diff mbox series

[v4,23/39] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory

Message ID 20221203003606.6838-24-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com (mailing list archive)
State New
Headers show
Series Shadow stacks for userspace | expand

Commit Message

Rick Edgecombe Dec. 3, 2022, 12:35 a.m. UTC 
The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new
type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some
unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function
properly.

Shadow stack memory is writable only in very specific, controlled ways.
However, since it is writable, the kernel treats it as such. As a result
there remain many ways for userspace to trigger the kernel to write to
shadow stack's via get_user_pages(, FOLL_WRITE) operations. To make this a
little less exposed, block writable GUPs for shadow stack VMAs.

Still allow FOLL_FORCE to write through shadow stack protections, as it
does for read-only protections.

Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
---

v3:
 - Add comment in __pte_access_permitted() (Dave)
 - Remove unneeded shadow stack specific check in
   __pte_access_permitted() (Jann)

 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 5 +++++
 mm/gup.c                       | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Comments

Kees Cook Dec. 3, 2022, 2:39 a.m. UTC | #1 
On Fri, Dec 02, 2022 at 04:35:50PM -0800, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new
> type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some
> unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function
> properly.
> 
> Shadow stack memory is writable only in very specific, controlled ways.
> However, since it is writable, the kernel treats it as such. As a result
> there remain many ways for userspace to trigger the kernel to write to
> shadow stack's via get_user_pages(, FOLL_WRITE) operations. To make this a
> little less exposed, block writable GUPs for shadow stack VMAs.
> 
> Still allow FOLL_FORCE to write through shadow stack protections, as it
> does for read-only protections.
> 
> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index a89dfa9174ae..945d58681a87 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -1636,6 +1636,11 @@  static inline bool __pte_access_permitted(unsigned long pteval, bool write)
 {
 	unsigned long need_pte_bits = _PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_USER;
 
+	/*
+	 * Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs are shadow stack, which the kernel
+	 * shouldn't generally allow access to, but since they
+	 * are already Write=0, the below logic covers both cases.
+	 */
 	if (write)
 		need_pte_bits |= _PAGE_RW;
 
diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
index cdff87343884..75e8d3853ff3 100644
--- a/mm/gup.c
+++ b/mm/gup.c
@@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@  static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	if (write) {
-		if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) {
+		if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE) || (vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) {
 			if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE))
 				return -EFAULT;
 			/*