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[Version,3,06/16] SUNRPC AUTH_GSS gss3 reply verifier

Message ID 1482509068-24516-7-git-send-email-andros@netapp.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show

Commit Message

Andy Adamson Dec. 23, 2016, 4:04 p.m. UTC 
From: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>

The new GSS Version 3 reply  verifier is taken over the same data as
the call verifier, caveat REPLY direction

Verifier Data

   xid          tk_rqstp->rq_xid
   direction    REPLY (always a 1) RPC_REPLY
   rpcvers      RPC_VERSION
   prog         clnt->cl_prog
   vers         clnt->cl_vers
   proc         tk_msg.rpc_proc->p_proc
   credential
         flavor       RPC_AUTH_GSS
         length       cred_len is in gss_marshal (new gv_crlen)
         gss version  ctx->gc_v
         gss proc     ctx->gv_proc
         gss seq      tk_rqstp->rq_seqno
         gss svc      gss_cred->gc_service
         gss ctx len  ctx->gc_wire_ctx
         gss ctx data ctx->gc_wire_ctx

Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
---
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Comments

Schumaker, Anna Jan. 4, 2017, 9:46 p.m. UTC | #1 
Hi Andy,

On 12/23/2016 11:04 AM, andros@netapp.com wrote:
> From: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
> 
> The new GSS Version 3 reply  verifier is taken over the same data as
> the call verifier, caveat REPLY direction
> 
> Verifier Data
> 
>    xid          tk_rqstp->rq_xid
>    direction    REPLY (always a 1) RPC_REPLY
>    rpcvers      RPC_VERSION
>    prog         clnt->cl_prog
>    vers         clnt->cl_vers
>    proc         tk_msg.rpc_proc->p_proc
>    credential
>          flavor       RPC_AUTH_GSS
>          length       cred_len is in gss_marshal (new gv_crlen)
>          gss version  ctx->gc_v
>          gss proc     ctx->gv_proc
>          gss seq      tk_rqstp->rq_seqno
>          gss svc      gss_cred->gc_service
>          gss ctx len  ctx->gc_wire_ctx
>          gss ctx data ctx->gc_wire_ctx
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
> ---
>  net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
> index 9288cc2..d11f421 100644
> --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
> +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
> @@ -1624,6 +1624,53 @@ static int gss_cred_is_negative_entry(struct rpc_cred *cred)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * gss3_reply_verifier: The new gssv3 verifier uses same data as call
> + * caveat REPLY direction - see rpc_encode_header
> + */
> +static  void *
> +gss3_reply_verifier(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx,
> +		    struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *seq, struct kvec *iov)
> +{
> +	struct gss_cred *g_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred, gc_base);
> +	void	*gss3_buf = NULL;
> +	__be32 *crlen, *ptr = NULL;
> +	int len;
> +
> +	/* freed in gss_validate */
> +	len = (13 * 4) + ctx->gc_wire_ctx.len;
> +	gss3_buf = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
> +	if (!gss3_buf) {
> +		gss3_buf = ERR_PTR(-EIO);
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +	ptr = (__be32 *)gss3_buf;
> +
> +	*ptr++ = htonl(task->tk_rqstp->rq_xid);
> +	*ptr++ = htonl(RPC_REPLY);
> +	*ptr++ = htonl(RPC_VERSION);
> +	*ptr++ = htonl(task->tk_client->cl_prog);
> +	*ptr++ = htonl(task->tk_client->cl_vers);
> +	*ptr++ = htonl(task->tk_msg.rpc_proc->p_proc);
> +	*ptr++ = htonl(RPC_AUTH_GSS);
> +
> +	/* credential */
> +	crlen = ptr++;
> +	*ptr++ = htonl(ctx->gc_v);
> +	*ptr++ = htonl(ctx->gc_proc);
> +	*ptr++ = *seq;
> +	*ptr++ = htonl(g_cred->gc_service);
> +	ptr = xdr_encode_netobj(ptr, &ctx->gc_wire_ctx);
> +
> +	/* backfill cred length */
> +	*crlen = htonl((ptr - (crlen + 1)) << 2);
> +
> +	iov->iov_base = gss3_buf;
> +	iov->iov_len = (ptr - (__be32 *)gss3_buf) << 2;
> +out:
> +	return gss3_buf;
> +}
> +
>  static __be32 *
>  gss_validate(struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *p)
>  {
> @@ -1633,6 +1680,7 @@ static int gss_cred_is_negative_entry(struct rpc_cred *cred)
>  	struct kvec	iov;
>  	struct xdr_buf	verf_buf;
>  	struct xdr_netobj mic;
> +	void	*g3_buf = NULL;
>  	u32		flav,len;
>  	u32		maj_stat;
>  	__be32		*ret = ERR_PTR(-EIO);
> @@ -1648,14 +1696,22 @@ static int gss_cred_is_negative_entry(struct rpc_cred *cred)
>  	if (!seq)
>  		goto out_bad;
>  	*seq = htonl(task->tk_rqstp->rq_seqno);
> -	iov.iov_base = seq;
> -	iov.iov_len = 4;
> +	if (ctx->gc_v == RPC_GSS_VERSION) {
> +		iov.iov_base = seq;
> +		iov.iov_len = 4;
> +	}
> +	if (ctx->gc_v == RPC_GSS3_VERSION) {

Can this be written as an else-if instead?  I don't think it's likely for gc_v to have two values at once :)

Thanks,
Anna

> +		g3_buf = gss3_reply_verifier(cred, ctx, task, seq, &iov);
> +		if (IS_ERR(g3_buf))
> +			goto out_bad;
> +	}
>  	xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_buf);
>  	mic.data = (u8 *)p;
>  	mic.len = len;
>  
>  	ret = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
>  	maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, &verf_buf, &mic);
> +	kfree(g3_buf);
>  	if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
>  		clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags);
>  	if (maj_stat) {
> 
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diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
index 9288cc2..d11f421 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
@@ -1624,6 +1624,53 @@  static int gss_cred_is_negative_entry(struct rpc_cred *cred)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * gss3_reply_verifier: The new gssv3 verifier uses same data as call
+ * caveat REPLY direction - see rpc_encode_header
+ */
+static  void *
+gss3_reply_verifier(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx,
+		    struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *seq, struct kvec *iov)
+{
+	struct gss_cred *g_cred = container_of(cred, struct gss_cred, gc_base);
+	void	*gss3_buf = NULL;
+	__be32 *crlen, *ptr = NULL;
+	int len;
+
+	/* freed in gss_validate */
+	len = (13 * 4) + ctx->gc_wire_ctx.len;
+	gss3_buf = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!gss3_buf) {
+		gss3_buf = ERR_PTR(-EIO);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ptr = (__be32 *)gss3_buf;
+
+	*ptr++ = htonl(task->tk_rqstp->rq_xid);
+	*ptr++ = htonl(RPC_REPLY);
+	*ptr++ = htonl(RPC_VERSION);
+	*ptr++ = htonl(task->tk_client->cl_prog);
+	*ptr++ = htonl(task->tk_client->cl_vers);
+	*ptr++ = htonl(task->tk_msg.rpc_proc->p_proc);
+	*ptr++ = htonl(RPC_AUTH_GSS);
+
+	/* credential */
+	crlen = ptr++;
+	*ptr++ = htonl(ctx->gc_v);
+	*ptr++ = htonl(ctx->gc_proc);
+	*ptr++ = *seq;
+	*ptr++ = htonl(g_cred->gc_service);
+	ptr = xdr_encode_netobj(ptr, &ctx->gc_wire_ctx);
+
+	/* backfill cred length */
+	*crlen = htonl((ptr - (crlen + 1)) << 2);
+
+	iov->iov_base = gss3_buf;
+	iov->iov_len = (ptr - (__be32 *)gss3_buf) << 2;
+out:
+	return gss3_buf;
+}
+
 static __be32 *
 gss_validate(struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *p)
 {
@@ -1633,6 +1680,7 @@  static int gss_cred_is_negative_entry(struct rpc_cred *cred)
 	struct kvec	iov;
 	struct xdr_buf	verf_buf;
 	struct xdr_netobj mic;
+	void	*g3_buf = NULL;
 	u32		flav,len;
 	u32		maj_stat;
 	__be32		*ret = ERR_PTR(-EIO);
@@ -1648,14 +1696,22 @@  static int gss_cred_is_negative_entry(struct rpc_cred *cred)
 	if (!seq)
 		goto out_bad;
 	*seq = htonl(task->tk_rqstp->rq_seqno);
-	iov.iov_base = seq;
-	iov.iov_len = 4;
+	if (ctx->gc_v == RPC_GSS_VERSION) {
+		iov.iov_base = seq;
+		iov.iov_len = 4;
+	}
+	if (ctx->gc_v == RPC_GSS3_VERSION) {
+		g3_buf = gss3_reply_verifier(cred, ctx, task, seq, &iov);
+		if (IS_ERR(g3_buf))
+			goto out_bad;
+	}
 	xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_buf);
 	mic.data = (u8 *)p;
 	mic.len = len;
 
 	ret = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
 	maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, &verf_buf, &mic);
+	kfree(g3_buf);
 	if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED)
 		clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags);
 	if (maj_stat) {