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[82.17.115.212]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id p8-20020a5d4e08000000b002054b5437f2sm1373745wrt.115.2022.03.22.07.04.04 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 22 Mar 2022 07:04:06 -0700 (PDT) From: Aaron Tomlin To: mcgrof@kernel.org, christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu Cc: cl@linux.com, mbenes@suse.cz, akpm@linux-foundation.org, jeyu@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-modules@vger.kernel.org, void@manifault.com, atomlin@atomlin.com, allen.lkml@gmail.com, joe@perches.com, msuchanek@suse.de, oleksandr@natalenko.name, jason.wessel@windriver.com, pmladek@suse.com, daniel.thompson@linaro.org, hch@infradead.org Subject: [PATCH v12 07/14] module: Move extra signature support out of core code Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 14:03:37 +0000 Message-Id: <20220322140344.556474-8-atomlin@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20220322140344.556474-1-atomlin@redhat.com> References: <20220322140344.556474-1-atomlin@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: No functional change. This patch migrates additional module signature check code from core module code into kernel/module/signing.c. Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin --- include/linux/module.h | 12 +++--- kernel/module/internal.h | 9 +++++ kernel/module/main.c | 87 ---------------------------------------- kernel/module/signing.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h index 7ec9715de7dc..5e2059f3afc7 100644 --- a/include/linux/module.h +++ b/include/linux/module.h @@ -672,7 +672,6 @@ static inline bool is_livepatch_module(struct module *mod) #endif } -bool is_module_sig_enforced(void); void set_module_sig_enforced(void); #else /* !CONFIG_MODULES... */ @@ -799,10 +798,6 @@ static inline bool module_requested_async_probing(struct module *module) return false; } -static inline bool is_module_sig_enforced(void) -{ - return false; -} static inline void set_module_sig_enforced(void) { @@ -854,11 +849,18 @@ static inline bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline) #endif #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG +bool is_module_sig_enforced(void); + static inline bool module_sig_ok(struct module *module) { return module->sig_ok; } #else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ +static inline bool is_module_sig_enforced(void) +{ + return false; +} + static inline bool module_sig_ok(struct module *module) { return true; diff --git a/kernel/module/internal.h b/kernel/module/internal.h index a6895bb5598a..d6f646a5da41 100644 --- a/kernel/module/internal.h +++ b/kernel/module/internal.h @@ -158,3 +158,12 @@ static inline int module_enforce_rwx_sections(Elf_Ehdr *hdr, Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG +int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags); +#else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ +static inline int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ diff --git a/kernel/module/main.c b/kernel/module/main.c index 5cd63f14b1ef..c63e10c61694 100644 --- a/kernel/module/main.c +++ b/kernel/module/main.c @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -127,28 +126,6 @@ static void module_assert_mutex_or_preempt(void) #endif } -#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG -static bool sig_enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE); -module_param(sig_enforce, bool_enable_only, 0644); - -void set_module_sig_enforced(void) -{ - sig_enforce = true; -} -#else -#define sig_enforce false -#endif - -/* - * Export sig_enforce kernel cmdline parameter to allow other subsystems rely - * on that instead of directly to CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE config. - */ -bool is_module_sig_enforced(void) -{ - return sig_enforce; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(is_module_sig_enforced); - /* Block module loading/unloading? */ int modules_disabled = 0; core_param(nomodule, modules_disabled, bint, 0); @@ -2569,70 +2546,6 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod, } #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG -static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) -{ - int err = -ENODATA; - const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; - const char *reason; - const void *mod = info->hdr; - bool mangled_module = flags & (MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_MODVERSIONS | - MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_VERMAGIC); - /* - * Do not allow mangled modules as a module with version information - * removed is no longer the module that was signed. - */ - if (!mangled_module && - info->len > markerlen && - memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) { - /* We truncate the module to discard the signature */ - info->len -= markerlen; - err = mod_verify_sig(mod, info); - if (!err) { - info->sig_ok = true; - return 0; - } - } - - /* - * We don't permit modules to be loaded into the trusted kernels - * without a valid signature on them, but if we're not enforcing, - * certain errors are non-fatal. - */ - switch (err) { - case -ENODATA: - reason = "unsigned module"; - break; - case -ENOPKG: - reason = "module with unsupported crypto"; - break; - case -ENOKEY: - reason = "module with unavailable key"; - break; - - default: - /* - * All other errors are fatal, including lack of memory, - * unparseable signatures, and signature check failures -- - * even if signatures aren't required. - */ - return err; - } - - if (is_module_sig_enforced()) { - pr_notice("Loading of %s is rejected\n", reason); - return -EKEYREJECTED; - } - - return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE); -} -#else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ -static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) -{ - return 0; -} -#endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ - static int validate_section_offset(struct load_info *info, Elf_Shdr *shdr) { #if defined(CONFIG_64BIT) diff --git a/kernel/module/signing.c b/kernel/module/signing.c index 8aeb6d2ee94b..85c8999dfecf 100644 --- a/kernel/module/signing.c +++ b/kernel/module/signing.c @@ -11,9 +11,29 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include +#include #include "internal.h" +static bool sig_enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE); +module_param(sig_enforce, bool_enable_only, 0644); + +/* + * Export sig_enforce kernel cmdline parameter to allow other subsystems rely + * on that instead of directly to CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE config. + */ +bool is_module_sig_enforced(void) +{ + return sig_enforce; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(is_module_sig_enforced); + +void set_module_sig_enforced(void) +{ + sig_enforce = true; +} + /* * Verify the signature on a module. */ @@ -43,3 +63,60 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL); } + +int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) +{ + int err = -ENODATA; + const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; + const char *reason; + const void *mod = info->hdr; + bool mangled_module = flags & (MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_MODVERSIONS | + MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_VERMAGIC); + /* + * Do not allow mangled modules as a module with version information + * removed is no longer the module that was signed. + */ + if (!mangled_module && + info->len > markerlen && + memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) { + /* We truncate the module to discard the signature */ + info->len -= markerlen; + err = mod_verify_sig(mod, info); + if (!err) { + info->sig_ok = true; + return 0; + } + } + + /* + * We don't permit modules to be loaded into the trusted kernels + * without a valid signature on them, but if we're not enforcing, + * certain errors are non-fatal. + */ + switch (err) { + case -ENODATA: + reason = "unsigned module"; + break; + case -ENOPKG: + reason = "module with unsupported crypto"; + break; + case -ENOKEY: + reason = "module with unavailable key"; + break; + + default: + /* + * All other errors are fatal, including lack of memory, + * unparseable signatures, and signature check failures -- + * even if signatures aren't required. + */ + return err; + } + + if (is_module_sig_enforced()) { + pr_notice("Loading of %s is rejected\n", reason); + return -EKEYREJECTED; + } + + return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE); +}