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b=evfmwULVzlZf5t8yhqozVZxSvab6gXzEG0uj/ii2L8XLAzIlp1Yq87CBL508sfNmj7 3gOhufOYhObUeRY/eAW18DCA9rDMKRqi73B5TANSMaYgJOBPOV/mkZ/zyT4W7sIrybAP MRH8GAA5LjiaEP5bZqGtH9TnA48ZhLwr1T3wi1tePY9BKLc+RRAQFq7NdynsC1tKMzEo Q8b5mU8lHMx7V6Jkc9rgis7BdFBVg7b4gGkmme6Qv2+Bz/2W7lexpg5b+mALKBmZKSmc OkvGppCzx/LOe0CRRRc/Yq++O/SMm5y2iYluAOG1CTvhO6YdUoxWyudtugiuNc7OVU/q 5z0g== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0Yy8Fk8490Yz8IIJmsRqKkTTYZBCeRUr5U8P8CkEBisQgno9ehtI +Yqw0Ae79SL44XmRyImyqh7SX0cv6TM= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IGTik1l5+MoAT0aZ1l3D7LvoGlEGGN/NmlkhnDMNOMyyxG0/NfMrOpUoSzppBt5u8UnrWOecHFs6SQ= X-Received: from zagreus.c.googlers.com ([fda3:e722:ac3:cc00:7f:e700:c0a8:5c37]) (user=seanjc job=sendgmr) by 2002:a25:d601:0:b0:d9a:6b49:433d with SMTP id n1-20020a25d601000000b00d9a6b49433dmr66158ybg.6.1698430945618; Fri, 27 Oct 2023 11:22:25 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: Sean Christopherson Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2023 11:21:42 -0700 Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.42.0.820.g83a721a137-goog Message-ID: <20231027182217.3615211-1-seanjc@google.com> Subject: [PATCH v13 00/35] KVM: guest_memfd() and per-page attributes From: Sean Christopherson To: Paolo Bonzini , Marc Zyngier , Oliver Upton , Huacai Chen , Michael Ellerman , Anup Patel , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Sean Christopherson , Alexander Viro , Christian Brauner , "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" , Andrew Morton Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, kvm-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Xiaoyao Li , Xu Yilun , Chao Peng , Fuad Tabba , Jarkko Sakkinen , Anish Moorthy , David Matlack , Yu Zhang , Isaku Yamahata , " =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala?= =?utf-8?q?=C3=BCn?= " , Vlastimil Babka , Vishal Annapurve , Ackerley Tng , Maciej Szmigiero , David Hildenbrand , Quentin Perret , Michael Roth , Wang , Liam Merwick , Isaku Yamahata , "Kirill A . Shutemov" X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: B2BA640002 X-Rspam-User: X-Stat-Signature: cfadajbqmca5zifkubwe9wwtasz8tucb X-Rspamd-Server: rspam01 X-HE-Tag: 1698430946-388990 X-HE-Meta: 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 aHAbGmn2 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 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Non-KVM people, please take a gander at two small-ish patches buried in the middle of this series: fs: Export anon_inode_getfile_secure() for use by KVM mm: Add AS_UNMOVABLE to mark mapping as completely unmovable Our plan/hope is to take this through the KVM tree for 6.8, reviews (and acks!) would be much appreciated. Note, adding AS_UNMOVABLE isn't strictly required as it's "just" an optimization, but we'd prefer to have it in place straightaway. Reviews on all the KVM changes, especially the guest_memfd.c implementation, are also most definitely welcome. The "what and why" at the very bottom is hopefully old news for most readers. My plan is to copy the blurb into a tag when this is merged (today's word of the day is: optimism), e.g. so that the big picture and why we're doing this is captured in the git history. Note, the v13 changelog below captures only changes that were not posted and applied to the v12+ development branch. Those changes can be found in commits 46c10adeda81..74a4d3b6a284 at https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux.git tags/kvm-x86-guest_memfd-v12 This series can be found at https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux.git guest_memfd kvm-x86/guest_memfd is also now being fed into kvm-x86/next, i.e. will be getting coverage in linux-next as of the next build. Similar to the v12 "development cycle", any changes needed will be applied on top of v13, and squashed prior to sending v14 (if needed) or merging (optimism!). KVM folks, ***LOOK HERE***. v13 has several breaking userspace changes relative to v12. Some were "necessary" (removal of a pointless ioctl), others were opportunistic and opinionated (renaming kvm_userspace_memory_region2 fields to use guest_memfd instead of gmem). I didn't post changes as I found the "issues" very late (when writing documentation) and didn't want to delay v13. Here's a diff of the linux/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h changes that will break userspace developed for v12. @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ struct kvm_userspace_memory_region2 { __u64 guest_phys_addr; __u64 memory_size; __u64 userspace_addr; - __u64 gmem_offset; - __u32 gmem_fd; + __u64 guest_memfd_offset; + __u32 guest_memfd; __u32 pad1; __u64 pad2[14]; }; @@ -1231,9 +1215,10 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt { #define KVM_CAP_ARM_EAGER_SPLIT_CHUNK_SIZE 228 #define KVM_CAP_ARM_SUPPORTED_BLOCK_SIZES 229 #define KVM_CAP_USER_MEMORY2 230 -#define KVM_CAP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES 231 -#define KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD 232 -#define KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES 233 +#define KVM_CAP_MEMORY_FAULT_INFO 231 +#define KVM_CAP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES 232 +#define KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD 233 +#define KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES 234 #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING @@ -2301,8 +2286,7 @@ struct kvm_s390_zpci_op { #define KVM_S390_ZPCIOP_REGAEN_HOST (1 << 0) /* Available with KVM_CAP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES */ -#define KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES _IOR(KVMIO, 0xd2, __u64) -#define KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES _IOW(KVMIO, 0xd3, struct kvm_memory_attributes) +#define KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES _IOW(KVMIO, 0xd2, struct kvm_memory_attributes) v13: - Drop KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES, have KVM_CAP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES return the supported attributes. - Add KVM_CAP_MEMORY_FAULT_INFO to report support for KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT, and shift capability numbers accordingly. - Do s/gmem/guest_memfd (roughly) in userspace-facing APIs, i.e. use guest_memfd as the formal name. Going off of various internal conversations, "gmem" isn't at all intuitive, whereas "guest_memfd" gives readers/listeners a rough idea of what's going on. If you don't like the rename, then next time volunteer to write the documentation. :-) - Rename a leftover "out_restricted" label to "out_unbind". - Write and clean up changelogs. - Write and clean up documentation. - Move "memory_fault" to the standard exit reasons union (requires userspace to rebuild, but shouldn't require code changes). - Fix intermediate build issues (hidden behind unselectable Kconfigs) - KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD and KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD under the same #ifdefs. - Fix a bug in kvm_mmu_invalidate_range_add() where adding multiple ranges in a single invalidation would captured only the last range. [Xu Yilun] v12: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230914015531.1419405-1-seanjc@google.com v11: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230718234512.1690985-1-seanjc@google.com v10: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221202061347.1070246-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.coms Fodder for a merge tag: --- Introduce several new KVM uAPIs to ultimately create a guest-first memory subsystem within KVM, a.k.a. guest_memfd. Guest-first memory allows KVM to provide features, enhancements, and optimizations that are kludgly or outright impossible to implement in a generic memory subsystem. The core KVM ioctl() for guest_memfd is KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD, which similar to the generic memfd_create(), creates an anonymous file and returns a file descriptor that refers to it. Again like "regular" memfd files, guest_memfd files live in RAM, have volatile storage, and are automatically released when the last reference is dropped. The key differences between memfd files (and every other memory subystem) is that guest_memfd files are bound to their owning virtual machine, cannot be mapped, read, or written by userspace, and cannot be resized (guest_memfd files do however support PUNCH_HOLE). A second KVM ioctl(), KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES, allows userspace to specify attributes for a given page of guest memory, e.g. in the long term, it will likely be extended to allow userspace to specify per-gfn RWX protections. The immediate and driving use case for guest_memfd are Confidential (CoCo) VMs, specifically AMD's SEV-SNP, Intel's TDX, and KVM's own pKVM. For KVM CoCo use cases, being able to map memory into KVM guests without requireming said memory to be mapped into the host is a hard requirement. While SEV+ and TDX prevent untrusted software from reading guest private data by encrypting guest memory, pKVM provides confidentiality and integrity *without* relying on memory encryption. And with SEV-SNP and TDX, accessing guest private memory can be fatal to the host, i.e. KVM must be prevent host userspace from accessing guest memory irrespective of hardware behavior. Long term, guest_memfd provides KVM line-of-sight to use cases beyond CoCo VMs, e.g. KVM currently doesn't support mapping memory as writable in the guest without it also being writable in host userspace, as KVM's ABI uses userspace VMA protections to define the allow guest protection (with an exception granted to mapping guest memory executable). Similarly, KVM currently requires the guest mapping size to be a strict subset of the host userspace mapping size, e.g. KVM doesn’t support creating a 1GiB guest mapping unless userspace also has a 1GiB guest mapping. Decoupling the mappings sizes would allow userspace to precisely map only what is needed without impacting guest performance, e.g. to again harden against unintentional accesses to guest memory. A guest-first memory subsystem also provides clearer line of sight to things like a dedicated memory pool (for slice-of-hardware VMs) and elimination of "struct page" (for offload setups where userspace _never_ needs to mmap() guest memory). guest_memfd is the result of 3+ years of development and exploration; taking on memory management responsibilities in KVM was not the first, second, or even third choice for supporting CoCo VMs. But after many failed attempts to avoid KVM-specific backing memory, and looking at where things ended up, it is quite clear that of all approaches tried, guest_memfd is the simplest, most robust, and most extensible, and the right thing to do for KVM and the kernel at-large. --- Ackerley Tng (1): KVM: selftests: Test KVM exit behavior for private memory/access Chao Peng (8): KVM: Use gfn instead of hva for mmu_notifier_retry KVM: Add KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT exit to report faults to userspace KVM: Introduce per-page memory attributes KVM: x86: Disallow hugepages when memory attributes are mixed KVM: x86/mmu: Handle page fault for private memory KVM: selftests: Add KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2 helper KVM: selftests: Expand set_memory_region_test to validate guest_memfd() KVM: selftests: Add basic selftest for guest_memfd() Sean Christopherson (23): KVM: Tweak kvm_hva_range and hva_handler_t to allow reusing for gfn ranges KVM: Assert that mmu_invalidate_in_progress *never* goes negative KVM: WARN if there are dangling MMU invalidations at VM destruction KVM: PPC: Drop dead code related to KVM_ARCH_WANT_MMU_NOTIFIER KVM: PPC: Return '1' unconditionally for KVM_CAP_SYNC_MMU KVM: Convert KVM_ARCH_WANT_MMU_NOTIFIER to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MMU_NOTIFIER KVM: Introduce KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2 KVM: Add a dedicated mmu_notifier flag for reclaiming freed memory KVM: Drop .on_unlock() mmu_notifier hook KVM: Prepare for handling only shared mappings in mmu_notifier events mm: Add AS_UNMOVABLE to mark mapping as completely unmovable fs: Export anon_inode_getfile_secure() for use by KVM KVM: Add KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD ioctl() for guest-specific backing memory KVM: Add transparent hugepage support for dedicated guest memory KVM: x86: "Reset" vcpu->run->exit_reason early in KVM_RUN KVM: Drop superfluous __KVM_VCPU_MULTIPLE_ADDRESS_SPACE macro KVM: Allow arch code to track number of memslot address spaces per VM KVM: x86: Add support for "protected VMs" that can utilize private memory KVM: selftests: Drop unused kvm_userspace_memory_region_find() helper KVM: selftests: Convert lib's mem regions to KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2 KVM: selftests: Add support for creating private memslots KVM: selftests: Introduce VM "shape" to allow tests to specify the VM type KVM: selftests: Add GUEST_SYNC[1-6] macros for synchronizing more data Vishal Annapurve (3): KVM: selftests: Add helpers to convert guest memory b/w private and shared KVM: selftests: Add helpers to do KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercalls (x86) KVM: selftests: Add x86-only selftest for private memory conversions Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 208 ++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 - arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/mips/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 - arch/mips/kvm/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 - arch/powerpc/kvm/Kconfig | 8 +- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 7 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 - arch/riscv/kvm/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 17 +- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 3 + arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 14 +- arch/x86/kvm/debugfs.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 271 +++++++- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 11 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 26 +- fs/anon_inodes.c | 1 + include/linux/kvm_host.h | 143 ++++- include/linux/kvm_types.h | 1 + include/linux/pagemap.h | 19 +- include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 51 ++ mm/compaction.c | 43 +- mm/migrate.c | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile | 3 + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/dirty_log_test.c | 2 +- .../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 221 +++++++ .../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h | 148 ++++- .../testing/selftests/kvm/include/test_util.h | 5 + .../selftests/kvm/include/ucall_common.h | 11 + .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h | 15 + .../selftests/kvm/kvm_page_table_test.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 233 ++++--- tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/memstress.c | 3 +- .../selftests/kvm/set_memory_region_test.c | 100 +++ .../kvm/x86_64/private_mem_conversions_test.c | 487 ++++++++++++++ .../kvm/x86_64/private_mem_kvm_exits_test.c | 120 ++++ .../kvm/x86_64/ucna_injection_test.c | 2 +- virt/kvm/Kconfig | 17 + virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm | 1 + virt/kvm/dirty_ring.c | 2 +- virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 607 ++++++++++++++++++ virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 505 ++++++++++++--- virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h | 26 + 46 files changed, 3083 insertions(+), 272 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/private_mem_conversions_test.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/private_mem_kvm_exits_test.c create mode 100644 virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c base-commit: 2b3f2325e71f09098723727d665e2e8003d455dc