From patchwork Mon Sep 5 07:05:57 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 12965627 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B0F84C6FA8B for ; Mon, 5 Sep 2022 07:08:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S237367AbiIEHIX (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Sep 2022 03:08:23 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:46656 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237235AbiIEHHU (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Sep 2022 03:07:20 -0400 Received: from mail-ej1-x631.google.com (mail-ej1-x631.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::631]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E11C33E75D; Mon, 5 Sep 2022 00:06:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ej1-x631.google.com with SMTP id nc14so15130423ejc.4; Mon, 05 Sep 2022 00:06:53 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date; bh=DDAdDDKNEDarG/TIf8PFofQDb3qfrTMogxncAYXkt6w=; b=qHAr5AkJfyzOu+SmLgqy5OQk+/UYRT1W7NkB2/QpyCzRozYxs9G/7kF7TSBbauwAgn ynQUWnd54yS49tmunW8JNTPKYmSCLGoLwxnzoxDigwafoHqRdGNCqbu1MZ6y09YtTgID LVqiWWRfrcs+z7j7plLl37RiStbVboXFd1VpKhM0KeVY3a6stEIy45lkpYTp0XGf674P STWvze4CVla7I+hrmy0CLYZc7Iosa6vcEJRWMOt19UFSK/g1ek3YwXnU8GhPwqB7N2Qv x9HixUHpU45pdReXE7A06paXk1XNkqQJFUsBJVvuWQX+R+6KKQZIrsLpzF02yTAjc80O gexw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date; bh=DDAdDDKNEDarG/TIf8PFofQDb3qfrTMogxncAYXkt6w=; b=znDJdlIXjOx4WgGZapb6B9V021pZ6iws0XXrVcMxJMMArMsiwBF8Mj+6KdvFEJdk+Y Owmcd1bV52Wz7Z5wCfVKNSFzt81uowPBlAvcHzVBp+gPB25YP+/A8RMu8AtpygWWmcml 3nzWFrOmzFqQ7Xfy6qd8K5ARnRoD8fZh+EaxU5KuwqOht8uNS2ZXwseQnFaXM6GCodlk +/MN8QYaisRWNcXcP1ITTYrksM8gZWJe0eWaWerI1PVa8SwDNoiLdngfXEmfmdrRXpN6 ihJQvBx/c4ET81L7Gq1zURS/JgmtNq1p9EeCppWNgOwKbbPBswCXHM2Gw6j4PhSf8wmK xCdw== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo0tmCQutDPucS+p6VJc1UtCTzHQ5SQfX1/Svbt3X6lb4bGeZL3E AxyubvqFYGVBCbVRsKRoyFg= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR5UqzREzQuzbsICKrpM6inAHXBhpxHPuhhpm/ZCRcLijdKba4gkwmgqgQzk5w5FhwIJmKXloQ== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:8a52:b0:741:5a6e:adb5 with SMTP id gx18-20020a1709068a5200b007415a6eadb5mr26856216ejc.47.1662361612428; Mon, 05 Sep 2022 00:06:52 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:a080:40ec:9f50:387:3cfb]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id n27-20020a056402515b00b0043cf2e0ce1csm5882775edd.48.2022.09.05.00.06.50 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 05 Sep 2022 00:06:52 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Cc: Francesco Ruggeri , Salam Noureddine , Philip Paeps , Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v8 21/26] tcp: authopt: Try to respect rnextkeyid from SYN on SYNACK Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2022 10:05:57 +0300 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org According to the RFC we should use the key that the peer suggests via rnextkeyid. This is currently done by storing recv_rnextkeyid in tcp_authopt_info but this does not work for the SYNACK case because the tcp_request_sock does not hold an info pointer for reasons of memory usage. Handle this by storing recv_rnextkeyid inside tcp_request_sock. This doesn't increase the memory usage because there are unused bytes at the end. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/linux/tcp.h | 6 ++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 14 +++++++++++--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h index 551942883f06..6a4ff0ed55c6 100644 --- a/include/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/linux/tcp.h @@ -125,10 +125,13 @@ struct tcp_options_received { u8 saw_unknown:1, /* Received unknown option */ unused:7; u8 num_sacks; /* Number of SACK blocks */ u16 user_mss; /* mss requested by user in ioctl */ u16 mss_clamp; /* Maximal mss, negotiated at connection setup */ +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + u8 rnextkeyid; +#endif }; static inline void tcp_clear_options(struct tcp_options_received *rx_opt) { rx_opt->tstamp_ok = rx_opt->sack_ok = 0; @@ -163,10 +166,13 @@ struct tcp_request_sock { u32 rcv_nxt; /* the ack # by SYNACK. For * FastOpen it's the seq# * after data-in-SYN. */ u8 syn_tos; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + u8 recv_rnextkeyid; +#endif }; static inline struct tcp_request_sock *tcp_rsk(const struct request_sock *req) { return (struct tcp_request_sock *)req; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 2a1ddae69b27..a141439d9ebe 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -547,21 +547,29 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk, struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk); bool anykey = false; int pref_send_id; /* Listen sockets don't refer to any specific connection so we don't try - * to keep using the same key and ignore any received keyids. + * to keep using the same key. + * The rnextkeyid is stored in tcp_request_sock */ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) { + struct tcp_request_sock *rsk; + + if (WARN_ONCE(addr_sk->sk_state != TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV, "bad socket state")) + return NULL; + rsk = tcp_rsk((struct request_sock *)addr_sk); + /* Forcing a specific send_keyid on a listen socket forces it for + * all clients so is unlikely to be useful. + */ if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID) pref_send_id = info->user_pref_send_keyid; else - pref_send_id = -1; + pref_send_id = rsk->recv_rnextkeyid; key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, pref_send_id, rnextkeyid, &anykey); if (!key && anykey) return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); - return key; } /* Try to keep the same sending key unless user or peer requires a different key * User request (via TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID) always overrides peer request. diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 4da39c32b934..6f477b110896 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -4108,10 +4108,18 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, /* * The MD5 Hash has already been * checked (see tcp_v{4,6}_do_rcv()). */ break; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + case TCPOPT_AUTHOPT: + /* Hash has already been checked. + * We parse rnextkeyid here so we can match it on synack + */ + opt_rx->rnextkeyid = ptr[1]; + break; #endif case TCPOPT_FASTOPEN: tcp_parse_fastopen_option( opsize - TCPOLEN_FASTOPEN_BASE, ptr, th->syn, foc, false); @@ -6964,10 +6972,14 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, tcp_clear_options(&tmp_opt); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMC) && want_cookie) tmp_opt.smc_ok = 0; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + tcp_rsk(req)->recv_rnextkeyid = tmp_opt.rnextkeyid; +#endif + tmp_opt.tstamp_ok = tmp_opt.saw_tstamp; tcp_openreq_init(req, &tmp_opt, skb, sk); inet_rsk(req)->no_srccheck = inet_sk(sk)->transparent; /* Note: tcp_v6_init_req() might override ir_iif for link locals */