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David Alan Gilbert" , , , , Brijesh Singh Subject: [PATCH v7 17/45] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2021 16:07:03 -0600 Message-ID: <20211110220731.2396491-18-brijesh.singh@amd.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20211110220731.2396491-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> References: <20211110220731.2396491-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [10.180.168.240] X-ClientProxiedBy: SATLEXMB03.amd.com (10.181.40.144) To SATLEXMB04.amd.com (10.181.40.145) X-EOPAttributedMessage: 0 X-MS-PublicTrafficType: Email X-MS-Office365-Filtering-Correlation-Id: 756b5b57-3820-4c3f-baf9-08d9a4969bf5 X-MS-TrafficTypeDiagnostic: BY5PR12MB3970: X-Microsoft-Antispam-PRVS: X-MS-Oob-TLC-OOBClassifiers: OLM:3044; X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck: 1 X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-Relay: 0 X-Microsoft-Antispam: BCL:0; X-Microsoft-Antispam-Message-Info: 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 X-Forefront-Antispam-Report: CIP:165.204.84.17;CTRY:US;LANG:en;SCL:1;SRV:;IPV:CAL;SFV:NSPM;H:SATLEXMB04.amd.com;PTR:InfoDomainNonexistent;CAT:NONE;SFS:(4636009)(46966006)(36840700001)(2906002)(36860700001)(5660300002)(36756003)(7696005)(26005)(83380400001)(82310400003)(44832011)(70586007)(47076005)(70206006)(8676002)(336012)(4326008)(356005)(110136005)(81166007)(316002)(16526019)(508600001)(186003)(426003)(8936002)(86362001)(6666004)(2616005)(1076003)(54906003)(7406005)(7416002)(2101003)(36900700001);DIR:OUT;SFP:1101; X-OriginatorOrg: amd.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 10 Nov 2021 22:08:21.7208 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: 756b5b57-3820-4c3f-baf9-08d9a4969bf5 X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalAttributedTenantConnectingIp: TenantId=3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d;Ip=[165.204.84.17];Helo=[SATLEXMB04.amd.com] X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: DM6NAM11FT066.eop-nam11.prod.protection.outlook.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Anonymous X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: HybridOnPrem X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: BY5PR12MB3970 X-Rspamd-Server: rspam02 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 9B48BB00009F X-Stat-Signature: 3wwqk8yofo8irxcdd3pb67gbncd9ykm9 Authentication-Results: imf24.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=amd.com header.s=selector1 header.b=DpWPkZu0; spf=pass (imf24.hostedemail.com: domain of brijesh.singh@amd.com designates 40.107.94.77 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=brijesh.singh@amd.com; dmarc=pass (policy=quarantine) header.from=amd.com X-HE-Tag: 1636582106-115541 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: The early_set_memory_{encrypt,decrypt}() are used for changing the page from decrypted (shared) to encrypted (private) and vice versa. When SEV-SNP is active, the page state transition needs to go through additional steps. If the page is transitioned from shared to private, then perform the following after the encryption attribute is set in the page table: 1. Issue the page state change VMGEXIT to add the page as a private in the RMP table. 2. Validate the page after its successfully added in the RMP table. To maintain the security guarantees, if the page is transitioned from private to shared, then perform the following before clearing the encryption attribute from the page table. 1. Invalidate the page. 2. Issue the page state change VMGEXIT to make the page shared in the RMP table. The early_set_memory_{encrypt,decrypt} can be called before the GHCB is setup, use the SNP page state MSR protocol VMGEXIT defined in the GHCB specification to request the page state change in the RMP table. While at it, add a helper snp_prep_memory() that can be used outside the sev specific files to change the page state for a specified memory range. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh --- arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 10 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h index 0df508374a35..eec2e1b9d557 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h @@ -123,6 +123,11 @@ static inline int pvalidate(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, bool validate) return rc; } void sev_snp_register_ghcb(void); +void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, + unsigned int npages); +void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, + unsigned int npages); +void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, enum psc_op op); #else static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { } static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { } @@ -132,6 +137,11 @@ static inline int sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd) { return 0; } static inline int pvalidate(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, bool validate) { return 0; } static inline int rmpadjust(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, unsigned long attrs) { return 0; } static inline void sev_snp_register_ghcb(void) { } +static inline void __init +early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages) { } +static inline void __init +early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages) { } +static inline void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, enum psc_op op) { } #endif #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c index 30634e7e5c7b..3c3b96a2990f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c @@ -532,6 +532,108 @@ static u64 get_jump_table_addr(void) return ret; } +static void pvalidate_pages(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages, bool validate) +{ + unsigned long vaddr_end; + int rc; + + vaddr = vaddr & PAGE_MASK; + vaddr_end = vaddr + (npages << PAGE_SHIFT); + + while (vaddr < vaddr_end) { + rc = pvalidate(vaddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, validate); + if (WARN(rc, "Failed to validate address 0x%lx ret %d", vaddr, rc)) + sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE); + + vaddr = vaddr + PAGE_SIZE; + } +} + +static void __init early_set_page_state(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages, enum psc_op op) +{ + unsigned long paddr_end; + u64 val; + + paddr = paddr & PAGE_MASK; + paddr_end = paddr + (npages << PAGE_SHIFT); + + while (paddr < paddr_end) { + /* + * Use the MSR protocol because this function can be called before the GHCB + * is established. + */ + sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_PSC_REQ_GFN(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, op)); + VMGEXIT(); + + val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr(); + + if (WARN(GHCB_RESP_CODE(val) != GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP, + "Wrong PSC response code: 0x%x\n", + (unsigned int)GHCB_RESP_CODE(val))) + goto e_term; + + if (WARN(GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_VAL(val), + "Failed to change page state to '%s' paddr 0x%lx error 0x%llx\n", + op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE ? "private" : "shared", + paddr, GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_VAL(val))) + goto e_term; + + paddr = paddr + PAGE_SIZE; + } + + return; + +e_term: + sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PSC); +} + +void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, + unsigned int npages) +{ + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SEV_SNP)) + return; + + /* + * Ask the hypervisor to mark the memory pages as private in the RMP + * table. + */ + early_set_page_state(paddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE); + + /* Validate the memory pages after they've been added in the RMP table. */ + pvalidate_pages(vaddr, npages, 1); +} + +void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, + unsigned int npages) +{ + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SEV_SNP)) + return; + + /* + * Invalidate the memory pages before they are marked shared in the + * RMP table. + */ + pvalidate_pages(vaddr, npages, 0); + + /* Ask hypervisor to mark the memory pages shared in the RMP table. */ + early_set_page_state(paddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED); +} + +void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, enum psc_op op) +{ + unsigned long vaddr, npages; + + vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr); + npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + + if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE) + early_snp_set_memory_private(vaddr, paddr, npages); + else if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED) + early_snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, paddr, npages); + else + WARN(1, "invalid memory op %d\n", op); +} + int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh) { u16 startup_cs, startup_ip; diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index 534c2c82fbec..d01bb95f7aef 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "mm_internal.h" @@ -49,6 +50,34 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key); /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */ static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); +/* + * When SNP is active, change the page state from private to shared before + * copying the data from the source to destination and restore after the copy. + * This is required because the source address is mapped as decrypted by the + * caller of the routine. + */ +static inline void __init snp_memcpy(void *dst, void *src, size_t sz, + unsigned long paddr, bool decrypt) +{ + unsigned long npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SEV_SNP) || !decrypt) { + memcpy(dst, src, sz); + return; + } + + /* + * With SNP, the paddr needs to be accessed decrypted, mark the page + * shared in the RMP table before copying it. + */ + early_snp_set_memory_shared((unsigned long)__va(paddr), paddr, npages); + + memcpy(dst, src, sz); + + /* Restore the page state after the memcpy. */ + early_snp_set_memory_private((unsigned long)__va(paddr), paddr, npages); +} + /* * This routine does not change the underlying encryption setting of the * page(s) that map this memory. It assumes that eventually the memory is @@ -97,8 +126,8 @@ static void __init __sme_early_enc_dec(resource_size_t paddr, * Use a temporary buffer, of cache-line multiple size, to * avoid data corruption as documented in the APM. */ - memcpy(sme_early_buffer, src, len); - memcpy(dst, sme_early_buffer, len); + snp_memcpy(sme_early_buffer, src, len, paddr, enc); + snp_memcpy(dst, sme_early_buffer, len, paddr, !enc); early_memunmap(dst, len); early_memunmap(src, len); @@ -273,14 +302,28 @@ static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc(pte_t *kpte, int level, bool enc) clflush_cache_range(__va(pa), size); /* Encrypt/decrypt the contents in-place */ - if (enc) + if (enc) { sme_early_encrypt(pa, size); - else + } else { sme_early_decrypt(pa, size); + /* + * ON SNP, the page state in the RMP table must happen + * before the page table updates. + */ + early_snp_set_memory_shared((unsigned long)__va(pa), pa, 1); + } + /* Change the page encryption mask. */ new_pte = pfn_pte(pfn, new_prot); set_pte_atomic(kpte, new_pte); + + /* + * If page is set encrypted in the page table, then update the RMP table to + * add this page as private. + */ + if (enc) + early_snp_set_memory_private((unsigned long)__va(pa), pa, 1); } static int __init early_set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long vaddr,