| Message ID | 76f96eb9162b3a7fa5949d71af38bf8fdf6924c4.1553093421.git.andreyknvl@google.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | arm64: untag user pointers passed to the kernel | expand |
On 20/03/2019 14:51, Andrey Konovalov wrote: > This patch is a part of a series that extends arm64 kernel ABI to allow to > pass tagged user pointers (with the top byte set to something else other > than 0x00) as syscall arguments. > > prctl_set_mm() and prctl_set_mm_map() use provided user pointers for vma > lookups and do some pointer comparisons to perform validation, which can > only by done with untagged pointers. > > Untag user pointers in these functions for vma lookup and validity checks. > > Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> > --- > kernel/sys.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- > 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c > index 12df0e5434b8..fe26ccf3c9e6 100644 > --- a/kernel/sys.c > +++ b/kernel/sys.c > @@ -1885,11 +1885,12 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd) > * WARNING: we don't require any capability here so be very careful > * in what is allowed for modification from userspace. > */ > -static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) > +static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *tagged_prctl_map) > { > unsigned long mmap_max_addr = TASK_SIZE; > struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; > int error = -EINVAL, i; > + struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map; > > static const unsigned char offsets[] = { > offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_code), > @@ -1905,12 +1906,25 @@ static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) > offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_end), > }; > > + memcpy(&prctl_map, tagged_prctl_map, sizeof(prctl_map)); > + prctl_map.start_code = untagged_addr(prctl_map.start_code); > + prctl_map.end_code = untagged_addr(prctl_map.end_code); > + prctl_map.start_data = untagged_addr(prctl_map.start_data); > + prctl_map.end_data = untagged_addr(prctl_map.end_data); > + prctl_map.start_brk = untagged_addr(prctl_map.start_brk); > + prctl_map.brk = untagged_addr(prctl_map.brk); > + prctl_map.start_stack = untagged_addr(prctl_map.start_stack); > + prctl_map.arg_start = untagged_addr(prctl_map.arg_start); > + prctl_map.arg_end = untagged_addr(prctl_map.arg_end); > + prctl_map.env_start = untagged_addr(prctl_map.env_start); > + prctl_map.env_end = untagged_addr(prctl_map.env_end); > + > /* > * Make sure the members are not somewhere outside > * of allowed address space. > */ > for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(offsets); i++) { > - u64 val = *(u64 *)((char *)prctl_map + offsets[i]); > + u64 val = *(u64 *)((char *)&prctl_map + offsets[i]); > > if ((unsigned long)val >= mmap_max_addr || > (unsigned long)val < mmap_min_addr) > @@ -1921,8 +1935,8 @@ static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) > * Make sure the pairs are ordered. > */ > #define __prctl_check_order(__m1, __op, __m2) \ > - ((unsigned long)prctl_map->__m1 __op \ > - (unsigned long)prctl_map->__m2) ? 0 : -EINVAL > + ((unsigned long)prctl_map.__m1 __op \ > + (unsigned long)prctl_map.__m2) ? 0 : -EINVAL > error = __prctl_check_order(start_code, <, end_code); > error |= __prctl_check_order(start_data, <, end_data); > error |= __prctl_check_order(start_brk, <=, brk); > @@ -1937,23 +1951,24 @@ static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) > /* > * @brk should be after @end_data in traditional maps. > */ > - if (prctl_map->start_brk <= prctl_map->end_data || > - prctl_map->brk <= prctl_map->end_data) > + if (prctl_map.start_brk <= prctl_map.end_data || > + prctl_map.brk <= prctl_map.end_data) > goto out; > > /* > * Neither we should allow to override limits if they set. > */ > - if (check_data_rlimit(rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA), prctl_map->brk, > - prctl_map->start_brk, prctl_map->end_data, > - prctl_map->start_data)) > + if (check_data_rlimit(rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA), prctl_map.brk, > + prctl_map.start_brk, prctl_map.end_data, > + prctl_map.start_data)) > goto out; > > /* > * Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector. > */ > - if (prctl_map->auxv_size) { > - if (!prctl_map->auxv || prctl_map->auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)) > + if (prctl_map.auxv_size) { > + if (!prctl_map.auxv || prctl_map.auxv_size > > + sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)) > goto out; > } > > @@ -1962,7 +1977,7 @@ static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) > * change /proc/pid/exe link: only local sys admin should > * be allowed to. > */ > - if (prctl_map->exe_fd != (u32)-1) { > + if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) { > if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > goto out; > } > @@ -2120,13 +2135,14 @@ static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr, > if (opt == PR_SET_MM_AUXV) > return prctl_set_auxv(mm, addr, arg4); > > - if (addr >= TASK_SIZE || addr < mmap_min_addr) > + if (untagged_addr(addr) >= TASK_SIZE || > + untagged_addr(addr) < mmap_min_addr) > return -EINVAL; > > error = -EINVAL; > > down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); > - vma = find_vma(mm, addr); > + vma = find_vma(mm, untagged_addr(addr)); > > prctl_map.start_code = mm->start_code; > prctl_map.end_code = mm->end_code; I think this new version is consistent w.r.t. tagged/untagged pointer usage. However, I also note that a significant change has been introduced: it is now possible to set MM fields to tagged addresses (tags are ignored by validate_prctl_map()). I am not opposed to this as such, but have you considered the implications? Does it make sense to have a tagged value for e.g. prctl_map.arg_start? Is the kernel able to handle tagged values in those fields? I have the feeling that it's safer to discard tags for now, and if necessary allow them to be preserved later on. Kevin
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 12df0e5434b8..fe26ccf3c9e6 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -1885,11 +1885,12 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd) * WARNING: we don't require any capability here so be very careful * in what is allowed for modification from userspace. */ -static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) +static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *tagged_prctl_map) { unsigned long mmap_max_addr = TASK_SIZE; struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; int error = -EINVAL, i; + struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map; static const unsigned char offsets[] = { offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_code), @@ -1905,12 +1906,25 @@ static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_end), }; + memcpy(&prctl_map, tagged_prctl_map, sizeof(prctl_map)); + prctl_map.start_code = untagged_addr(prctl_map.start_code); + prctl_map.end_code = untagged_addr(prctl_map.end_code); + prctl_map.start_data = untagged_addr(prctl_map.start_data); + prctl_map.end_data = untagged_addr(prctl_map.end_data); + prctl_map.start_brk = untagged_addr(prctl_map.start_brk); + prctl_map.brk = untagged_addr(prctl_map.brk); + prctl_map.start_stack = untagged_addr(prctl_map.start_stack); + prctl_map.arg_start = untagged_addr(prctl_map.arg_start); + prctl_map.arg_end = untagged_addr(prctl_map.arg_end); + prctl_map.env_start = untagged_addr(prctl_map.env_start); + prctl_map.env_end = untagged_addr(prctl_map.env_end); + /* * Make sure the members are not somewhere outside * of allowed address space. */ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(offsets); i++) { - u64 val = *(u64 *)((char *)prctl_map + offsets[i]); + u64 val = *(u64 *)((char *)&prctl_map + offsets[i]); if ((unsigned long)val >= mmap_max_addr || (unsigned long)val < mmap_min_addr) @@ -1921,8 +1935,8 @@ static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) * Make sure the pairs are ordered. */ #define __prctl_check_order(__m1, __op, __m2) \ - ((unsigned long)prctl_map->__m1 __op \ - (unsigned long)prctl_map->__m2) ? 0 : -EINVAL + ((unsigned long)prctl_map.__m1 __op \ + (unsigned long)prctl_map.__m2) ? 0 : -EINVAL error = __prctl_check_order(start_code, <, end_code); error |= __prctl_check_order(start_data, <, end_data); error |= __prctl_check_order(start_brk, <=, brk); @@ -1937,23 +1951,24 @@ static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) /* * @brk should be after @end_data in traditional maps. */ - if (prctl_map->start_brk <= prctl_map->end_data || - prctl_map->brk <= prctl_map->end_data) + if (prctl_map.start_brk <= prctl_map.end_data || + prctl_map.brk <= prctl_map.end_data) goto out; /* * Neither we should allow to override limits if they set. */ - if (check_data_rlimit(rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA), prctl_map->brk, - prctl_map->start_brk, prctl_map->end_data, - prctl_map->start_data)) + if (check_data_rlimit(rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA), prctl_map.brk, + prctl_map.start_brk, prctl_map.end_data, + prctl_map.start_data)) goto out; /* * Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector. */ - if (prctl_map->auxv_size) { - if (!prctl_map->auxv || prctl_map->auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)) + if (prctl_map.auxv_size) { + if (!prctl_map.auxv || prctl_map.auxv_size > + sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)) goto out; } @@ -1962,7 +1977,7 @@ static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) * change /proc/pid/exe link: only local sys admin should * be allowed to. */ - if (prctl_map->exe_fd != (u32)-1) { + if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) { if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) goto out; } @@ -2120,13 +2135,14 @@ static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr, if (opt == PR_SET_MM_AUXV) return prctl_set_auxv(mm, addr, arg4); - if (addr >= TASK_SIZE || addr < mmap_min_addr) + if (untagged_addr(addr) >= TASK_SIZE || + untagged_addr(addr) < mmap_min_addr) return -EINVAL; error = -EINVAL; down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); - vma = find_vma(mm, addr); + vma = find_vma(mm, untagged_addr(addr)); prctl_map.start_code = mm->start_code; prctl_map.end_code = mm->end_code;
This patch is a part of a series that extends arm64 kernel ABI to allow to pass tagged user pointers (with the top byte set to something else other than 0x00) as syscall arguments. prctl_set_mm() and prctl_set_mm_map() use provided user pointers for vma lookups and do some pointer comparisons to perform validation, which can only by done with untagged pointers. Untag user pointers in these functions for vma lookup and validity checks. Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> --- kernel/sys.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)