From patchwork Tue May 10 18:08:49 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Reinette Chatre X-Patchwork-Id: 12845364 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A40B5C433FE for ; Tue, 10 May 2022 18:09:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1348650AbiEJSNb (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 May 2022 14:13:31 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58148 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1348565AbiEJSNW (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 May 2022 14:13:22 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06b.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 57CFB2634; Tue, 10 May 2022 11:09:24 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1652206164; x=1683742164; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=T3NibJYeFifD2Khb+6wDuupuzMBFL4C7BsZG+q3UhRg=; b=TRCmAy66FzsnSu85IPZIx++mBJ9qPTfq993/J1qyRkyWrJ16RXuM5lkD Vwpur0UDkjgHlwFHrqoVPop4h06NyFZNG/xHVD5sGkGiepeoQ2KrxlBnU yJ13bUu+WozHJ0nFtmRUKPmBuu+rVxBKiRjoVQLHM9ghK58nveohlVUga ED2yEvXD3t/tQP6Y24PXgCeOEzWOYZgMp/H6ZmLMBoBs6nYQYUPXQhXG6 awFTEdhoHuOYx2J/JTpT6udMmVN+braBY1CYf2R0AJbV1Ysw+bdfO6Afg Yj2Mxgw2onn2z3Kyvn788OmSKX11Rz4xRmKNL8W5O8aY7KsG5faE1l4yB w==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6400,9594,10343"; a="330057529" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.91,214,1647327600"; d="scan'208";a="330057529" Received: from orsmga006.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.51]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 10 May 2022 11:09:17 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.91,214,1647327600"; d="scan'208";a="541908782" Received: from rchatre-ws.ostc.intel.com ([10.54.69.144]) by orsmga006-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 10 May 2022 11:09:16 -0700 From: Reinette Chatre To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V5 13/31] x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_page_alloc() Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 11:08:49 -0700 Message-Id: <57ae71b4ea17998467670232e12d6617b95c6811.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Jarkko Sakkinen Move sgx_encl_page_alloc() to encl.c and export it so that it can be used in the implementation for support of adding pages to initialized enclaves, which requires to allocate new enclave pages. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre --- No changes since V4. Changes since V2: - New patch Originally submitted at: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/20220308112833.262805-3-jarkko@kernel.org/ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 32 -------------------------------- 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index 91df05c6568f..2f053af9ce3e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -882,6 +882,38 @@ int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm, return ret; } +struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long offset, + u64 secinfo_flags) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; + unsigned long prot; + + encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!encl_page) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset; + encl_page->encl = encl; + + prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) | + _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) | + _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC); + + /* + * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO + * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided + * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions. + */ + if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) + prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; + + /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */ + encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0); + + return encl_page; +} + /** * sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() - remove PTEs mapping the address from enclave * @encl: the enclave diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h index b6b53c0346ad..2cb58ab868e5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h @@ -112,6 +112,9 @@ int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index, void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing); int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm, struct sgx_encl_page *page); +struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long offset, + u64 secinfo_flags); void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr); struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(void); unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 2df27dd8b30d..bb8cdb2ad0d1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -169,38 +169,6 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) return ret; } -static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl, - unsigned long offset, - u64 secinfo_flags) -{ - struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; - unsigned long prot; - - encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!encl_page) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - - encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset; - encl_page->encl = encl; - - prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) | - _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) | - _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC); - - /* - * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO - * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided - * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions. - */ - if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) - prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; - - /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */ - encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0); - - return encl_page; -} - static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo) { u64 perm = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK;