From patchwork Mon Jul 24 12:45:47 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mark Brown X-Patchwork-Id: 13324620 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from kanga.kvack.org (kanga.kvack.org [205.233.56.17]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8785FC0015E for ; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 12:47:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) id E7D626B0071; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 08:47:03 -0400 (EDT) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 40) id E2D7C6B0074; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 08:47:03 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 63042) id D1C4C6B0075; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 08:47:03 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: linux-mm@kvack.org Received: from relay.hostedemail.com (smtprelay0013.hostedemail.com [216.40.44.13]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BF71C6B0071 for ; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 08:47:03 -0400 (EDT) Received: from smtpin02.hostedemail.com (a10.router.float.18 [10.200.18.1]) by unirelay08.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 68108140A07 for ; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 12:47:03 +0000 (UTC) X-FDA: 81046480326.02.60F725F Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by imf27.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6EC5540008 for ; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 12:47:01 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: imf27.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=CQYZH07E; dmarc=pass (policy=none) header.from=kernel.org; spf=pass (imf27.hostedemail.com: domain of broonie@kernel.org designates 139.178.84.217 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=broonie@kernel.org ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=hostedemail.com; s=arc-20220608; t=1690202821; h=from:from:sender:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding:in-reply-to: references:dkim-signature; bh=H47WYmqinujPMg/WnrQnHxvyfQJUZNEyjuE4lOEon/E=; b=1YuwghgDtEGHS9tAhSizT5avi98coh4U9MyfYsqhDWmai/vnQZ1Nqp6/3omNgO+2EVL50/ eM4vdmdzsKE1XhOsNRSHWULOY1ZVDGZLiAwwgqE9qXDJ36d/PCPwkxLz7Q+SJPiim9LJK1 L9LMUxXC1s27rdd5eTrm0iY2MoD6mT8= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; imf27.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=CQYZH07E; dmarc=pass (policy=none) header.from=kernel.org; spf=pass (imf27.hostedemail.com: domain of broonie@kernel.org designates 139.178.84.217 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=broonie@kernel.org ARC-Seal: i=1; s=arc-20220608; d=hostedemail.com; t=1690202821; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; b=Y6iyB7yZf5R+IOGVGFit0T4bC0BG0c5o9N6mARH2uBwcVVBV5iW6WuCjNXM7VGH570wIA6 NWNo6RONYDi187MZ4uw4NH9f78HUeuLaR6PpxJjUpK/yBZWqtdjBqSPz7mj3n/zGz9K46R xniKwkxPeNsn9JPkgJaZ75kCaV5T08M= Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 341B261136; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 12:47:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 886FBC433CA; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 12:46:53 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1690202819; bh=B4RAoMseNkNIkWpPj2Wehxnn95Jmf+et0Sq3Zsx0vLk=; h=From:Subject:Date:To:Cc:From; b=CQYZH07E6ymenUNN4D1vCSxUL8I9WvC6pdJqjzTO9RR38uHtOmxbVj/sMXqZyhIVM /3qYQyjqeHfEp6QTjMF57gEHsjgyLmtsPvOycSB1oNudF80kVdWAvxfjkdmIGeCzQ2 dxregEaNimjlzjmhlxzzstm2Unzlovu9iBHofrLxXVn2U71Tf33zaiBNXHLtlNRhcy Up+L/DfLx7d515YohwfxwPfwjgMSArCZoOzl0U1R4hqfAbuLeRdz18/sq5EyrGThAl w5BphZQYa/V7K2nMA8/Lb1bDTtgN0tmFzpU9O4Sbr938zpdqWZSEtXT1CUaiKsDE8i +RPEi3PCMXyBQ== From: Mark Brown Subject: [PATCH v2 00/35] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2023 13:45:47 +0100 Message-Id: <20230724-arm64-gcs-v2-0-dc2c1d44c2eb@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-B4-Tracking: v=1; b=H4sIAH5yvmQC/02NTQ6CMBCFr0Jm7Zi2aBFW3sOwaGGARmnJlBAN4 e4W3Ji3+l7ezwqR2FGEKluBaXHRBZ9AnTJoBuN7QtcmBiVULpLQ8Kgv2DcRKZfSWNHeClVCyls TCS0b3wx7Yx6n3Z2YOvc+Hh514sHFOfDnOFzk7v62C6n/theJAm131UVX5tYafX8Se3qdA/dQb 9v2BWAZ14i5AAAA To: Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Jonathan Corbet , Andrew Morton , Marc Zyngier , Oliver Upton , James Morse , Suzuki K Poulose , Arnd Bergmann , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Shuah Khan , "Rick P. Edgecombe" , Deepak Gupta , Ard Biesheuvel , Szabolcs Nagy Cc: "H.J. Lu" , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Mark Brown X-Mailer: b4 0.13-dev-099c9 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=10572; i=broonie@kernel.org; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=B4RAoMseNkNIkWpPj2Wehxnn95Jmf+et0Sq3Zsx0vLk=; b=owEBbQGS/pANAwAKASTWi3JdVIfQAcsmYgBkvnKF2/vK2LFgpivVm/wXBYXr0rid/c5qZErjCdjG CsGaFWOJATMEAAEKAB0WIQSt5miqZ1cYtZ/in+ok1otyXVSH0AUCZL5yhQAKCRAk1otyXVSH0EpbB/ 9IPPzitXSWGuusofJcvz3ZR37Wj2+8VVR3Ulrg5FHrdqwwlvdXDZ//rGR8+WRrOKKWwghmnt5RLpmW 7oW6DA7eaLcdG6pdsLMH+hyi3Pa9D0fkCVCK4UDdgd3CcSBSFz7lvc5Oc1Gj2hpHZBkydXnQn1WioZ 7wJVLUSs+kOLZ9ZsyI319a2YpIRF44Yf5xtL+z/cXdSEvVCCd3YvVPToRgWTxgOvBYM0bcRTGSGI+F p5IYjBNErAGtnW575hjzOFvBowKUrTOr0q5rybhUHtmaNAzeUytefgxzyGxQ8Rh4xhrp1EDNN8eSQF dtmOFg4tV7NO08j1etd5tTxiqbDSCH X-Developer-Key: i=broonie@kernel.org; a=openpgp; fpr=3F2568AAC26998F9E813A1C5C3F436CA30F5D8EB X-Rspam-User: X-Rspamd-Server: rspam12 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 6EC5540008 X-Stat-Signature: y7fsc7wicgaworckcp4zzizkwdnwqsgd X-HE-Tag: 1690202821-485699 X-HE-Meta: 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 6ehXsTOh bbVtZzMPtGWITo/wAAkZdxTou+ijOLkF0Y4r/YuWoRhl8ZSy+zErjNaX3wvmXboVnhgWE7O8r5e4XpC5Rdu/FCpEEDegIOixtMoX0gu91XDhVldYP+S9ZRhbLKWDrn/y1g0tIkTueCLkUpoZ3PPT2qs22Kwzlmuk+xmQkUxdQc5QGSN0roG8I4i7tTK8om9aAappLPuoMd52/JsOcSALSI2w6Wd7lATrWaCSXZYKp19q5wcdhDX6rwtXUm1fLS/guEaepHo2mV/VBagB7Fb97QwY4oJBDxblAO49Sf8BlBQPLDuTI4EMesZCG3i4Gc59bmMee2x5pcg9npVF6nPzbKuQxcU8QPT3AFnfkiDPYD0Q+ZpcGK/1Q4tNwXQmrNloIcTVlmD5bCxgqrpHKJFqXzX3VsFpaOb/FaYjxYWfrZOf+N3lOhvxg0OkdE77zcOEN4V2szxkF8PL5ybZn1ASaRpWJJvxfa3NzZ9XEvMPYihbtAOLn9bdAb8qHCt8uHJSRj8Nk X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: The arm64 Guarded Control Stack (GCS) feature provides support for hardware protected stacks of return addresses, intended to provide hardening against return oriented programming (ROP) attacks and to make it easier to gather call stacks for applications such as profiling. When GCS is active a secondary stack called the Guarded Control Stack is maintained, protected with a memory attribute which means that it can only be written with specific GCS operations. When a BL is executed the value stored in LR is also pushed onto the GCS, and when a RET is executed the top of the GCS is popped and compared to LR with a fault being raised if the values do not match. GCS operations may only be performed on GCS pages, a data abort is generated if they are not. This series implements support for use of GCS by userspace, along with support for use of GCS within KVM guests. It does not enable use of GCS by either EL1 or EL2. Executables are started without GCS and must use a prctl() to enable it, it is expected that this will be done very early in application execution by the dynamic linker or other startup code. x86 has an equivalent feature called shadow stacks, this series depends on the x86 patches for generic memory management support for the new guarded/shadow stack page type and shares APIs as much as possible. As there has been extensive discussion with the wider community around the ABI for shadow stacks I have as far as practical kept implementation decisions close to those for x86, anticipating that review would lead to similar conclusions in the absence of strong reasoning for divergence. The main divergence I am concious of is that x86 allows shadow stack to be enabled and disabled repeatedly, freeing the shadow stack for the thread whenever disabled, while this implementation keeps the GCS allocated after disable but refuses to reenable it. This is to avoid races with things actively walking the GCS during a disable, we do anticipate that some systems will wish to disable GCS at runtime but are not aware of any demand for subsequently reenabling it. x86 uses an arch_prctl() to manage enable and disable, since only x86 and S/390 use arch_prctl() a generic prctl() was proposed[1] as part of a patch set for the equivalent RISC-V zisslpcfi feature which I initially adopted fairly directly but following review feedback has been reviewed quite a bit. There is an open issue with support for CRIU, on x86 this required the ability to set the GCS mode via ptrace. This series supports configuring mode bits other than enable/disable via ptrace but it needs to be confirmed if this is sufficient. There's a few bits where I'm not convinced with where I've placed things, in particular the GCS write operation is in the GCS header not in uaccess.h, I wasn't sure what was clearest there and am probably too close to the code to have a clear opinion. The reporting of GCS in /proc/PID/smaps is also a bit awkward. The series depends on the x86 shadow stack support: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230227222957.24501-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/ I've rebased this onto v6.5-rc3 but not included it in the series in order to avoid confusion with Rick's work and cut down the size of the series, you can see the branch at: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/misc.git arm64-gcs [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230213045351.3945824-1-debug@rivosinc.com/ Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- Changes in v2: - Rebase onto v6.5-rc3. - Rework prctl() interface to allow each bit to be locked independently. - map_shadow_stack() now places the cap token based on the size requested by the caller not the actual space allocated. - Mode changes other than enable via ptrace are now supported. - Expand test coverage. - Various smaller fixes and adjustments. - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230716-arm64-gcs-v1-0-bf567f93bba6@kernel.org --- Mark Brown (35): prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack arm64: Document boot requirements for Guarded Control Stacks arm64/gcs: Document the ABI for Guarded Control Stacks arm64/sysreg: Add new system registers for GCS arm64/sysreg: Add definitions for architected GCS caps arm64/gcs: Add manual encodings of GCS instructions arm64/gcs: Provide copy_to_user_gcs() arm64/cpufeature: Runtime detection of Guarded Control Stack (GCS) arm64/mm: Allocate PIE slots for EL0 guarded control stack mm: Define VM_SHADOW_STACK for arm64 when we support GCS arm64/mm: Map pages for guarded control stack KVM: arm64: Manage GCS registers for guests arm64/el2_setup: Allow GCS usage at EL0 and EL1 arm64/idreg: Add overrride for GCS arm64/hwcap: Add hwcap for GCS arm64/traps: Handle GCS exceptions arm64/mm: Handle GCS data aborts arm64/gcs: Context switch GCS registers for EL0 arm64/gcs: Allocate a new GCS for threads with GCS enabled arm64/gcs: Implement shadow stack prctl() interface arm64/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() arm64/signal: Set up and restore the GCS context for signal handlers arm64/signal: Expose GCS state in signal frames arm64/ptrace: Expose GCS via ptrace and core files arm64: Add Kconfig for Guarded Control Stack (GCS) kselftest/arm64: Verify the GCS hwcap kselftest/arm64: Add GCS as a detected feature in the signal tests kselftest/arm64: Add framework support for GCS to signal handling tests kselftest/arm64: Allow signals tests to specify an expected si_code kselftest/arm64: Always run signals tests with GCS enabled kselftest/arm64: Add very basic GCS test program kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS test program built with the system libc kselftest/arm64: Add test coverage for GCS mode locking selftests/arm64: Add GCS signal tests kselftest/arm64: Enable GCS for the FP stress tests Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 + Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst | 22 ++ Documentation/arch/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst | 3 + Documentation/arch/arm64/gcs.rst | 225 +++++++++++++ Documentation/arch/arm64/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 2 +- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 19 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 6 + arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h | 17 + arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h | 28 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h | 2 + arch/arm64/include/asm/gcs.h | 106 ++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 12 + arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 14 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 7 + arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 20 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 42 +++ arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 8 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 9 + arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 19 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c | 23 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/idreg-override.c | 2 + arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 78 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 59 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 237 ++++++++++++- arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 11 + arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/sysreg-sr.h | 17 + arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 22 ++ arch/arm64/mm/Makefile | 1 + arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 78 ++++- arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c | 226 +++++++++++++ arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 17 +- arch/arm64/tools/cpucaps | 1 + arch/arm64/tools/sysreg | 55 +++ fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 + include/linux/mm.h | 16 +- include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 +- include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 22 ++ kernel/sys.c | 30 ++ kernel/sys_ni.c | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/Makefile | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/hwcap.c | 19 ++ tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/assembler.h | 15 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/fpsimd-test.S | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/sve-test.S | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/za-test.S | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/zt-test.S | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/.gitignore | 3 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/Makefile | 19 ++ tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/basic-gcs.c | 351 +++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/gcs-locking.c | 200 +++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/gcs-util.h | 87 +++++ tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/libc-gcs.c | 372 +++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/arm64/signal/.gitignore | 1 + .../testing/selftests/arm64/signal/test_signals.c | 17 +- .../testing/selftests/arm64/signal/test_signals.h | 6 + .../selftests/arm64/signal/test_signals_utils.c | 32 +- .../selftests/arm64/signal/test_signals_utils.h | 39 +++ .../arm64/signal/testcases/gcs_exception_fault.c | 59 ++++ .../selftests/arm64/signal/testcases/gcs_frame.c | 78 +++++ .../arm64/signal/testcases/gcs_write_fault.c | 67 ++++ .../selftests/arm64/signal/testcases/testcases.c | 7 + .../selftests/arm64/signal/testcases/testcases.h | 1 + 68 files changed, 2825 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) --- base-commit: b8f2cc1100d85456f9a48243328b33ab0ce5caff change-id: 20230303-arm64-gcs-e311ab0d8729 Best regards,