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Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Borislav Petkov , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H . J . Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , Weijiang Yang , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , John Allen , kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org, jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com, christina.schimpe@intel.com Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu Subject: [PATCH v4 16/39] x86/mm: Check Shadow Stack page fault errors Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2022 16:35:43 -0800 Message-Id: <20221203003606.6838-17-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20221203003606.6838-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> References: <20221203003606.6838-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> X-Stat-Signature: rrgdrrtgwp6fogcygq87xr8bd37a3nui X-Rspam-User: X-Spamd-Result: default: False [-4.40 / 9.00]; BAYES_HAM(-6.00)[100.00%]; SUSPICIOUS_RECIPS(1.50)[]; MID_CONTAINS_FROM(1.00)[]; DMARC_POLICY_ALLOW(-0.50)[intel.com,none]; R_SPF_ALLOW(-0.20)[+ip4:192.55.52.93/32:c]; R_DKIM_ALLOW(-0.20)[intel.com:s=Intel]; MIME_GOOD(-0.10)[text/plain]; RCVD_NO_TLS_LAST(0.10)[]; MIME_TRACE(0.00)[0:+]; FROM_EQ_ENVFROM(0.00)[]; RCPT_COUNT_TWELVE(0.00)[40]; TO_MATCH_ENVRCPT_SOME(0.00)[]; RCVD_COUNT_THREE(0.00)[3]; FROM_HAS_DN(0.00)[]; DKIM_TRACE(0.00)[intel.com:+]; TO_DN_SOME(0.00)[]; ARC_SIGNED(0.00)[hostedemail.com:s=arc-20220608:i=1]; TAGGED_RCPT(0.00)[]; ARC_NA(0.00)[] X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: DC1F2100006 X-Rspamd-Server: rspam06 X-HE-Tag: 1670027829-187480 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: From: Yu-cheng Yu The CPU performs "shadow stack accesses" when it expects to encounter shadow stack mappings. These accesses can be implicit (via CALL/RET instructions) or explicit (instructions like WRSS). Shadow stacks accesses to shadow-stack mappings can see faults in normal, valid operation just like regular accesses to regular mappings. Shadow stacks need some of the same features like delayed allocation, swap and copy-on-write. The kernel needs to use faults to implement those features. The architecture has concepts of both shadow stack reads and shadow stack writes. Any shadow stack access to non-shadow stack memory will generate a fault with the shadow stack error code bit set. This means that, unlike normal write protection, the fault handler needs to create a type of memory that can be written to (with instructions that generate shadow stack writes), even to fulfill a read access. So in the case of COW memory, the COW needs to take place even with a shadow stack read. Otherwise the page will be left (shadow stack) writable in userspace. So to trigger the appropriate behavior, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE for shadow stack accesses, even if the access was a shadow stack read. Shadow stack accesses can also result in errors, such as when a shadow stack overflows, or if a shadow stack access occurs to a non-shadow-stack mapping. Also, generate the errors for invalid shadow stack accesses. Tested-by: Pengfei Xu Tested-by: John Allen Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe --- v4: - Further improve comment talking about FAULT_FLAG_WRITE (Peterz) v3: - Improve comment talking about using FAULT_FLAG_WRITE (Peterz) v2: - Update commit log with verbiage/feedback from Dave Hansen - Clarify reasoning for FAULT_FLAG_WRITE for all shadow stack accesses - Update comments with some verbiage from Dave Hansen Yu-cheng v30: - Update Subject line and add a verb arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h index 10b1de500ab1..afa524325e55 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ * bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected * bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch * bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access + * bit 6 == 1: shadow stack access fault * bit 15 == 1: SGX MMU page-fault */ enum x86_pf_error_code { @@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code { X86_PF_RSVD = 1 << 3, X86_PF_INSTR = 1 << 4, X86_PF_PK = 1 << 5, + X86_PF_SHSTK = 1 << 6, X86_PF_SGX = 1 << 15, }; diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 7b0d4ab894c8..3004ad044e9b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -1138,8 +1138,22 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma) (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign)) return 1; + /* + * Shadow stack accesses (PF_SHSTK=1) are only permitted to + * shadow stack VMAs. All other accesses result in an error. + */ + if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK) { + if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK))) + return 1; + if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))) + return 1; + return 0; + } + if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) { /* write, present and write, not present: */ + if (unlikely(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) + return 1; if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))) return 1; return 0; @@ -1331,6 +1345,30 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address); + /* + * When a page becomes COW it changes from a shadow stack permissioned + * page (Write=0,Dirty=1) to (Write=0,Dirty=0,CoW=1), which is simply + * read-only to the CPU. When shadow stack is enabled, a RET would + * normally pop the shadow stack by reading it with a "shadow stack + * read" access. However, in the COW case the shadow stack memory does + * not have shadow stack permissions, it is read-only. So it will + * generate a fault. + * + * For conventionally writable pages, a read can be serviced with a + * read only PTE, and COW would not have to happen. But for shadow + * stack, there isn't the concept of read-only shadow stack memory. + * If it is shadow stack permissioned, it can be modified via CALL and + * RET instructions. So COW needs to happen before any memory can be + * mapped with shadow stack permissions. + * + * Shadow stack accesses (read or write) need to be serviced with + * shadow stack permissioned memory, so in the case of a shadow stack + * read access, treat it as a WRITE fault so both COW will happen and + * the write fault path will tickle maybe_mkwrite() and map the memory + * shadow stack. + */ + if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK) + flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; if (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR)