From patchwork Mon Jul 24 12:45:50 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mark Brown X-Patchwork-Id: 13324623 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from kanga.kvack.org (kanga.kvack.org [205.233.56.17]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B8389C001DE for ; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 12:47:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) id 381C26B0078; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 08:47:22 -0400 (EDT) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 40) id 331946B007B; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 08:47:22 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 63042) id 1D1DB6B007D; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 08:47:22 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: linux-mm@kvack.org Received: from relay.hostedemail.com (smtprelay0012.hostedemail.com [216.40.44.12]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0CC166B0078 for ; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 08:47:22 -0400 (EDT) Received: from smtpin18.hostedemail.com (a10.router.float.18 [10.200.18.1]) by unirelay02.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AA5A6120A75 for ; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 12:47:21 +0000 (UTC) X-FDA: 81046481082.18.D935E66 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by imf29.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C2CF512000F for ; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 12:47:19 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: imf29.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b="ffH/RQ4g"; spf=pass (imf29.hostedemail.com: domain of broonie@kernel.org designates 139.178.84.217 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=broonie@kernel.org; dmarc=pass (policy=none) header.from=kernel.org ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=hostedemail.com; s=arc-20220608; t=1690202839; h=from:from:sender:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references:dkim-signature; bh=efWpO6kQZ4NBVvO+VRNIClHcValqnYdNn1UkQ+vSR1Q=; b=7HWK79vMgesn1737LMht7ttnwCzHhWUhwaDuJqKPxsvABuOEj7Xyds0+/0i2i3jOmseiUv MRka4olWhTejywrF0x02Bzx1syIUxizyklT1Ai7M11NFFyifm7qFhW+qix15muMnFDizIy 203mJ3X3rcgGXkRzoY/DePyqwJ/4ZME= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; imf29.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b="ffH/RQ4g"; spf=pass (imf29.hostedemail.com: domain of broonie@kernel.org designates 139.178.84.217 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=broonie@kernel.org; dmarc=pass (policy=none) header.from=kernel.org ARC-Seal: i=1; s=arc-20220608; d=hostedemail.com; t=1690202839; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; b=rW4Y0yhqD5lsaYHq3cy0GzAccp0PMryjLb5Qt0rZaeyD3ZNX4yKJka3aEX43gVI1tbiLF2 CBwz8/KnAsP9qa3sznEktygjFoe1JQYWF3cJEGjP1T6M/aox2CoVPWhy+bCqa0+DZMwXy0 mmfNg0L2rm4sL4jYr9a0olGy0VDou1E= Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 01B5761150; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 12:47:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 96242C433CB; Mon, 24 Jul 2023 12:47:12 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1690202838; bh=JKDtvlLgCbRxcWm9rtPAv0aBzdkLrhP5DYKE0inZ7vs=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:From; b=ffH/RQ4g0IB9tcoBBh1H1ocL2Zba7p2EfMEAR2PTNdPzg50sCvUJ3Qr1K55lAJH3K 0KPyBAlf2ZFdEJofSE0crGwD9pFqrI9NczJdUrrmHKX5ltCxKZe543ZxFVjPwWBWpB kPcztuu1ldDii5yosGe3B2ofk2xJ2O2DFHZ3I/wONLZc+mTHaDXwahHwBmKvPtG+w8 HRQciGT9x9B5h5mQPWjVZ1tmFOW4qFx+9PuIBOdh6C4VQPQOFkLlIoRFxcMwaH+9Im QlZSX45d7O5+UQGdwfODRrKDz0oxQxqqeMD8fgP3X8dqwDdepYfMRleVJ4UQaH1T1+ R8w2kz5utRVHg== From: Mark Brown Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2023 13:45:50 +0100 Subject: [PATCH v2 03/35] arm64/gcs: Document the ABI for Guarded Control Stacks MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <20230724-arm64-gcs-v2-3-dc2c1d44c2eb@kernel.org> References: <20230724-arm64-gcs-v2-0-dc2c1d44c2eb@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <20230724-arm64-gcs-v2-0-dc2c1d44c2eb@kernel.org> To: Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Jonathan Corbet , Andrew Morton , Marc Zyngier , Oliver Upton , James Morse , Suzuki K Poulose , Arnd Bergmann , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Shuah Khan , "Rick P. Edgecombe" , Deepak Gupta , Ard Biesheuvel , Szabolcs Nagy Cc: "H.J. Lu" , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Mark Brown X-Mailer: b4 0.13-dev-099c9 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=10156; i=broonie@kernel.org; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=JKDtvlLgCbRxcWm9rtPAv0aBzdkLrhP5DYKE0inZ7vs=; b=owEBbQGS/pANAwAKASTWi3JdVIfQAcsmYgBkvnKIkI/z/FRFl2yq+/W4QeCB8aMno8PWhHrRhMUA 59OEymqJATMEAAEKAB0WIQSt5miqZ1cYtZ/in+ok1otyXVSH0AUCZL5yiAAKCRAk1otyXVSH0HQsB/ 0TbA9rgdVcFGKnIhca5/92eJorzzjU+xl30gtzLkaEX0J5ai5El4stEqnoNrAQltV8oR0F84Xy2zlu sUmMHcXMusZUV6BZofpnv1t4AoiWGEBNvmff7JNqhlBf1MCr/jKQuYjqCXjnQMjtMmnZAb0hIUskO4 qoReL+7c7A92pXLI31ZfdNr7efwCWYYZUA149D0K6OtFHlivE/ebBwvtoPzb22Lyr0az9SAQCZKKyn 2ua341gEeJhBMEqGsmaMFI24gUZqZSD3VBs1Fcn0Ou5MxR55YSrqFBY0YuuGmHUg7fIjpOncpxCeqD K/5ejCzx/h9kGzRL++a3Ivv09Fw/KW X-Developer-Key: i=broonie@kernel.org; a=openpgp; fpr=3F2568AAC26998F9E813A1C5C3F436CA30F5D8EB X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: C2CF512000F X-Rspam-User: X-Stat-Signature: y9idthj7swcf9bp8nmz53tsi835ori75 X-Rspamd-Server: rspam01 X-HE-Tag: 1690202839-747441 X-HE-Meta: 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 2n9nvjev EAIKAECL4uFM5/M7UQ9cHGnnSERgBn1/yGokYFKbXWdrtgggoIbnvsBg8yGwKyrWbzRZhp/zPvFuNxAJywbGKFpg7TmPE2nY7vr/GtdpsoxtoAjZoxYTkMFoHLLzhjduhAOL6UUXk7HUEjOSNXQ9yt7Y9ib/rAOmLkGZ0iMPdxLfUxT1pocaw/bP8E5/AS6LsS5wqq2MdKsSQGXyfdlJuaQSJYn23R3m7R+wqwnYAemVQvF+uxrzLjQLSHX8RmL8wnvVs2X+vUz9QeEhfZc+gHAz37T4KGsjQifaGMdjcWyVPkPQOJULySXhlO2sFaHhpXbIW7VKMnoDu4QS841khgFJZx30zE72Gip9PWeL4eV0KgcAycz+bZmmmqChWtBPo7i1pq2JDySuSKpug+78ozvJt1ouex9iJGgkZYmuaud03EZM= X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: Add some documentation of the userspace ABI for Guarded Control Stacks. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- Documentation/arch/arm64/gcs.rst | 225 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/arch/arm64/index.rst | 1 + 2 files changed, 226 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/arch/arm64/gcs.rst b/Documentation/arch/arm64/gcs.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..33f21bbcc2d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/arm64/gcs.rst @@ -0,0 +1,225 @@ +=============================================== +Guarded Control Stack support for AArch64 Linux +=============================================== + +This document outlines briefly the interface provided to userspace by Linux in +order to support use of the ARM Guarded Control Stack (GCS) feature. + +This is an outline of the most important features and issues only and not +intended to be exhaustive. + + + +1. General +----------- + +* GCS is an architecture feature intended to provide greater protection + against return oriented programming (ROP) attacks and to simplify the + implementation of features that need to collect stack traces such as + profiling. + +* When GCS is enabled a separate guarded control stack is maintained by the + PE which is writeable only through specific GCS operations. This + stores the call stack only, when a procedure call instruction is + performed the current PC is pushed onto the GCS and on RET the + address in the LR is verified against that on the top of the GCS. + +* When active current GCS pointer is stored in the system register + GCSPR_EL0. This is readable by userspace but can only be updated + via specific GCS instructions. + +* The architecture provides instructions for switching between guarded + control stacks with checks to ensure that the new stack is a valid + target for switching. + +* The functionality of GCS is similar to that provided by the x86 Shadow + Stack feature, due to sharing of userspace interfaces the ABI refers to + shadow stacks rather than GCS. + +* Support for GCS is reported to userspace via HWCAP2_GCS in the aux vector + AT_HWCAP2 entry. + +* GCS is enabled per thread. While there is support for disabling GCS + at runtime this should be done with great care. + +* GCS memory access faults are reported as normal memory access faults. + +* GCS specific errors (those reported with EC 0x2d) will be reported as + SIGSEGV with a si_code of SEGV_CPERR (control protection error). + +* GCS is supported only for AArch64. + +* On systems where GCS is supported GCSPR_EL0 is always readable by EL0 + regardless of the GCS configuration for the thread. + +* The architecture supports enabling GCS without verifying that return values + in LR match those in the GCS, the LR will be ignored. This is not supported + by Linux. + +* EL0 GCS entries with bit 63 set are reserved for use, one such use is defined + below for signals and should be ignored when parsing the stack if not + understood. + + +2. Enabling and disabling Guarded Control Stacks +------------------------------------------------- + +* GCS is enabled and disabled for a thread via the PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS + prctl(), this takes a single flags argument specifying which GCS features + should be used. + +* When set PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE flag allocates a Guarded Control Stack for + and enables GCS for the thread, enabling the functionality controlled by + GCSPRE0_EL1.{nTR, RVCHKEN, PCRSEL}. + +* When set the PR_SHADOW_STACK_PUSH flag enables the functionality controlled + by GCSCRE0_EL1.PUSHMEn, allowing explicit GCS pushes. + +* When set the PR_SHADOW_STACK_WRITE flag enables the functionality controlled + by GCSCRE0_EL1.STREn, allowing explicit stores to the Guarded Control Stack. + +* Any unknown flags will cause PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS to return -EINVAL. + +* PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS is passed a bitmask of features with the same + values as used for PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS. Any future changes to the + status of the specified GCS mode bits will be rejected. + +* PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS allows any bit to be locked, this allows + userspace to prevent changes to any future features. + +* PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS and PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS affect only the + thread the called them, any other running threads will be unaffected. + +* New threads inherit the GCS configuration of the thread that created them. + +* GCS is disabled on exec(). + +* The current GCS configuration for a thread may be read with the + PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS prctl(), this returns the same flags that + are passed to PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS. + +* If GCS is disabled for a thread after having previously been enabled then + the stack will remain allocated for the lifetime of the thread. At present + any attempt to reenable GCS for the thread will be rejected, this may be + revisited in future. + +* It should be noted that since enabling GCS will result in GCS becoming + active immediately it is not normally possible to return from the function + that invoked the prctl() that enabled GCS. It is expected that the normal + usage will be that GCS is enabled very early in execution of a program. + + + +3. Allocation of Guarded Control Stacks +---------------------------------------- + +* When GCS is enabled for a thread a new Guarded Control Stack will be + allocated for it of size RLIMIT_STACK / 2 or 2 gigabytes, whichever is + smaller. + +* When a new thread is created by a thread which has GCS enabled then a + new Guarded Control Stack will be allocated for the new thread with + half the size of the standard stack. + +* When a stack is allocated by enabling GCS or during thread creation then + the top 8 bytes of the stack will be initialised to 0 and GCSPR_EL0 will + be set to point to the address of this 0 value, this can be used to + detect the top of the stack. + +* Additional Guarded Control Stacks can be allocated using the + map_shadow_stack() system call. + +* Stacks allocated using map_shadow_stack() will have the top 8 bytes + set to 0 and the 8 bytes below that initialised with an architecturally + valid GCS cap value, this allows switching to these stacks using the + stack switch instructions provided by the architecture. + +* Stacks allocated using map_shadow_stack() must be larger than 16 bytes and + must be 16 bytes aligned. + +* When GCS is disabled for a thread the Guarded Control Stack initially + allocated for that thread will be freed. Note carefully that if the + stack has been switched this may not be the stack currently in use by + the thread. + + +4. Signal handling +-------------------- + +* A new signal frame record gcs_context encodes the current GCS mode and + pointer for the interrupted context on signal delivery. This will always + be present on systems that support GCS. + +* The record contains a flag field which reports the current GCS configuration + for the interrupted context as PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS would. + +* The signal handler is run with the same GCS configuration as the interrupted + context. + +* When GCS is enabled for the interrupted thread a signal handling specific + GCS cap token will be written to the GCS, this is an architectural GCS cap + token with bit 63 set. The GCSPR_EL0 reported in the signal frame will + point to this cap token. + +* The signal handler will use the same GCS as the interrupted context. + +* When GCS is enabled on signal entry a frame with the address of the signal + return handler will be pushed onto the GCS, allowing return from the signal + handler via RET as normal. This will not be reported in the gcs_context in + the signal frame. + + +5. Signal return +----------------- + +When returning from a signal handler: + +* If there is a gcs_context record in the signal frame then the GCS flags + and GCSPR_EL0 will be restored from that context prior to further + validation. + +* If there is no gcs_context record in the signal frame then the GCS + configuration will be unchanged. + +* If GCS is enabled on return from a signal handler then GCSPR_EL0 must + point to a valid GCS signal cap record, this will be popped from the + GCS prior to signal return. + +* If the GCS configuration is locked when returning from a signal then any + attempt to change the GCS configuration will be treated as an error. This + is true even if GCS was not enabled prior to signal entry. + +* GCS may be disabled via signal return but any attempt to enable GCS via + signal return will be rejected. + + +7. ptrace extensions +--------------------- + +* A new regset NT_ARM_GCS is defined for use with PTRACE_GETREGSET and + PTRACE_SETREGSET. + +* Due to the complexity surrounding allocation and deallocation of stacks and + lack of practical application it is not possible to enable GCS via ptrace. + GCS may be disabled via the ptrace interface. + +* Other GCS modes may be configured via ptrace. + +* Configuration via ptrace ignores locking of GCS mode bits. + + +8. ELF coredump extensions +--------------------------- + +* NT_ARM_GCS notes will be added to each coredump for each thread of the + dumped process. The contents will be equivalent to the data that would + have been read if a PTRACE_GETREGSET of the corresponding type were + executed for each thread when the coredump was generated. + + + +9. /proc extensions +-------------------- + +* Guarded Control Stack pages will include "ss" in their VmFlags in + /proc//smaps. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/arm64/index.rst b/Documentation/arch/arm64/index.rst index d08e924204bf..dcf3ee3eb8c0 100644 --- a/Documentation/arch/arm64/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/arch/arm64/index.rst @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ ARM64 Architecture booting cpu-feature-registers elf_hwcaps + gcs hugetlbpage kdump legacy_instructions