diff mbox series

[2/2] exec: Avoid pathological argc, envc, and bprm->p values

Message ID 20240520021615.741800-2-keescook@chromium.org (mailing list archive)
State New
Headers show
Series [1/2] exec: Add KUnit test for bprm_stack_limits() | expand

Commit Message

Kees Cook May 20, 2024, 2:16 a.m. UTC
Make sure nothing goes wrong with the string counters or the bprm's
belief about the stack pointer. Add checks and matching self-tests.

For 32-bit validation, this was run under 32-bit UML:
$ tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run --make_options SUBARCH=i386 exec

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
---
 fs/exec.c      | 11 ++++++++++-
 fs/exec_test.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Comments

Kees Cook June 21, 2024, 7 a.m. UTC | #1
On Thu, Jun 20, 2024 at 05:19:55PM -0700, Guenter Roeck wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> On Sun, May 19, 2024 at 07:16:12PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > Make sure nothing goes wrong with the string counters or the bprm's
> > belief about the stack pointer. Add checks and matching self-tests.
> > 
> > For 32-bit validation, this was run under 32-bit UML:
> > $ tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run --make_options SUBARCH=i386 exec
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> 
> With this patch in linux-next, the qemu m68k:mcf5208evb emulation
> fails to boot. The error is:

Eeek. Thanks for the report! I've dropped this patch from my for-next
tree.

> Run /init as init process
> Failed to execute /init (error -7)

-7 is E2BIG, so it's certainly one of the 3 new added checks. I must
have made a mistake in my reasoning about how bprm->p is initialized;
the other two checks seems extremely unlikely to be tripped.

I will try to get qemu set up and take a close look at what's happening.
While I'm doing that, if it's easy for you, can you try it with just
this removed (i.e. the other 2 new -E2BIG cases still in place):

	/* Avoid a pathological bprm->p. */
	if (bprm->p < limit)
		return -E2BIG;
Guenter Roeck June 21, 2024, 1:21 p.m. UTC | #2
On 6/21/24 00:00, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 20, 2024 at 05:19:55PM -0700, Guenter Roeck wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> On Sun, May 19, 2024 at 07:16:12PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> Make sure nothing goes wrong with the string counters or the bprm's
>>> belief about the stack pointer. Add checks and matching self-tests.
>>>
>>> For 32-bit validation, this was run under 32-bit UML:
>>> $ tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run --make_options SUBARCH=i386 exec
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>>
>> With this patch in linux-next, the qemu m68k:mcf5208evb emulation
>> fails to boot. The error is:
> 
> Eeek. Thanks for the report! I've dropped this patch from my for-next
> tree.
> 
>> Run /init as init process
>> Failed to execute /init (error -7)
> 
> -7 is E2BIG, so it's certainly one of the 3 new added checks. I must
> have made a mistake in my reasoning about how bprm->p is initialized;
> the other two checks seems extremely unlikely to be tripped.
> 
> I will try to get qemu set up and take a close look at what's happening.
> While I'm doing that, if it's easy for you, can you try it with just
> this removed (i.e. the other 2 new -E2BIG cases still in place):
> 
> 	/* Avoid a pathological bprm->p. */
> 	if (bprm->p < limit)
> 		return -E2BIG;

I added a printk:

argc: 1 envc: 2 p: 262140 limit: 2097152
                 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Removing the check above does indeed fix the problem.

Guenter
Kees Cook June 21, 2024, 7:54 p.m. UTC | #3
On Fri, Jun 21, 2024 at 06:21:15AM -0700, Guenter Roeck wrote:
> On 6/21/24 00:00, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 20, 2024 at 05:19:55PM -0700, Guenter Roeck wrote:
> > > Hi,
> > > 
> > > On Sun, May 19, 2024 at 07:16:12PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > > Make sure nothing goes wrong with the string counters or the bprm's
> > > > belief about the stack pointer. Add checks and matching self-tests.
> > > > 
> > > > For 32-bit validation, this was run under 32-bit UML:
> > > > $ tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run --make_options SUBARCH=i386 exec
> > > > 
> > > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > > 
> > > With this patch in linux-next, the qemu m68k:mcf5208evb emulation
> > > fails to boot. The error is:
> > 
> > Eeek. Thanks for the report! I've dropped this patch from my for-next
> > tree.
> > 
> > > Run /init as init process
> > > Failed to execute /init (error -7)
> > 
> > -7 is E2BIG, so it's certainly one of the 3 new added checks. I must
> > have made a mistake in my reasoning about how bprm->p is initialized;
> > the other two checks seems extremely unlikely to be tripped.
> > 
> > I will try to get qemu set up and take a close look at what's happening.
> > While I'm doing that, if it's easy for you, can you try it with just
> > this removed (i.e. the other 2 new -E2BIG cases still in place):
> > 
> > 	/* Avoid a pathological bprm->p. */
> > 	if (bprm->p < limit)
> > 		return -E2BIG;
> 
> I added a printk:
> 
> argc: 1 envc: 2 p: 262140 limit: 2097152
>                 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> Removing the check above does indeed fix the problem.

Thanks for checking this!

And I've found my mistake. "argmin" is only valid for CONFIG_MMU. And
you noticed this back in 2018. ;)

http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126122307.GA1660@redhat.com

I will try to fix this better so we don't trip over it again.
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 1d45e1a2d620..5dcdd115739e 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -503,6 +503,9 @@  static int bprm_stack_limits(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	 * of argument strings even with small stacks
 	 */
 	limit = max_t(unsigned long, limit, ARG_MAX);
+	/* Reject totally pathological counts. */
+	if (bprm->argc < 0 || bprm->envc < 0)
+		return -E2BIG;
 	/*
 	 * We must account for the size of all the argv and envp pointers to
 	 * the argv and envp strings, since they will also take up space in
@@ -516,11 +519,17 @@  static int bprm_stack_limits(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	 * argc can never be 0, to keep them from walking envp by accident.
 	 * See do_execveat_common().
 	 */
-	ptr_size = (max(bprm->argc, 1) + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *);
+	if (check_add_overflow(max(bprm->argc, 1), bprm->envc, &ptr_size) ||
+	    check_mul_overflow(ptr_size, sizeof(void *), &ptr_size))
+		return -E2BIG;
 	if (limit <= ptr_size)
 		return -E2BIG;
 	limit -= ptr_size;
 
+	/* Avoid a pathological bprm->p. */
+	if (bprm->p < limit)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
 	bprm->argmin = bprm->p - limit;
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/fs/exec_test.c b/fs/exec_test.c
index 32a90c6f47e7..f2d4a80c861d 100644
--- a/fs/exec_test.c
+++ b/fs/exec_test.c
@@ -8,9 +8,32 @@  struct bprm_stack_limits_result {
 };
 
 static const struct bprm_stack_limits_result bprm_stack_limits_results[] = {
-	/* Giant values produce -E2BIG */
+	/* Negative argc/envc counts produce -E2BIG */
+	{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
+	    .argc = INT_MIN, .envc = INT_MIN }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+	{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
+	    .argc = 5, .envc = -1 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+	{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
+	    .argc = -1, .envc = 10 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+	/* The max value of argc or envc is MAX_ARG_STRINGS. */
 	{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
 	    .argc = INT_MAX, .envc = INT_MAX }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+	{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
+	    .argc = MAX_ARG_STRINGS, .envc = MAX_ARG_STRINGS }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+	{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
+	    .argc = 0, .envc = MAX_ARG_STRINGS }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+	{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
+	    .argc = MAX_ARG_STRINGS, .envc = 0 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+	/*
+	 * On 32-bit system these argc and envc counts, while likely impossible
+	 * to represent within the associated TASK_SIZE, could overflow the
+	 * limit calculation, and bypass the ptr_size <= limit check.
+	 */
+	{ { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
+	    .argc = 0x20000001, .envc = 0x20000001 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+	/* Make sure a pathological bprm->p doesn't cause an overflow. */
+	{ { .p = sizeof(void *), .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
+	    .argc = 10, .envc = 10 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
 	/*
 	 * 0 rlim_stack will get raised to ARG_MAX. With 1 string pointer,
 	 * we should see p - ARG_MAX + sizeof(void *).
@@ -88,6 +111,7 @@  static void exec_test_bprm_stack_limits(struct kunit *test)
 	/* Double-check the constants. */
 	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, _STK_LIM, SZ_8M);
 	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, ARG_MAX, 32 * SZ_4K);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, MAX_ARG_STRINGS, 0x7FFFFFFF);
 
 	for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bprm_stack_limits_results); i++) {
 		const struct bprm_stack_limits_result *result = &bprm_stack_limits_results[i];