From patchwork Mon Sep 5 07:05:51 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 12965622 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F8FDECAAD5 for ; Mon, 5 Sep 2022 07:08:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S237095AbiIEHIE (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Sep 2022 03:08:04 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:47214 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237050AbiIEHHI (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Sep 2022 03:07:08 -0400 Received: from mail-ej1-x62a.google.com (mail-ej1-x62a.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::62a]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 00DCC3ED4B; Mon, 5 Sep 2022 00:06:41 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ej1-x62a.google.com with SMTP id og21so15165227ejc.2; Mon, 05 Sep 2022 00:06:41 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date; bh=xCw5q8VQfq0DXn00kPNE+QaTnVNFPq55IEgRZMfRqU4=; b=aP/x3S+ifdbsqeyNf828x+/CIreGIilRQ5hdAQKDHo0oOQ0K0e5CAF8cV2J+5zxhZB ywBtmgEO2/qJs/zbfmhBeIPGGu/UQfe43rbP7eXCKFlvNI3vv2gnsDrDzRDgCZGBH1u8 F+Z0LHsCm/onsSOWwDATPBuVu17pZfUM1oLm7pY0FHAtYmnU4hD7xkU82SXUUWS612Ts UwMiGcTRratqzlQCiIOKCpVrcjrnjpfuwg50tndV4+opLCm7CFwk7de/gAVejYkfnYdk 4u6WV3R3CdpzueghIDlOEipop/FSypOZi6uxqijtrx29m8sapi/BjF3dhtGEEsODGc0f /fcg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date; bh=xCw5q8VQfq0DXn00kPNE+QaTnVNFPq55IEgRZMfRqU4=; b=05tw2gMsToahNVbQL/yhMkrYKtJEZovAh+yOUtsYjgVhifCYhz8HDIacif0Dm0m/6x yJgQUivBJVomz5uP2JuJYwY+pps935AP/oYcUtDMqEQ8thoMYvS4BVYC3CcDmg8biqIi I9T8qqsaeR4j6E//9vX/z+UQbzVOvI7JbgTSPkTvfhrBZA8L8jj+8nPjq/h0ruswspli vaAaSH7uKyfmyXDRKJmIhokvgdDzE3LF6ud/FQl6wn+GL5/ISTqhaRmHWnm94xMFbP7s +91LQDB7SM5jbGYtgDW6OOYOvIO9DmwP2odC3n04mC/bxdip9HsypTf1ZKHq/5ZNXhXn kDBQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo31gl8UhPogr7LdcqtziRumzGb5BVSTfHffwqrVYy+bhL0eqi08 XIIPbJRQOo2YhcTy188QwqQ= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR7KZ0zj50JBamW+PXK8JbC+ASu8tl1LmnA5B9JPCduYa3DDJDy2eUjr9xb7Vvnt/OkLywu5FA== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:974b:b0:733:10e:b940 with SMTP id o11-20020a170906974b00b00733010eb940mr34863864ejy.326.1662361600536; Mon, 05 Sep 2022 00:06:40 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:a080:40ec:9f50:387:3cfb]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id n27-20020a056402515b00b0043cf2e0ce1csm5882775edd.48.2022.09.05.00.06.38 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 05 Sep 2022 00:06:40 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Salam Noureddine , Philip Paeps , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v8 15/26] tcp: authopt: Add prefixlen support Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2022 10:05:51 +0300 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org This allows making a key apply to an addr/prefix instead of just the full addr. This is enabled through a custom flag, default behavior is still full address match. This is equivalent to TCP_MD5SIG_FLAG_PREFIX from TCP_MD5SIG and has the same use-cases. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 1 + include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 2 + include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 10 ++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst index cbdea65e2b5d..d0191d0c6c02 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst @@ -38,10 +38,11 @@ new flags. * Address binding is optional, by default keys match all addresses * Local address is ignored, matching is done by remote address * Ports are ignored * It is possible to match a specific VRF by l3index (default is to ignore) + * It is possible to match with a fixed prefixlen (default is full address) RFC5925 requires that key ids do not overlap when tcp identifiers (addr/port) overlap. This is not enforced by linux, configuring ambiguous keys will result in packet drops and lost connections. diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index e450f7c30043..6260c3ef6864 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -47,10 +47,12 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info { u8 keylen; /** @key: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.key */ u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN]; /** @l3index: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.ifindex */ int l3index; + /** @prefixlen: Length of addr match (default full) */ + int prefixlen; /** @addr: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.addr */ struct sockaddr_storage addr; /** @alg: Algorithm implementation matching alg_id */ struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; }; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h index 28be52f4e411..274ddfefd6de 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h @@ -372,18 +372,21 @@ struct tcp_authopt { * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr` * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.ifindex` * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND: Key invalid for send (expired) * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV: Key invalid for recv (expired) + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN: Valid value in `tcp_authopt.prefixlen`, otherwise + * match full address length */ enum tcp_authopt_key_flag { TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 << 0), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 << 1), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 << 2), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX = (1 << 3), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND = (1 << 4), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV = (1 << 5), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN = (1 << 6), }; /** * enum tcp_authopt_alg - Algorithms for TCP Authentication Option */ @@ -434,10 +437,17 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key { * connections through this interface. Interface must be an vrf master. * * This is similar to `tcp_msg5sig.tcpm_ifindex` */ int ifindex; + /** + * @prefixlen: length of prefix to match + * + * Without the TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN flag this is ignored and a full + * address match is performed. + */ + int prefixlen; }; /* setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE, ...) */ #define TCP_RECEIVE_ZEROCOPY_FLAG_TLB_CLEAN_HINT 0x1 diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 3704af8202eb..daeecb64c89e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -4,10 +4,11 @@ #include #include #include #include #include +#include /* This is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through * a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced. */ int sysctl_tcp_authopt; @@ -269,10 +270,14 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_exact(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *info, return false; if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX)) return false; if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) && info->l3index != key->ifindex) return false; + if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN)) + return false; + if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) && info->prefixlen != key->prefixlen) + return false; if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND)) return false; if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) if (!ipvx_addr_match(&info->addr, &key->addr)) return false; @@ -286,17 +291,20 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_skb_addr(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, u16 keyaf = key->addr.ss_family; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *)skb_network_header(skb); if (keyaf == AF_INET && iph->version == 4) { struct sockaddr_in *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr; + __be32 mask = inet_make_mask(key->prefixlen); - return iph->saddr == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; + return (iph->saddr & mask) == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; } else if (keyaf == AF_INET6 && iph->version == 6) { struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = (struct ipv6hdr *)skb_network_header(skb); struct sockaddr_in6 *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr; - return ipv6_addr_equal(&ip6h->saddr, &key_addr->sin6_addr); + return ipv6_prefix_equal(&ip6h->saddr, + &key_addr->sin6_addr, + key->prefixlen); } /* This actually happens with ipv6-mapped-ipv4-addresses * IPv6 listen sockets will be asked to validate ipv4 packets. */ @@ -312,17 +320,20 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, if (keyaf != addr_sk->sk_family) return false; if (keyaf == AF_INET) { struct sockaddr_in *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr; + __be32 mask = inet_make_mask(key->prefixlen); - return addr_sk->sk_daddr == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; + return (addr_sk->sk_daddr & mask) == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) } else if (keyaf == AF_INET6) { struct sockaddr_in6 *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr; - return ipv6_addr_equal(&addr_sk->sk_v6_daddr, &key_addr->sin6_addr); + return ipv6_prefix_equal(&addr_sk->sk_v6_daddr, + &key_addr->sin6_addr, + key->prefixlen); #endif } return false; } @@ -348,10 +359,16 @@ static bool better_key_match(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *old, struct tcp_authop /* l3index always overrides non-l3index */ if (old->l3index && new->l3index == 0) return false; if (old->l3index == 0 && new->l3index) return true; + /* Full address match overrides match by prefixlen */ + if (!(new->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) && (old->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN)) + return false; + /* Longer prefixes are better matches */ + if (new->prefixlen > old->prefixlen) + return true; return false; } /** @@ -536,21 +553,32 @@ int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) #define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV) +static bool ipv6_addr_is_prefix(struct in6_addr *addr, int plen) +{ + struct in6_addr copy; + + ipv6_addr_prefix(©, addr, plen); + + return !memcmp(©, addr, sizeof(*addr)); +} + int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct tcp_authopt_key opt; struct tcp_authopt_info *info; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info, *old_key_info; struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk); struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; int l3index = 0; + int prefixlen; int err; sock_owned_by_me(sk); err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); if (err) @@ -586,10 +614,36 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) { if (sk->sk_family != opt.addr.ss_family) return -EINVAL; } + /* check prefixlen */ + if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) { + prefixlen = opt.prefixlen; + if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET) { + if (prefixlen < 0 || prefixlen > 32) + return -EINVAL; + if (((struct sockaddr_in *)&opt.addr)->sin_addr.s_addr & + ~inet_make_mask(prefixlen)) + return -EINVAL; + } + if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6) { + if (prefixlen < 0 || prefixlen > 128) + return -EINVAL; + if (!ipv6_addr_is_prefix(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&opt.addr)->sin6_addr, + prefixlen)) + return -EINVAL; + } + } else { + if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET) + prefixlen = 32; + else if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6) + prefixlen = 128; + else + return -EINVAL; + } + /* Initialize tcp_authopt_info if not already set */ info = __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(sk); if (IS_ERR(info)) return PTR_ERR(info); @@ -635,10 +689,11 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) key_info->alg = alg; key_info->keylen = opt.keylen; memcpy(key_info->key, opt.key, opt.keylen); memcpy(&key_info->addr, &opt.addr, sizeof(key_info->addr)); key_info->l3index = l3index; + key_info->prefixlen = prefixlen; hlist_add_head_rcu(&key_info->node, &net->head); mutex_unlock(&net->mutex); return 0; }