| Message ID | 20230220183847.59159-33-michael.roth@amd.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support | expand |
On Mon, 20 Feb 2023 12:38:23 -0600 Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> wrote: > From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > > The next generation of SEV is called SEV-SNP (Secure Nested Paging). > SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding new > hardware based security protection. SEV-SNP adds strong memory encryption > integrity protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks > such as data replay, memory re-mapping, and more, to create an isolated > execution environment. > > The SNP feature is added incrementally, the later patches adds a new module > parameters that can be used to enabled SEV-SNP in the KVM. > > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> > --- > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 10 +++++++++- > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 8 ++++++++ > 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > index 9e9efb42a766..51db01b282eb 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > @@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444); > #define sev_es_enabled false > #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */ > > +/* enable/disable SEV-SNP support */ > +static bool sev_snp_enabled; > + > #define AP_RESET_HOLD_NONE 0 > #define AP_RESET_HOLD_NAE_EVENT 1 > #define AP_RESET_HOLD_MSR_PROTO 2 > @@ -2306,6 +2309,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) > { > #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV > unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count; > + bool sev_snp_supported = false; > bool sev_es_supported = false; > bool sev_supported = false; > > @@ -2385,12 +2389,16 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) > if (misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count)) > goto out; > > - pr_info("SEV-ES supported: %u ASIDs\n", sev_es_asid_count); > sev_es_supported = true; > + sev_snp_supported = sev_snp_enabled && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP); > + > + pr_info("SEV-ES %ssupported: %u ASIDs\n", > + sev_snp_supported ? "and SEV-SNP " : "", sev_es_asid_count); > > out: > sev_enabled = sev_supported; > sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported; > + sev_snp_enabled = sev_snp_supported; > #endif > } > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > index 5efcf036ccad..8eb1b51e92f5 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ enum { > struct kvm_sev_info { > bool active; /* SEV enabled guest */ > bool es_active; /* SEV-ES enabled guest */ > + bool snp_active; /* SEV-SNP enabled guest */ > unsigned int asid; /* ASID used for this guest */ > unsigned int handle; /* SEV firmware handle */ > int fd; /* SEV device fd */ > @@ -323,6 +324,13 @@ static __always_inline bool sev_es_guest(struct kvm *kvm) > #endif > } > > +static inline bool sev_snp_guest(struct kvm *kvm) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + > + return sev_es_guest(kvm) && sev->snp_active; > +} > + Maybe also use __always_inline like sev_es_guest() above? It seems solved some warnings before: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210624095147.880513802@infradead.org/ > static inline void vmcb_mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb) > { > vmcb->control.clean = 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 9e9efb42a766..51db01b282eb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444); #define sev_es_enabled false #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */ +/* enable/disable SEV-SNP support */ +static bool sev_snp_enabled; + #define AP_RESET_HOLD_NONE 0 #define AP_RESET_HOLD_NAE_EVENT 1 #define AP_RESET_HOLD_MSR_PROTO 2 @@ -2306,6 +2309,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count; + bool sev_snp_supported = false; bool sev_es_supported = false; bool sev_supported = false; @@ -2385,12 +2389,16 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) if (misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count)) goto out; - pr_info("SEV-ES supported: %u ASIDs\n", sev_es_asid_count); sev_es_supported = true; + sev_snp_supported = sev_snp_enabled && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP); + + pr_info("SEV-ES %ssupported: %u ASIDs\n", + sev_snp_supported ? "and SEV-SNP " : "", sev_es_asid_count); out: sev_enabled = sev_supported; sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported; + sev_snp_enabled = sev_snp_supported; #endif } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h index 5efcf036ccad..8eb1b51e92f5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ enum { struct kvm_sev_info { bool active; /* SEV enabled guest */ bool es_active; /* SEV-ES enabled guest */ + bool snp_active; /* SEV-SNP enabled guest */ unsigned int asid; /* ASID used for this guest */ unsigned int handle; /* SEV firmware handle */ int fd; /* SEV device fd */ @@ -323,6 +324,13 @@ static __always_inline bool sev_es_guest(struct kvm *kvm) #endif } +static inline bool sev_snp_guest(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + + return sev_es_guest(kvm) && sev->snp_active; +} + static inline void vmcb_mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb) { vmcb->control.clean = 0;