELECTOR);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> +	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {

Shouldn't this be gated on whether FRED is enabled in kvm aka the CPUID 
bit is enumerated ?

<snip>
Li, Xin3 Nov. 15, 2023, 2:41 a.m. UTC | #2 
> > @@ -6440,6 +6440,8 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >
> >   	vmentry_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS);
> >   	vmexit_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS);
> > +	secondary_vmexit_ctl = cpu_has_secondary_vmexit_ctrls() ?
> > +			       vmcs_read64(SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS) : 0;
> >   	cpu_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
> >   	pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
> >   	cr4 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4);
> > @@ -6486,6 +6488,19 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >   	vmx_dump_sel("LDTR:", GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR);
> >   	vmx_dump_dtsel("IDTR:", GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
> >   	vmx_dump_sel("TR:  ", GUEST_TR_SELECTOR);
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> > +	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
> 
> Shouldn't this be gated on whether FRED is enabled in kvm aka the CPUID bit is
> enumerated ?

Yeah, that is more accurate.
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 518e68ee5a0d..b826dc188fc7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6429,7 +6429,7 @@  void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 	u32 vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl;
 	u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl, pin_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control;
-	u64 tertiary_exec_control;
+	u64 tertiary_exec_control, secondary_vmexit_ctl;
 	unsigned long cr4;
 	int efer_slot;
 
@@ -6440,6 +6440,8 @@  void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	vmentry_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS);
 	vmexit_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS);
+	secondary_vmexit_ctl = cpu_has_secondary_vmexit_ctrls() ?
+			       vmcs_read64(SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS) : 0;
 	cpu_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
 	pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
 	cr4 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4);
@@ -6486,6 +6488,19 @@  void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vmx_dump_sel("LDTR:", GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR);
 	vmx_dump_dtsel("IDTR:", GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
 	vmx_dump_sel("TR:  ", GUEST_TR_SELECTOR);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
+		pr_err("FRED guest: config=0x%016llx, stack levels=0x%016llx\n"
+		       "RSP0=0x%016lx, RSP1=0x%016llx\n"
+		       "RSP2=0x%016llx, RSP3=0x%016llx\n",
+		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG),
+		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS),
+		       read_msr(MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0),
+		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1),
+		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2),
+		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3));
+	}
+#endif
 	efer_slot = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&vmx->msr_autoload.guest, MSR_EFER);
 	if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
 		pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_EFER));
@@ -6533,6 +6548,19 @@  void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	       vmcs_readl(HOST_TR_BASE));
 	pr_err("GDTBase=%016lx IDTBase=%016lx\n",
 	       vmcs_readl(HOST_GDTR_BASE), vmcs_readl(HOST_IDTR_BASE));
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
+		pr_err("FRED host: config=0x%016llx, stack levels=0x%016llx\n"
+		       "RSP0=0x%016llx, RSP1=0x%016llx\n"
+		       "RSP2=0x%016llx, RSP3=0x%016llx\n",
+		       vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG),
+		       vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS),
+		       vmx->msr_host_fred_rsp0,
+		       vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP1),
+		       vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP2),
+		       vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP3));
+	}
+#endif
 	pr_err("CR0=%016lx CR3=%016lx CR4=%016lx\n",
 	       vmcs_readl(HOST_CR0), vmcs_readl(HOST_CR3),
 	       vmcs_readl(HOST_CR4));
@@ -6554,25 +6582,31 @@  void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	pr_err("*** Control State ***\n");
 	pr_err("CPUBased=0x%08x SecondaryExec=0x%08x TertiaryExec=0x%016llx\n",
 	       cpu_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control, tertiary_exec_control);
-	pr_err("PinBased=0x%08x EntryControls=%08x ExitControls=%08x\n",
-	       pin_based_exec_ctrl, vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl);
+	pr_err("PinBased=0x%08x EntryControls=0x%08x\n",
+	       pin_based_exec_ctrl, vmentry_ctl);
+	pr_err("ExitControls=0x%08x SecondaryExitControls=0x%016llx\n",
+	       vmexit_ctl, secondary_vmexit_ctl);
 	pr_err("ExceptionBitmap=%08x PFECmask=%08x PFECmatch=%08x\n",
 	       vmcs_read32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP),
 	       vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK),
 	       vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH));
-	pr_err("VMEntry: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
+	pr_err("VMEntry: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x event data=%016llx\n",
 	       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),
 	       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE),
-	       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN),
+	       cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED) ?
+	       vmcs_read64(INJECTED_EVENT_DATA) : 0);
 	pr_err("VMExit: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
 	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO),
 	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),
 	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
 	pr_err("        reason=%08x qualification=%016lx\n",
 	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON), vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION));
-	pr_err("IDTVectoring: info=%08x errcode=%08x\n",
+	pr_err("IDTVectoring: info=%08x errcode=%08x event data=%016llx\n",
 	       vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD),
-	       vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE));
+	       vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE),
+	       cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED) ?
+	       vmcs_read64(ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA) : 0);
 	pr_err("TSC Offset = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(TSC_OFFSET));
 	if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING)
 		pr_err("TSC Multiplier = 0x%016llx\n",