Message ID | 1398615293-22931-9-git-send-email-aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 09:44:39PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote: > From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@kernel.org> > > Some permission models can allow processes to take ownership of a file, > change the file permissions, and set the file timestamps. Introduce new > permission mask flags and check for those permissions in > inode_change_ok(). > > Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@kernel.org> > Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > --- > fs/attr.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- > fs/namei.c | 2 +- > include/linux/fs.h | 4 ++++ > 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c > index 1d158c972442..e468d4f2dca8 100644 > --- a/fs/attr.c > +++ b/fs/attr.c > @@ -16,6 +16,54 @@ > #include <linux/evm.h> > #include <linux/ima.h> > > +static int richacl_change_ok(struct inode *inode, int mask) > +{ acl_change_ok() > + if (!IS_RICHACL(inode)) > + return -EPERM; > + > + if (inode->i_op->permission) > + return inode->i_op->permission(inode, mask); > + > + return check_acl(inode, mask); > +} > + > +static bool inode_uid_change_ok(struct inode *inode, kuid_t ia_uid) > +{ > + if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) && > + uid_eq(ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) > + return true; > + if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), ia_uid) && > + richacl_change_ok(inode, MAY_TAKE_OWNERSHIP) == 0) > + return true; > + if (capable(CAP_CHOWN)) > + return true; > + return false; > +} > + > +static bool inode_gid_change_ok(struct inode *inode, kgid_t ia_gid) > +{ > + int in_group = in_group_p(ia_gid); > + if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) && > + (in_group || gid_eq(ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) > + return true; > + if (in_group && richacl_change_ok(inode, MAY_TAKE_OWNERSHIP) == 0) > + return true; > + if (capable(CAP_CHOWN)) > + return true; > + return false; > +} > + > +static bool inode_owner_permitted_or_capable(struct inode *inode, int mask) > +{ > + if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid)) > + return true; > + if (richacl_change_ok(inode, mask) == 0) > + return true; > + if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER)) > + return true; > + return false; > +} Some comments on when and why these need to be used instead of inode_owner_or_capable() would be useful. I can see people getting this wrong in future. Cheers, Dave.
Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> writes: > On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 09:44:39PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote: >> From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@kernel.org> >> >> Some permission models can allow processes to take ownership of a file, >> change the file permissions, and set the file timestamps. Introduce new >> permission mask flags and check for those permissions in >> inode_change_ok(). >> >> Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@kernel.org> >> Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> >> --- >> fs/attr.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- >> fs/namei.c | 2 +- >> include/linux/fs.h | 4 ++++ >> 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c >> index 1d158c972442..e468d4f2dca8 100644 >> --- a/fs/attr.c >> +++ b/fs/attr.c >> @@ -16,6 +16,54 @@ >> #include <linux/evm.h> >> #include <linux/ima.h> >> >> +static int richacl_change_ok(struct inode *inode, int mask) >> +{ > > acl_change_ok() Will update. > >> + if (!IS_RICHACL(inode)) >> + return -EPERM; >> + >> + if (inode->i_op->permission) >> + return inode->i_op->permission(inode, mask); >> + >> + return check_acl(inode, mask); >> +} >> + >> +static bool inode_uid_change_ok(struct inode *inode, kuid_t ia_uid) >> +{ >> + if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) && >> + uid_eq(ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) >> + return true; >> + if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), ia_uid) && >> + richacl_change_ok(inode, MAY_TAKE_OWNERSHIP) == 0) >> + return true; >> + if (capable(CAP_CHOWN)) >> + return true; >> + return false; >> +} >> + >> +static bool inode_gid_change_ok(struct inode *inode, kgid_t ia_gid) >> +{ >> + int in_group = in_group_p(ia_gid); >> + if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) && >> + (in_group || gid_eq(ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) >> + return true; >> + if (in_group && richacl_change_ok(inode, MAY_TAKE_OWNERSHIP) == 0) >> + return true; >> + if (capable(CAP_CHOWN)) >> + return true; >> + return false; >> +} >> + >> +static bool inode_owner_permitted_or_capable(struct inode *inode, int mask) >> +{ >> + if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid)) >> + return true; >> + if (richacl_change_ok(inode, mask) == 0) >> + return true; >> + if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER)) >> + return true; >> + return false; >> +} > > Some comments on when and why these need to be used instead of > inode_owner_or_capable() would be useful. I can see people getting > this wrong in future. > Ok. -aneesh -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c index 1d158c972442..e468d4f2dca8 100644 --- a/fs/attr.c +++ b/fs/attr.c @@ -16,6 +16,54 @@ #include <linux/evm.h> #include <linux/ima.h> +static int richacl_change_ok(struct inode *inode, int mask) +{ + if (!IS_RICHACL(inode)) + return -EPERM; + + if (inode->i_op->permission) + return inode->i_op->permission(inode, mask); + + return check_acl(inode, mask); +} + +static bool inode_uid_change_ok(struct inode *inode, kuid_t ia_uid) +{ + if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) && + uid_eq(ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) + return true; + if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), ia_uid) && + richacl_change_ok(inode, MAY_TAKE_OWNERSHIP) == 0) + return true; + if (capable(CAP_CHOWN)) + return true; + return false; +} + +static bool inode_gid_change_ok(struct inode *inode, kgid_t ia_gid) +{ + int in_group = in_group_p(ia_gid); + if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) && + (in_group || gid_eq(ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) + return true; + if (in_group && richacl_change_ok(inode, MAY_TAKE_OWNERSHIP) == 0) + return true; + if (capable(CAP_CHOWN)) + return true; + return false; +} + +static bool inode_owner_permitted_or_capable(struct inode *inode, int mask) +{ + if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid)) + return true; + if (richacl_change_ok(inode, mask) == 0) + return true; + if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER)) + return true; + return false; +} + /** * inode_change_ok - check if attribute changes to an inode are allowed * @inode: inode to check @@ -47,22 +95,18 @@ int inode_change_ok(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr) return 0; /* Make sure a caller can chown. */ - if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) && - (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) || - !uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) && - !inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN)) - return -EPERM; + if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID) + if (!inode_uid_change_ok(inode, attr->ia_uid)) + return -EPERM; /* Make sure caller can chgrp. */ - if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) && - (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) || - (!in_group_p(attr->ia_gid) && !gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) && - !inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN)) - return -EPERM; + if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID) + if (!inode_gid_change_ok(inode, attr->ia_gid)) + return -EPERM; /* Make sure a caller can chmod. */ if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) { - if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) + if (!inode_owner_permitted_or_capable(inode, MAY_CHMOD)) return -EPERM; /* Also check the setgid bit! */ if (!in_group_p((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid : @@ -73,7 +117,7 @@ int inode_change_ok(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr) /* Check for setting the inode time. */ if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) { - if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) + if (!inode_owner_permitted_or_capable(inode, MAY_SET_TIMES)) return -EPERM; } diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 56ac7613fbca..26b9a8212837 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ void putname(struct filename *name) } #endif -static int check_acl(struct inode *inode, int mask) +int check_acl(struct inode *inode, int mask) { #ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL struct posix_acl *acl; diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index 33da154dd27d..22d85798b520 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -81,6 +81,9 @@ typedef void (dio_iodone_t)(struct kiocb *iocb, loff_t offset, #define MAY_CREATE_DIR 0x00000200 #define MAY_DELETE_CHILD 0x00000400 #define MAY_DELETE_SELF 0x00000800 +#define MAY_TAKE_OWNERSHIP 0x00001000 +#define MAY_CHMOD 0x00002000 +#define MAY_SET_TIMES 0x00004000 /* * flags in file.f_mode. Note that FMODE_READ and FMODE_WRITE must correspond @@ -2248,6 +2251,7 @@ extern sector_t bmap(struct inode *, sector_t); extern int notify_change(struct dentry *, struct iattr *, struct inode **); extern int inode_permission(struct inode *, int); extern int generic_permission(struct inode *, int); +extern int check_acl(struct inode *, int); static inline bool execute_ok(struct inode *inode) {