From patchwork Mon Jul 24 12:45:48 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mark Brown X-Patchwork-Id: 13324621 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from kanga.kvack.org (kanga.kvack.org [205.233.56.17]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 47E51C0015E for ; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 12:47:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) id D47066B0074; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 08:47:09 -0400 (EDT) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 40) id CF56D6B0075; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 08:47:09 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 63042) id BE41A8E0001; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 08:47:09 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: linux-mm@kvack.org Received: from relay.hostedemail.com (smtprelay0016.hostedemail.com [216.40.44.16]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B0CC86B0074 for ; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 08:47:09 -0400 (EDT) Received: from smtpin04.hostedemail.com (a10.router.float.18 [10.200.18.1]) by unirelay05.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6B96140A1F for ; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 12:47:09 +0000 (UTC) X-FDA: 81046480578.04.AEE5F9D Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by imf04.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6BB7840012 for ; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 12:47:07 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: imf04.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=XjzuJ4CC; dmarc=pass (policy=none) header.from=kernel.org; spf=pass (imf04.hostedemail.com: domain of broonie@kernel.org designates 139.178.84.217 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=broonie@kernel.org ARC-Seal: i=1; s=arc-20220608; d=hostedemail.com; t=1690202827; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; b=crUzcYJWJ3s5AKaYgWiwEd4wGgUwY7/PmxFutI6Lwq4gRWeTpVcUcRRW2hnrw7a81SVH41 RpitbdZWO2kVI81o2fdjM1SXMCfsrphfqDj7HKR6cpnhcscVVPAW4UbiRh+bZd402fUkmG BtnwqINTMPmIIBfBfmRIm8AIQvQFJdk= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; imf04.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=XjzuJ4CC; dmarc=pass (policy=none) header.from=kernel.org; spf=pass (imf04.hostedemail.com: domain of broonie@kernel.org designates 139.178.84.217 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=broonie@kernel.org ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=hostedemail.com; s=arc-20220608; t=1690202827; h=from:from:sender:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references:dkim-signature; bh=zOOBGuU2lqMR6FP1kWfddXG72xN4mge4QdS1tIq9BEI=; b=J2vuC1TnrAcbwpjoGPg9awq9OnT0jZo7uui4668qz8ZwEce92ukl+G0CNaEZoyRzeKoaF6 He1LWsqwPkNEd03nf75skXt3TcBVi6Xl/iVo0Di+kzkzaKH9rh4+aQ623GOuAg726H7vSJ AmQfuZcpARs55brviFeYuvDTVbuwHtY= Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 71CA861158; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 12:47:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 10031C433C8; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 12:46:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1690202825; bh=Ha5XZJGD09gV/heFbQXX/olVVoWkfD4y83jPPv1O1fs=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:From; b=XjzuJ4CCM6ZFYVXQVBnAtl2qFaSJcOnSdBa2YnR2gctCsWr1Kjge1Cr5Hm6hCCL1L lJte51uwrpvFxPHkIi4zmAIjOIQXm2aIxcZztmYzPr0dwlT8N1lA8vnIxeAgbNsFaH NhzgYSQgAulfi7NFvsH4rkHykMGTVXUp53McliPAk5ddgoiKpfWgmgSYi1tSGdGb8j VrymgggOsdKu520q0Nar3Iq/Dar5vXeuRYwMjC48qEX/MJJh9Syc0ko6SRhgtETTSb 8griVt+nzArLfXGI0wOltEET48B1bdL24Nj1CHr5z2+kdGsq6IFK8ZES8TeJoF2iL9 twAcqvgrRi/QA== From: Mark Brown Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2023 13:45:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH v2 01/35] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <20230724-arm64-gcs-v2-1-dc2c1d44c2eb@kernel.org> References: <20230724-arm64-gcs-v2-0-dc2c1d44c2eb@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <20230724-arm64-gcs-v2-0-dc2c1d44c2eb@kernel.org> To: Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Jonathan Corbet , Andrew Morton , Marc Zyngier , Oliver Upton , James Morse , Suzuki K Poulose , Arnd Bergmann , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Shuah Khan , "Rick P. Edgecombe" , Deepak Gupta , Ard Biesheuvel , Szabolcs Nagy Cc: "H.J. Lu" , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Mark Brown X-Mailer: b4 0.13-dev-099c9 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=4712; i=broonie@kernel.org; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=Ha5XZJGD09gV/heFbQXX/olVVoWkfD4y83jPPv1O1fs=; b=owEBbQGS/pANAwAKASTWi3JdVIfQAcsmYgBkvnKGzmJ6bW+XHW3KRIRbKtzN7oIBqPwmzob9MSSu feu/jZyJATMEAAEKAB0WIQSt5miqZ1cYtZ/in+ok1otyXVSH0AUCZL5yhgAKCRAk1otyXVSH0N53B/ 0RCo+v9GuodPKGUUlsCb2m+fzugBVD7KAydw/W8joi4ncLHkFDCfF6a3VR+OdzeVPXXbt5jrPyUUDK wtQtIe1CZpTrqp6ldxUREMtG8Zy9FCESrZUW7nGwiis9h2Ts5sNohIFo1jzK0JP84HQ3KZr8r2hMku +flLsRBhm3GwM888dK1xvk/xWY1UI2+MNcDm5KNa1QKOSYXrVoJaswMr3d4gT1anqYo5W9lDviiZqV PXptSh6/2iwzcXvokTe3DU2QvemUrTTXEm3QKC8HAs2tzSOWejm+DJhzvKg9e5Dx9U5lk/gEmt+McO yU6xnXXrvY6u5N/LXOWS8P5xSIE5mv X-Developer-Key: i=broonie@kernel.org; a=openpgp; fpr=3F2568AAC26998F9E813A1C5C3F436CA30F5D8EB X-Rspam-User: X-Rspamd-Server: rspam06 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 6BB7840012 X-Stat-Signature: r7yx35zeymnqmf8patwyg4u9f7maxgsc X-HE-Tag: 1690202827-267655 X-HE-Meta: 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 IcTkfp0H sXFn3ESTn4Vjdx5Ke7fVnUQ82Px5H8Hbq2zUMAA0w0Xky0G/4LNB91Kr6tN7UzWw7YxuOOCFlk9PoBAAY2pCa+Tm2Fo7ROq0CU9bgZitVfI9KT9sBa3+E4+9BROqjkbZXLumRa970wklEGOw/Swg+no0U8wMdk6KpNBWZOStku1YfJFZfLQMvasj3sDRreh3g0hx7vNUEizK85MR/Sf03osx1E6txplGTtxf0dxUnYFF6wLsZA0n/O0erDmGy9iemm1wpfwcWMQaBvRErwit9dbWxLw1WrSjWTTNEC3fhRqBmUnS+aTq3dO0n5pbzdJXMwJVhhcRcL6d5lmQG3SA1uKXCR6R45KJP7grawRiXF/ZEzUDHVqAPuHTQ64Vp1mSSBMYhKqTXY4vc/LJYc8TUVV3fIi0VG43u1AUwiLBq0T44FSQ= X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: Three architectures (x86, aarch64, riscv) have announced support for shadow stacks with fairly similar functionality. While x86 is using arch_prctl() to control the functionality neither arm64 nor riscv uses that interface so this patch adds arch-agnostic prctl() support to get and set status of shadow stacks and lock the current configuation to prevent further changes, with support for turning on and off individual subfeatures so applications can limit their exposure to features that they do not need. The features are: - PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE: Tracking and enforcement of shadow stacks, including allocation of a shadow stack if one is not already allocated. - PR_SHADOW_STACK_WRITE: Writes to specific addresses in the shadow stack. - PR_SHADOW_STACK_PUSH: Push additional values onto the shadow stack. These features are expected to be inherited by new threads and cleared on exec(), unknown features should be rejected for enable but accepted for locking (in order to allow for future proofing). This is based on a patch originally written by Deepak Gupta but modified fairly heavily, support for indirect landing pads is removed, additional modes added and the locking interface reworked. The set status prctl() is also reworked to just set flags, if setting/reading the shadow stack pointer is required this could be a separate prctl. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- include/linux/mm.h | 4 ++++ include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/sys.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index 97eddc83d19c..c57c5030ef6c 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -3947,4 +3947,8 @@ static inline void accept_memory(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end) #endif +int arch_get_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long __user *status); +int arch_set_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status); +int arch_lock_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status); + #endif /* _LINUX_MM_H */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h index 3c36aeade991..0de3d6ee18e0 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h @@ -305,4 +305,26 @@ struct prctl_mm_map { # define PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_NEXT_MASK 0xc # define PR_RISCV_V_VSTATE_CTRL_MASK 0x1f +/* + * Get the current shadow stack configuration for the current thread, + * this will be the value configured via PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS. + */ +#define PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS 71 + +/* + * Set the current shadow stack configuration. Enabling the shadow + * stack will cause a shadow stack to be allocated for the thread. + */ +#define PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS 72 +# define PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE (1UL << 0) +# define PR_SHADOW_STACK_WRITE (1UL << 1) +# define PR_SHADOW_STACK_PUSH (1UL << 2) + +/* + * Prevent further changes to the specified shadow stack + * configuration. All bits may be locked via this call, including + * undefined bits. + */ +#define PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS 73 + #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */ diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 2410e3999ebe..b26423a614a9 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -2302,6 +2302,21 @@ int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which, return -EINVAL; } +int __weak arch_get_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long __user *status) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + +int __weak arch_set_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + +int __weak arch_lock_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + #define PR_IO_FLUSHER (PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO | PF_LOCAL_THROTTLE) #ifdef CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME @@ -2720,6 +2735,21 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, case PR_RISCV_V_GET_CONTROL: error = RISCV_V_GET_CONTROL(); break; + case PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS: + if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) + return -EINVAL; + error = arch_get_shadow_stack_status(me, (unsigned long __user *) arg2); + break; + case PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS: + if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) + return -EINVAL; + error = arch_set_shadow_stack_status(me, arg2); + break; + case PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS: + if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) + return -EINVAL; + error = arch_lock_shadow_stack_status(me, arg2); + break; default: error = -EINVAL; break;