diff mbox

Fix 16-byte memory leak in gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall

Message ID 1526677984-29854-1-git-send-email-dwysocha@redhat.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show

Commit Message

David Wysochanski May 18, 2018, 9:13 p.m. UTC
There is a 16-byte memory leak inside sunrpc/auth_gss on an nfs server when
a client mounts with 'sec=krb5' in a simple mount / umount loop.  The leak
is seen by either monitoring the kmalloc-16 slab or with kmemleak enabled

unreferenced object 0xffff92e6a045f030 (size 16):
  comm "nfsd", pid 1096, jiffies 4294936658 (age 761.110s)
  hex dump (first 16 bytes):
    2a 86 48 86 f7 12 01 02 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  *.H.............
  backtrace:
    [<000000004b2b79a7>] gssx_dec_buffer+0x79/0x90 [auth_rpcgss]
    [<000000002610ac1a>] gssx_dec_accept_sec_context+0x215/0x6dd [auth_rpcgss]
    [<000000004fd0e81d>] rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xa9/0xe0 [sunrpc]
    [<000000002b099233>] call_decode+0x1e9/0x840 [sunrpc]
    [<00000000954fc846>] __rpc_execute+0x80/0x3f0 [sunrpc]
    [<00000000c83a961c>] rpc_run_task+0x10d/0x150 [sunrpc]
    [<000000002c2cdcd2>] rpc_call_sync+0x4d/0xa0 [sunrpc]
    [<000000000b74eea2>] gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall+0x196/0x470 [auth_rpcgss]
    [<000000003271273f>] svcauth_gss_proxy_init+0x188/0x520 [auth_rpcgss]
    [<000000001cf69f01>] svcauth_gss_accept+0x3a6/0xb50 [auth_rpcgss]

If you map the above to code you'll see the following call chain
  gssx_dec_accept_sec_context
    gssx_dec_ctx  (missing from kmemleak output)
      gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &ctx->mech)

Inside gssx_dec_buffer there is 'kmemdup' where we allocate memory for
any gssx_buffer (buf) and store into buf->data.  In the above instance,
'buf == &ctx->mech).

Further up in the chain in gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall we see ctx->mech
is part of a stack variable 'struct gssx_ctx rctxh'.  Now later inside
gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall after gssp_call, there is a number of
memcpy and kfree statements, but there is no kfree(rctxh.mech.data)
after the memcpy into data->mech_oid.data.

With this patch applied and the same mount / unmount loop, the kmalloc-16
slab is stable and kmemleak enabled no longer shows the above backtrace.

Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
---
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Comments

J. Bruce Fields May 21, 2018, 9:28 p.m. UTC | #1
This looks right, thanks, it's just waiting on testing--the latest
Fedora update seems to have broken my test rig's krb5 server, hopefully
I'll get that back up tommorrow.

--b.

On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 05:13:04PM -0400, Dave Wysochanski wrote:
> There is a 16-byte memory leak inside sunrpc/auth_gss on an nfs server when
> a client mounts with 'sec=krb5' in a simple mount / umount loop.  The leak
> is seen by either monitoring the kmalloc-16 slab or with kmemleak enabled
> 
> unreferenced object 0xffff92e6a045f030 (size 16):
>   comm "nfsd", pid 1096, jiffies 4294936658 (age 761.110s)
>   hex dump (first 16 bytes):
>     2a 86 48 86 f7 12 01 02 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  *.H.............
>   backtrace:
>     [<000000004b2b79a7>] gssx_dec_buffer+0x79/0x90 [auth_rpcgss]
>     [<000000002610ac1a>] gssx_dec_accept_sec_context+0x215/0x6dd [auth_rpcgss]
>     [<000000004fd0e81d>] rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xa9/0xe0 [sunrpc]
>     [<000000002b099233>] call_decode+0x1e9/0x840 [sunrpc]
>     [<00000000954fc846>] __rpc_execute+0x80/0x3f0 [sunrpc]
>     [<00000000c83a961c>] rpc_run_task+0x10d/0x150 [sunrpc]
>     [<000000002c2cdcd2>] rpc_call_sync+0x4d/0xa0 [sunrpc]
>     [<000000000b74eea2>] gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall+0x196/0x470 [auth_rpcgss]
>     [<000000003271273f>] svcauth_gss_proxy_init+0x188/0x520 [auth_rpcgss]
>     [<000000001cf69f01>] svcauth_gss_accept+0x3a6/0xb50 [auth_rpcgss]
> 
> If you map the above to code you'll see the following call chain
>   gssx_dec_accept_sec_context
>     gssx_dec_ctx  (missing from kmemleak output)
>       gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &ctx->mech)
> 
> Inside gssx_dec_buffer there is 'kmemdup' where we allocate memory for
> any gssx_buffer (buf) and store into buf->data.  In the above instance,
> 'buf == &ctx->mech).
> 
> Further up in the chain in gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall we see ctx->mech
> is part of a stack variable 'struct gssx_ctx rctxh'.  Now later inside
> gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall after gssp_call, there is a number of
> memcpy and kfree statements, but there is no kfree(rctxh.mech.data)
> after the memcpy into data->mech_oid.data.
> 
> With this patch applied and the same mount / unmount loop, the kmalloc-16
> slab is stable and kmemleak enabled no longer shows the above backtrace.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
> ---
>  net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c | 4 +++-
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
> index 46b295e..d98e2b6 100644
> --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
> +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
> @@ -298,9 +298,11 @@ int gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall(struct net *net,
>  	if (res.context_handle) {
>  		data->out_handle = rctxh.exported_context_token;
>  		data->mech_oid.len = rctxh.mech.len;
> -		if (rctxh.mech.data)
> +		if (rctxh.mech.data) {
>  			memcpy(data->mech_oid.data, rctxh.mech.data,
>  						data->mech_oid.len);
> +			kfree(rctxh.mech.data);
> +		}
>  		client_name = rctxh.src_name.display_name;
>  	}
>  
> -- 
> 1.8.3.1
> 
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Chuck Lever May 21, 2018, 9:30 p.m. UTC | #2
Agreed, I was just pawing around in that code, and
this patch looks sane and plausible.

Reviewed-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>

> On May 21, 2018, at 2:28 PM, bfields@fieldses.org wrote:
> 
> This looks right, thanks, it's just waiting on testing--the latest
> Fedora update seems to have broken my test rig's krb5 server, hopefully
> I'll get that back up tommorrow.
> 
> --b.
> 
> On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 05:13:04PM -0400, Dave Wysochanski wrote:
>> There is a 16-byte memory leak inside sunrpc/auth_gss on an nfs server when
>> a client mounts with 'sec=krb5' in a simple mount / umount loop.  The leak
>> is seen by either monitoring the kmalloc-16 slab or with kmemleak enabled
>> 
>> unreferenced object 0xffff92e6a045f030 (size 16):
>>  comm "nfsd", pid 1096, jiffies 4294936658 (age 761.110s)
>>  hex dump (first 16 bytes):
>>    2a 86 48 86 f7 12 01 02 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  *.H.............
>>  backtrace:
>>    [<000000004b2b79a7>] gssx_dec_buffer+0x79/0x90 [auth_rpcgss]
>>    [<000000002610ac1a>] gssx_dec_accept_sec_context+0x215/0x6dd [auth_rpcgss]
>>    [<000000004fd0e81d>] rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xa9/0xe0 [sunrpc]
>>    [<000000002b099233>] call_decode+0x1e9/0x840 [sunrpc]
>>    [<00000000954fc846>] __rpc_execute+0x80/0x3f0 [sunrpc]
>>    [<00000000c83a961c>] rpc_run_task+0x10d/0x150 [sunrpc]
>>    [<000000002c2cdcd2>] rpc_call_sync+0x4d/0xa0 [sunrpc]
>>    [<000000000b74eea2>] gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall+0x196/0x470 [auth_rpcgss]
>>    [<000000003271273f>] svcauth_gss_proxy_init+0x188/0x520 [auth_rpcgss]
>>    [<000000001cf69f01>] svcauth_gss_accept+0x3a6/0xb50 [auth_rpcgss]
>> 
>> If you map the above to code you'll see the following call chain
>>  gssx_dec_accept_sec_context
>>    gssx_dec_ctx  (missing from kmemleak output)
>>      gssx_dec_buffer(xdr, &ctx->mech)
>> 
>> Inside gssx_dec_buffer there is 'kmemdup' where we allocate memory for
>> any gssx_buffer (buf) and store into buf->data.  In the above instance,
>> 'buf == &ctx->mech).
>> 
>> Further up in the chain in gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall we see ctx->mech
>> is part of a stack variable 'struct gssx_ctx rctxh'.  Now later inside
>> gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall after gssp_call, there is a number of
>> memcpy and kfree statements, but there is no kfree(rctxh.mech.data)
>> after the memcpy into data->mech_oid.data.
>> 
>> With this patch applied and the same mount / unmount loop, the kmalloc-16
>> slab is stable and kmemleak enabled no longer shows the above backtrace.
>> 
>> Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
>> ---
>> net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c | 4 +++-
>> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>> 
>> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
>> index 46b295e..d98e2b6 100644
>> --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
>> +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
>> @@ -298,9 +298,11 @@ int gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall(struct net *net,
>> 	if (res.context_handle) {
>> 		data->out_handle = rctxh.exported_context_token;
>> 		data->mech_oid.len = rctxh.mech.len;
>> -		if (rctxh.mech.data)
>> +		if (rctxh.mech.data) {
>> 			memcpy(data->mech_oid.data, rctxh.mech.data,
>> 						data->mech_oid.len);
>> +			kfree(rctxh.mech.data);
>> +		}
>> 		client_name = rctxh.src_name.display_name;
>> 	}
>> 
>> -- 
>> 1.8.3.1
>> 
>> --
>> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in
>> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
>> More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

--
Chuck Lever



--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
index 46b295e..d98e2b6 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
@@ -298,9 +298,11 @@  int gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall(struct net *net,
 	if (res.context_handle) {
 		data->out_handle = rctxh.exported_context_token;
 		data->mech_oid.len = rctxh.mech.len;
-		if (rctxh.mech.data)
+		if (rctxh.mech.data) {
 			memcpy(data->mech_oid.data, rctxh.mech.data,
 						data->mech_oid.len);
+			kfree(rctxh.mech.data);
+		}
 		client_name = rctxh.src_name.display_name;
 	}