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d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:sender:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=ISHwxx5EnSKzUDUjZ1ysUZFyHBfF802klWxWhYA/428=; b=QtlZPEIpQ2RCWeuVcZjKteu1yV4KUGKLt3iXYY8oxprW8vxcXWZGDlTJovIunthV6T HS4vrj/XV+ir86VzOtK5Tg4UiFyklinXheob03orokhW5pc0LutgpBMgb9FgJ6sfxfn6 74SiNmpoGG15l/ATT6nuL0DzwY99ixpr6u8b1KZ6zJDoC49R5FHPwiZAuWCbHJNsuyCM MOwGT2Ofx9sT8bGa3+XxBpUqBnGQGZYEzWl/eb/5qG4f2XQai1E90sWW5au0kVSHi7an wN5mPSNxpGXYrZfcldmPE44lnjjyySuQeynQff8oUsMOiAu+lEgvwiWnX3K3neErLk9D E3WQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531cbZ4EMNxVXMhVUQfdGC0SkAbS6PtrdOj1HnPqsaAp5dzSLR+H i1AWqCDzryMsw8YeCqt63PEHON5+v6aLSv9E X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxP6vMDfthzecVC5ecdLO+5Dv7Y8pBeoXM66UJWgdoywOg+JFnFIENVMygIhQfAgTki+HWSylKOMpIDzaAZ X-Received: from andreyknvl3.muc.corp.google.com ([2a00:79e0:15:13:edb8:b79c:2e20:e531]) (user=andreyknvl job=sendgmr) by 2002:a7b:c5c1:: with SMTP id n1mr4107578wmk.163.1612539577356; Fri, 05 Feb 2021 07:39:37 -0800 (PST) Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2021 16:39:09 +0100 In-Reply-To: Message-Id: <1cf400f36ab1fd3c83e7626c3797cb11ebf9ef7f.1612538932.git.andreyknvl@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.0.365.g02bc693789-goog Subject: [PATCH v2 08/12] kasan, mm: optimize krealloc poisoning From: Andrey Konovalov To: Andrew Morton , Catalin Marinas , Vincenzo Frascino , Dmitry Vyukov , Alexander Potapenko , Marco Elver Cc: Will Deacon , Andrey Ryabinin , Peter Collingbourne , Evgenii Stepanov , Branislav Rankov , Kevin Brodsky , kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andrey Konovalov X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: Currently, krealloc() always calls ksize(), which unpoisons the whole object including the redzone. This is inefficient, as kasan_krealloc() repoisons the redzone for objects that fit into the same buffer. This patch changes krealloc() instrumentation to use uninstrumented __ksize() that doesn't unpoison the memory. Instead, kasan_kreallos() is changed to unpoison the memory excluding the redzone. For objects that don't fit into the old allocation, this patch disables KASAN accessibility checks when copying memory into a new object instead of unpoisoning it. Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov --- mm/kasan/common.c | 12 ++++++++++-- mm/slab_common.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c index 7ea643f7e69c..a8a67dca5e55 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/common.c +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, /* * The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_slab_alloc() for - * kmalloc() or by ksize() for krealloc(). + * kmalloc() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc(). */ /* @@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size, /* * The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_alloc_pages() for - * alloc_pages() or by ksize() for krealloc(). + * alloc_pages() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc(). */ /* @@ -554,8 +554,16 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag if (unlikely(object == ZERO_SIZE_PTR)) return (void *)object; + /* + * Unpoison the object's data. + * Part of it might already have been unpoisoned, but it's unknown + * how big that part is. + */ + kasan_unpoison(object, size); + page = virt_to_head_page(object); + /* Piggy-back on kmalloc() instrumentation to poison the redzone. */ if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags); else diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c index dad70239b54c..60a2f49df6ce 100644 --- a/mm/slab_common.c +++ b/mm/slab_common.c @@ -1140,19 +1140,27 @@ static __always_inline void *__do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size, void *ret; size_t ks; - if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p)) && !kasan_check_byte(p)) - return NULL; - - ks = ksize(p); + /* Don't use instrumented ksize to allow precise KASAN poisoning. */ + if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p))) { + if (!kasan_check_byte(p)) + return NULL; + ks = kfence_ksize(p) ?: __ksize(p); + } else + ks = 0; + /* If the object still fits, repoison it precisely. */ if (ks >= new_size) { p = kasan_krealloc((void *)p, new_size, flags); return (void *)p; } ret = kmalloc_track_caller(new_size, flags); - if (ret && p) - memcpy(ret, p, ks); + if (ret && p) { + /* Disable KASAN checks as the object's redzone is accessed. */ + kasan_disable_current(); + memcpy(ret, kasan_reset_tag(p), ks); + kasan_enable_current(); + } return ret; }