@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@
#include "vivid-ctrls.h"
#include "vivid-sdr-cap.h"
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
/* stream formats */
struct vivid_format {
u32 pixelformat;
@@ -320,11 +322,15 @@ int vivid_sdr_enum_freq_bands(struct file *file, void *fh,
case 0:
if (band->index >= ARRAY_SIZE(bands_adc))
return -EINVAL;
+ band->index = array_index_nospec(band->index,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(bands_adc));
*band = bands_adc[band->index];
return 0;
case 1:
if (band->index >= ARRAY_SIZE(bands_fm))
return -EINVAL;
+ band->index = array_index_nospec(band->index,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(bands_fm));
*band = bands_fm[band->index];
return 0;
default:
band->index can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. Smatch warning: drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-sdr-cap.c:323 vivid_sdr_enum_freq_bands() warn: potential spectre issue 'bands_adc' Fix this by sanitizing band->index before using it to index bands_adc and bands_fm. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> --- drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-sdr-cap.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)