From patchwork Tue Jun 7 19:14:48 2016 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Scott Mayhew X-Patchwork-Id: 9162269 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 42C5A60777 for ; Tue, 7 Jun 2016 19:15:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 272A82831B for ; Tue, 7 Jun 2016 19:15:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 1BB7C28354; Tue, 7 Jun 2016 19:15:04 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6EB932831B for ; Tue, 7 Jun 2016 19:14:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754093AbcFGTOw (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 Jun 2016 15:14:52 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:58318 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751228AbcFGTOv (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 Jun 2016 15:14:51 -0400 Received: from int-mx13.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com (int-mx13.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.26]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 957BE8553B; Tue, 7 Jun 2016 19:14:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: from tonberry.usersys.redhat.com (dhcp145-110.rdu.redhat.com [10.13.145.110]) by int-mx13.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id u57JEn4U026997 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 7 Jun 2016 15:14:50 -0400 Received: from tonberry.usersys.redhat.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by tonberry.usersys.redhat.com (8.15.2/8.14.5) with ESMTP id u57JEnos011225; Tue, 7 Jun 2016 15:14:49 -0400 Received: (from smayhew@localhost) by tonberry.usersys.redhat.com (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id u57JEm7X011223; Tue, 7 Jun 2016 15:14:48 -0400 From: Scott Mayhew To: trond.myklebust@primarydata.com, anna.schumaker@netapp.com Cc: bfields@fieldses.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH RESEND] sunrpc: move NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT to the auth->au_flags Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2016 15:14:48 -0400 Message-Id: <1465326888-11185-1-git-send-email-smayhew@redhat.com> X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.68 on 10.5.11.26 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.28]); Tue, 07 Jun 2016 19:14:50 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-nfs-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP A generic_cred can be used to look up a unx_cred or a gss_cred, so it's not really safe to use the the generic_cred->acred->ac_flags to store the NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT flag. A lookup for a unx_cred triggered while the KEY_EXPIRE_SOON flag is already set will cause both NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT and KEY_EXPIRE_SOON to be set in the ac_flags, leaving the user associated with the auth_cred to be in a state where they're perpetually doing 4K NFS_FILE_SYNC writes. This can be reproduced as follows: 1. Mount two NFS filesystems, one with sec=krb5 and one with sec=sys. They do not need to be the same export, nor do they even need to be from the same NFS server. Also, v3 is fine. $ sudo mount -o v3,sec=krb5 server1:/export /mnt/krb5 $ sudo mount -o v3,sec=sys server2:/export /mnt/sys 2. As the normal user, before accessing the kerberized mount, kinit with a short lifetime (but not so short that renewing the ticket would leave you within the 4-minute window again by the time the original ticket expires), e.g. $ kinit -l 10m -r 60m 3. Do some I/O to the kerberized mount and verify that the writes are wsize, UNSTABLE: $ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/krb5/file bs=1M count=1 4. Wait until you're within 4 minutes of key expiry, then do some more I/O to the kerberized mount to ensure that RPC_CRED_KEY_EXPIRE_SOON gets set. Verify that the writes are 4K, FILE_SYNC: $ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/krb5/file bs=1M count=1 5. Now do some I/O to the sec=sys mount. This will cause RPC_CRED_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT to be set: $ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/sys/file bs=1M count=1 6. Writes for that user will now be permanently 4K, FILE_SYNC for that user, regardless of which mount is being written to, until you reboot the client. Renewing the kerberos ticket (assuming it hasn't already expired) will have no effect. Grabbing a new kerberos ticket at this point will have no effect either. Move the flag to the auth->au_flags field (which is currently unused) and rename it slightly to reflect that it's no longer associated with the auth_cred->ac_flags. Add the rpc_auth to the arg list of rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire and check the au_flags there too. Finally, add the inode to the arg list of nfs_ctx_key_to_expire so we can determine the rpc_auth to pass to rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire. Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington --- fs/nfs/file.c | 4 ++-- fs/nfs/internal.h | 2 +- fs/nfs/write.c | 6 ++++-- include/linux/sunrpc/auth.h | 6 ++++-- net/sunrpc/auth.c | 4 +++- net/sunrpc/auth_generic.c | 9 +-------- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c | 1 + net/sunrpc/auth_null.c | 1 + net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c | 1 + 9 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfs/file.c b/fs/nfs/file.c index 717a8d6..6bcd891 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/file.c +++ b/fs/nfs/file.c @@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ static int nfs_write_end(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping, return status; NFS_I(mapping->host)->write_io += copied; - if (nfs_ctx_key_to_expire(ctx)) { + if (nfs_ctx_key_to_expire(ctx, mapping->host)) { status = nfs_wb_all(mapping->host); if (status < 0) return status; @@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ static int nfs_need_check_write(struct file *filp, struct inode *inode) ctx = nfs_file_open_context(filp); if (test_bit(NFS_CONTEXT_ERROR_WRITE, &ctx->flags) || - nfs_ctx_key_to_expire(ctx)) + nfs_ctx_key_to_expire(ctx, inode)) return 1; return 0; } diff --git a/fs/nfs/internal.h b/fs/nfs/internal.h index 5154fa6..ca87787 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/internal.h +++ b/fs/nfs/internal.h @@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ void nfs_init_cinfo(struct nfs_commit_info *cinfo, struct inode *inode, struct nfs_direct_req *dreq); int nfs_key_timeout_notify(struct file *filp, struct inode *inode); -bool nfs_ctx_key_to_expire(struct nfs_open_context *ctx); +bool nfs_ctx_key_to_expire(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct inode *inode); void nfs_pageio_stop_mirroring(struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *pgio); #ifdef CONFIG_MIGRATION diff --git a/fs/nfs/write.c b/fs/nfs/write.c index e1c74d3..0b949a0 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/write.c +++ b/fs/nfs/write.c @@ -1195,9 +1195,11 @@ nfs_key_timeout_notify(struct file *filp, struct inode *inode) /* * Test if the open context credential key is marked to expire soon. */ -bool nfs_ctx_key_to_expire(struct nfs_open_context *ctx) +bool nfs_ctx_key_to_expire(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct inode *inode) { - return rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire(ctx->cred); + struct rpc_auth *auth = NFS_SERVER(inode)->client->cl_auth; + + return rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire(auth, ctx->cred); } /* diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/auth.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/auth.h index 8997915..f890a29 100644 --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/auth.h +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/auth.h @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ struct rpcsec_gss_info; /* auth_cred ac_flags bits */ enum { - RPC_CRED_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT = 0, /* underlying cred has no key timeout */ RPC_CRED_KEY_EXPIRE_SOON = 1, /* underlying cred key will expire soon */ RPC_CRED_NOTIFY_TIMEOUT = 2, /* nofity generic cred when underlying key will expire soon */ @@ -82,6 +81,9 @@ struct rpc_cred { #define RPCAUTH_CRED_MAGIC 0x0f4aa4f0 +/* rpc_auth au_flags */ +#define RPCAUTH_AUTH_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT 0x0001 /* underlying cred has no key timeout */ + /* * Client authentication handle */ @@ -196,7 +198,7 @@ void rpcauth_destroy_credcache(struct rpc_auth *); void rpcauth_clear_credcache(struct rpc_cred_cache *); int rpcauth_key_timeout_notify(struct rpc_auth *, struct rpc_cred *); -bool rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire(struct rpc_cred *); +bool rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire(struct rpc_auth *, struct rpc_cred *); char * rpcauth_stringify_acceptor(struct rpc_cred *); static inline diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth.c b/net/sunrpc/auth.c index 040ff62..696eb39 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth.c @@ -359,8 +359,10 @@ rpcauth_key_timeout_notify(struct rpc_auth *auth, struct rpc_cred *cred) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rpcauth_key_timeout_notify); bool -rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire(struct rpc_cred *cred) +rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire(struct rpc_auth *auth, struct rpc_cred *cred) { + if (auth->au_flags & RPCAUTH_AUTH_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT) + return false; if (!cred->cr_ops->crkey_to_expire) return false; return cred->cr_ops->crkey_to_expire(cred); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_generic.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_generic.c index 54dd3fd..1682195 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_generic.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_generic.c @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ generic_key_timeout(struct rpc_auth *auth, struct rpc_cred *cred) /* Fast track for non crkey_timeout (no key) underlying credentials */ - if (test_bit(RPC_CRED_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT, &acred->ac_flags)) + if (auth->au_flags & RPCAUTH_AUTH_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT) return 0; /* Fast track for the normal case */ @@ -236,12 +236,6 @@ generic_key_timeout(struct rpc_auth *auth, struct rpc_cred *cred) if (IS_ERR(tcred)) return -EACCES; - if (!tcred->cr_ops->crkey_timeout) { - set_bit(RPC_CRED_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT, &acred->ac_flags); - ret = 0; - goto out_put; - } - /* Test for the almost error case */ ret = tcred->cr_ops->crkey_timeout(tcred); if (ret != 0) { @@ -257,7 +251,6 @@ generic_key_timeout(struct rpc_auth *auth, struct rpc_cred *cred) set_bit(RPC_CRED_NOTIFY_TIMEOUT, &acred->ac_flags); } -out_put: put_rpccred(tcred); return ret; } diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c index e64ae93..813a3cd 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c @@ -1015,6 +1015,7 @@ gss_create_new(struct rpc_auth_create_args *args, struct rpc_clnt *clnt) auth = &gss_auth->rpc_auth; auth->au_cslack = GSS_CRED_SLACK >> 2; auth->au_rslack = GSS_VERF_SLACK >> 2; + auth->au_flags = 0; auth->au_ops = &authgss_ops; auth->au_flavor = flavor; atomic_set(&auth->au_count, 1); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_null.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_null.c index 8d9eb4d..4d17376 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_null.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_null.c @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ static struct rpc_auth null_auth = { .au_cslack = NUL_CALLSLACK, .au_rslack = NUL_REPLYSLACK, + .au_flags = RPCAUTH_AUTH_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT, .au_ops = &authnull_ops, .au_flavor = RPC_AUTH_NULL, .au_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0), diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c index 9f65452..a99278c 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c @@ -228,6 +228,7 @@ static struct rpc_auth unix_auth = { .au_cslack = UNX_CALLSLACK, .au_rslack = NUL_REPLYSLACK, + .au_flags = RPCAUTH_AUTH_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT, .au_ops = &authunix_ops, .au_flavor = RPC_AUTH_UNIX, .au_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0),