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[198.145.64.163]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id a24sm12522914pfl.115.2020.04.06.16.16.10 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 06 Apr 2020 16:16:10 -0700 (PDT) From: Kees Cook To: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Kees Cook , Elena Reshetova , x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Mark Rutland , Alexander Potapenko , Ard Biesheuvel , Jann Horn , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 0/5] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2020 16:16:01 -0700 Message-Id: <20200406231606.37619-1-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: v3: - added review/ack tags (peterz, glider) - further clarified commit logs and public attack references - added -fstack-protector downgrades and details v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200324203231.64324-1-keescook@chromium.org/ rfc: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20190329081358.30497-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com/ Hi, This is a continuation and refactoring of Elena's earlier effort to add kernel stack base offset randomization. In the time since the previous discussions, two attacks[1][2] were made public that depended on stack determinism, so we're no longer in the position of "this is a good idea but we have no examples of attacks". :) Earlier discussions also devolved into debates on entropy sources, which is mostly a red herring, given the already low entropy available due to stack size. Regardless, entropy can be changed/improved separately from this series as needed. Earlier discussions also got stuck debating how much syscall overhead was too much, but this is also a red herring since the feature itself needs to be selectable at boot with no cost for those that don't want it: this is solved here with static branches. So, here is an improved version, made as arch-agnostic as possible, with usage added for x86 and arm64. It also includes some small static branch clean ups, and addresses some surprise performance issues due to the stack canary[3]. Thanks! -Kees [1] https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html [2] https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202003281520.A9BFF461@keescook/ Kees Cook (5): jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults init_on_alloc: Unpessimize default-on builds stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support Makefile | 4 ++++ arch/Kconfig | 23 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 4 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c | 10 ++++++++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/Makefile | 9 +++++++ arch/x86/entry/common.c | 12 +++++++++- include/linux/jump_label.h | 19 +++++++++++++++ include/linux/mm.h | 18 +++++--------- include/linux/randomize_kstack.h | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ init/main.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++ mm/page_alloc.c | 12 ++-------- 13 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/randomize_kstack.h