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[198.145.64.163]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id v18sm4189804pgo.0.2021.03.31.13.55.02 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 31 Mar 2021 13:55:03 -0700 (PDT) From: Kees Cook To: Will Deacon Cc: Kees Cook , Catalin Marinas , Mark Rutland , Thomas Gleixner , Elena Reshetova , x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski , Peter Zijlstra , Alexander Potapenko , Alexander Popov , Ard Biesheuvel , Jann Horn , Vlastimil Babka , David Hildenbrand , Mike Rapoport , Andrew Morton , Jonathan Corbet , Randy Dunlap , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v9 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 13:54:52 -0700 Message-Id: <20210331205458.1871746-1-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Rspamd-Server: rspam03 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 1CC9712E X-Stat-Signature: 8xsn14c86fz5tx6adubu6356pptgitka Received-SPF: none (chromium.org>: No applicable sender policy available) receiver=imf29; identity=mailfrom; envelope-from=""; helo=mail-pg1-f175.google.com; client-ip=209.85.215.175 X-HE-DKIM-Result: pass/pass X-HE-Tag: 1617224103-11681 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: Hi Will (and Mark and Catalin), Can you take this via the arm64 tree for v5.13 please? Thomas has added his Reviewed-by, so it only leaves arm64's. :) v9: - comment position nit (tglx) - Added tglx's Reviewed-by v8: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210330205750.428816-1-keescook@chromium.org/ v7: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210319212835.3928492-1-keescook@chromium.org/ v6: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210315180229.1224655-1-keescook@chromium.org/ v5: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210309214301.678739-1-keescook@chromium.org/ v4: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200622193146.2985288-1-keescook@chromium.org/ v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200406231606.37619-1-keescook@chromium.org/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200324203231.64324-1-keescook@chromium.org/ rfc: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20190329081358.30497-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com/ This is a continuation and refactoring of Elena's earlier effort to add kernel stack base offset randomization. In the time since the earlier discussions, two attacks[1][2] were made public that depended on stack determinism, so we're no longer in the position of "this is a good idea but we have no examples of attacks". :) Earlier discussions also devolved into debates on entropy sources, which is mostly a red herring, given the already low entropy available due to stack size. Regardless, entropy can be changed/improved separately from this series as needed. Earlier discussions also got stuck debating how much syscall overhead was too much, but this is also a red herring since the feature itself needs to be selectable at boot with no cost for those that don't want it: this is solved here with static branches. So, here is the latest improved version, made as arch-agnostic as possible, with usage added for x86 and arm64. It also includes some small static branch clean ups, and addresses some surprise performance issues due to the stack canary[3]. Thanks! -Kees [1] https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html [2] https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202003281520.A9BFF461@keescook/ Kees Cook (6): jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 ++++ Makefile | 4 ++ arch/Kconfig | 23 ++++++++ arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 5 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c | 16 ++++++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/common.c | 3 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 16 ++++++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 17 ++++++ drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 1 + drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 1 + include/linux/jump_label.h | 19 +++++++ include/linux/mm.h | 10 ++-- include/linux/randomize_kstack.h | 54 +++++++++++++++++++ init/main.c | 23 ++++++++ mm/page_alloc.c | 4 +- mm/slab.h | 6 ++- 18 files changed, 207 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/randomize_kstack.h