Message ID | e17b91ad-a578-9a15-5e3-4989e0f999b5@google.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New |
Headers | show |
Series | fs, mm: fix race in unlinking swapfile | expand |
On Wed 07-07-21 13:48:31, Hugh Dickins wrote: > We had a recurring situation in which admin procedures setting up > swapfiles would race with test preparation clearing away swapfiles; > and just occasionally that got stuck on a swapfile "(deleted)" which > could never be swapped off. That is not supposed to be possible. > > 2.6.28 commit f9454548e17c ("don't unlink an active swapfile") admitted > that it was leaving a race window open: now close it. > > may_delete() makes the IS_SWAPFILE check (amongst many others) before > inode_lock has been taken on target: now repeat just that simple check > in vfs_unlink() and vfs_rename(), after taking inode_lock. > > Which goes most of the way to fixing the race, but swapon() must also > check after it acquires inode_lock, that the file just opened has not > already been unlinked. > > Fixes: f9454548e17c ("don't unlink an active swapfile") > Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Looks good to me. Feel free to add: Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Honza > --- > fs/namei.c | 8 +++++++- > mm/swapfile.c | 6 ++++++ > 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c > index bf6d8a738c59..ff866c07f4d2 100644 > --- a/fs/namei.c > +++ b/fs/namei.c > @@ -4024,7 +4024,9 @@ int vfs_unlink(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir, > return -EPERM; > > inode_lock(target); > - if (is_local_mountpoint(dentry)) > + if (IS_SWAPFILE(target)) > + error = -EPERM; > + else if (is_local_mountpoint(dentry)) > error = -EBUSY; > else { > error = security_inode_unlink(dir, dentry); > @@ -4526,6 +4528,10 @@ int vfs_rename(struct renamedata *rd) > else if (target) > inode_lock(target); > > + error = -EPERM; > + if (IS_SWAPFILE(source) || (target && IS_SWAPFILE(target))) > + goto out; > + > error = -EBUSY; > if (is_local_mountpoint(old_dentry) || is_local_mountpoint(new_dentry)) > goto out; > diff --git a/mm/swapfile.c b/mm/swapfile.c > index 1e07d1c776f2..7527afd95284 100644 > --- a/mm/swapfile.c > +++ b/mm/swapfile.c > @@ -3130,6 +3130,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(swapon, const char __user *, specialfile, int, swap_flags) > struct filename *name; > struct file *swap_file = NULL; > struct address_space *mapping; > + struct dentry *dentry; > int prio; > int error; > union swap_header *swap_header; > @@ -3173,6 +3174,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(swapon, const char __user *, specialfile, int, swap_flags) > > p->swap_file = swap_file; > mapping = swap_file->f_mapping; > + dentry = swap_file->f_path.dentry; > inode = mapping->host; > > error = claim_swapfile(p, inode); > @@ -3180,6 +3182,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(swapon, const char __user *, specialfile, int, swap_flags) > goto bad_swap; > > inode_lock(inode); > + if (d_unlinked(dentry) || cant_mount(dentry)) { > + error = -ENOENT; > + goto bad_swap_unlock_inode; > + } > if (IS_SWAPFILE(inode)) { > error = -EBUSY; > goto bad_swap_unlock_inode; > -- > 2.26.2 >
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index bf6d8a738c59..ff866c07f4d2 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -4024,7 +4024,9 @@ int vfs_unlink(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir, return -EPERM; inode_lock(target); - if (is_local_mountpoint(dentry)) + if (IS_SWAPFILE(target)) + error = -EPERM; + else if (is_local_mountpoint(dentry)) error = -EBUSY; else { error = security_inode_unlink(dir, dentry); @@ -4526,6 +4528,10 @@ int vfs_rename(struct renamedata *rd) else if (target) inode_lock(target); + error = -EPERM; + if (IS_SWAPFILE(source) || (target && IS_SWAPFILE(target))) + goto out; + error = -EBUSY; if (is_local_mountpoint(old_dentry) || is_local_mountpoint(new_dentry)) goto out; diff --git a/mm/swapfile.c b/mm/swapfile.c index 1e07d1c776f2..7527afd95284 100644 --- a/mm/swapfile.c +++ b/mm/swapfile.c @@ -3130,6 +3130,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(swapon, const char __user *, specialfile, int, swap_flags) struct filename *name; struct file *swap_file = NULL; struct address_space *mapping; + struct dentry *dentry; int prio; int error; union swap_header *swap_header; @@ -3173,6 +3174,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(swapon, const char __user *, specialfile, int, swap_flags) p->swap_file = swap_file; mapping = swap_file->f_mapping; + dentry = swap_file->f_path.dentry; inode = mapping->host; error = claim_swapfile(p, inode); @@ -3180,6 +3182,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(swapon, const char __user *, specialfile, int, swap_flags) goto bad_swap; inode_lock(inode); + if (d_unlinked(dentry) || cant_mount(dentry)) { + error = -ENOENT; + goto bad_swap_unlock_inode; + } if (IS_SWAPFILE(inode)) { error = -EBUSY; goto bad_swap_unlock_inode;
We had a recurring situation in which admin procedures setting up swapfiles would race with test preparation clearing away swapfiles; and just occasionally that got stuck on a swapfile "(deleted)" which could never be swapped off. That is not supposed to be possible. 2.6.28 commit f9454548e17c ("don't unlink an active swapfile") admitted that it was leaving a race window open: now close it. may_delete() makes the IS_SWAPFILE check (amongst many others) before inode_lock has been taken on target: now repeat just that simple check in vfs_unlink() and vfs_rename(), after taking inode_lock. Which goes most of the way to fixing the race, but swapon() must also check after it acquires inode_lock, that the file just opened has not already been unlinked. Fixes: f9454548e17c ("don't unlink an active swapfile") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> --- fs/namei.c | 8 +++++++- mm/swapfile.c | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)