[v3,28/37] x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack

Commit Message

Rick Edgecombe Nov. 4, 2022, 10:35 p.m. UTC

From: Yu-cheng Yu <[e-mail]>

When a signal is handled normally the context is pushed to the stack
before handling it. For shadow stacks, since the shadow stack only track's
return addresses, there isn't any state that needs to be pushed. However,
there are still a few things that need to be done. These things are
userspace visible and which will be kernel ABI for shadow stacks.

One is to make sure the restorer address is written to shadow stack, since
the signal handler (if not changing ucontext) returns to the restorer, and
the restorer calls sigreturn. So add the restorer on the shadow stack
before handling the signal, so there is not a conflict when the signal
handler returns to the restorer.

The other thing to do is to place some type of checkable token on the
thread's shadow stack before handling the signal and check it during
sigreturn. This is an extra layer of protection to hamper attackers
calling sigreturn manually as in SROP-like attacks.

For this token we can use the shadow stack data format defined earlier.
Have the data pushed be the previous SSP. In the future the sigreturn
might want to return back to a different stack. Storing the SSP (instead
of a restore offset or something) allows for future functionality that
may want to restore to a different stack.

So, when handling a signal push
 - the SSP pointing in the shadow stack data format
 - the restorer address below the restore token.

In sigreturn, verify SSP is stored in the data format and pop the shadow
stack.

Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <[e-mail]>
Tested-by: John Allen <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[e-mail]>
Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <[e-mail]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[e-mail]>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <[e-mail]>
Cc: Florian Weimer <[e-mail]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[e-mail]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[e-mail]>

---

v3:
 - Drop shstk_setup_rstor_token() (Kees)
 - Drop x32 signal support, since x32 support is dropped

v2:
 - Switch to new shstk signal format

v1:
 - Use xsave helpers.
 - Expand commit log.

Yu-cheng v27:
 - Eliminate saving shadow stack pointer to signal context.

Yu-cheng v25:
 - Update commit log/comments for the sc_ext struct.
 - Use restorer address already calculated.
 - Change CONFIG_X86_CET to CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK.
 - Change X86_FEATURE_CET to X86_FEATURE_SHSTK.
 - Eliminate writing to MSR_IA32_U_CET for shadow stack.
 - Change wrmsrl() to wrmsrl_safe() and handle error.

 arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h  |  5 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c     | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c    |  7 +++
 4 files changed, 111 insertions(+)

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
index c9c3859322fa..88d71b9de616 100644
--- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ 
 #include <asm/sigframe.h>
 #include <asm/sighandling.h>
 #include <asm/smap.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
 
 static inline void reload_segments(struct sigcontext_32 *sc)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index 1a97223e7d2f..098e4ecfdf9b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
 struct task_struct;
+struct ksignal;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
 struct thread_shstk {
@@ -19,6 +20,8 @@  int shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags,
 			     unsigned long stack_size,
 			     unsigned long *shstk_addr);
 void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
+int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig);
+int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void);
 #else
 static inline long cet_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option,
 			     unsigned long features) { return -EINVAL; }
@@ -28,6 +31,8 @@  static inline int shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p,
 					   unsigned long stack_size,
 					   unsigned long *shstk_addr) { return 0; }
 static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
+static inline int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig) { return 0; }
+static inline int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void) { return 0; }
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK */
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
index 755b4af40413..332b7c73a1af 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -233,6 +233,104 @@  static int get_shstk_data(unsigned long *data, unsigned long __user *addr)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int shstk_push_sigframe(unsigned long *ssp)
+{
+	unsigned long target_ssp = *ssp;
+
+	/* Token must be aligned */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(*ssp, 8))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(target_ssp, 8))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*ssp -= SS_FRAME_SIZE;
+	if (put_shstk_data((void *__user)*ssp, target_ssp))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int shstk_pop_sigframe(unsigned long *ssp)
+{
+	unsigned long token_addr;
+	int err;
+
+	err = get_shstk_data(&token_addr, (unsigned long __user *)*ssp);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return err;
+
+	/* Restore SSP aligned? */
+	if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED(token_addr, 8)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* SSP in userspace? */
+	if (unlikely(token_addr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*ssp = token_addr;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig)
+{
+	void __user *restorer = ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer;
+	unsigned long ssp;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK) ||
+	    !features_enabled(CET_SHSTK))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!restorer)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ssp = get_user_shstk_addr();
+	if (unlikely(!ssp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	err = shstk_push_sigframe(&ssp);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return err;
+
+	/* Push restorer address */
+	ssp -= SS_FRAME_SIZE;
+	err = write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)ssp, (u64)restorer);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	fpregs_lock_and_load();
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+	fpregs_unlock();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void)
+{
+	unsigned long ssp;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK) ||
+	    !features_enabled(CET_SHSTK))
+		return 0;
+
+	ssp = get_user_shstk_addr();
+	if (unlikely(!ssp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	err = shstk_pop_sigframe(&ssp);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return err;
+
+	fpregs_lock_and_load();
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+	fpregs_unlock();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	struct thread_shstk *shstk = &tsk->thread.shstk;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
index 9c7265b524c7..be25f7dce2d5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ 
 #include <asm/syscall.h>
 #include <asm/sigframe.h>
 #include <asm/signal.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 /*
@@ -472,6 +473,9 @@  static int __setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig,
 	frame = get_sigframe(&ksig->ka, regs, sizeof(struct rt_sigframe), &fp);
 	uc_flags = frame_uc_flags(regs);
 
+	if (setup_signal_shadow_stack(ksig))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
 	if (!user_access_begin(frame, sizeof(*frame)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -675,6 +679,9 @@  SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
 	if (!restore_sigcontext(regs, &frame->uc.uc_mcontext, uc_flags))
 		goto badframe;
 
+	if (restore_signal_shadow_stack())
+		goto badframe;
+
 	if (restore_altstack(&frame->uc.uc_stack))
 		goto badframe;