From patchwork Fri Nov 6 23:28:58 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ira Weiny X-Patchwork-Id: 11888377 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9759214B4 for ; Fri, 6 Nov 2020 23:29:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ml01.01.org (ml01.01.org [198.145.21.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 386EA20867 for ; Fri, 6 Nov 2020 23:29:24 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 386EA20867 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Received: from ml01.vlan13.01.org (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9B6FE166D2535; Fri, 6 Nov 2020 15:29:24 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: Pass (mailfrom) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=134.134.136.20; helo=mga02.intel.com; envelope-from=ira.weiny@intel.com; receiver= Received: from mga02.intel.com (mga02.intel.com [134.134.136.20]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7DEB4166D2533 for ; Fri, 6 Nov 2020 15:29:20 -0800 (PST) IronPort-SDR: G9cYEJUgI75SUnkZwngsJS/xkfKYcG+G1dLNNdhI+OmQyYmQaKdfinZZ8Q8FeBZKLBa8UugTJK l7y14g4WlIDw== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9797"; a="156614101" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.77,457,1596524400"; d="scan'208";a="156614101" X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga004.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.38]) by orsmga101.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 06 Nov 2020 15:29:20 -0800 IronPort-SDR: zaDqMGB9XRpHk6wfRNgLNPM/Xi4LQeFdyZDX5uZQoH9ZqsuvtcMF4rAzvTsyJwz6BP18N5GIAc CIqkU8VVcFhA== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.77,457,1596524400"; d="scan'208";a="472236412" Received: from iweiny-desk2.sc.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.3.52.147]) by orsmga004-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 06 Nov 2020 15:29:20 -0800 From: ira.weiny@intel.com To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Andy Lutomirski , Peter Zijlstra , Dave Hansen Subject: [PATCH V3 00/10] PKS: Add Protection Keys Supervisor (PKS) support V3 Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2020 15:28:58 -0800 Message-Id: <20201106232908.364581-1-ira.weiny@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9 MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID-Hash: 7A6UK4CDVKWVT2DJCJXKTBHM3BYCK3JA X-Message-ID-Hash: 7A6UK4CDVKWVT2DJCJXKTBHM3BYCK3JA X-MailFrom: ira.weiny@intel.com X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; suspicious-header CC: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton , Fenghua Yu , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Greg KH X-Mailman-Version: 3.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: "Linux-nvdimm developer list." Archived-At: List-Archive: List-Help: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: From: Ira Weiny Changes from V2 [4] Rebased on tip-tree/core/entry From Thomas Gleixner Address bisectability Drop Patch: x86/entry: Move nmi entry/exit into common code From Greg KH Remove WARN_ON's From Dan Williams Add __must_check to pks_key_alloc() New patch: x86/pks: Add PKS defines and config options Split from Enable patch to build on through the series Fix compile errors Changes from V1 Rebase to TIP master; resolve conflicts and test Clean up some kernel docs updates missed in V1 Add irqentry_state_t kernel doc for PKRS field Removed redundant irq_state->pkrs This is only needed when we add the global state and somehow ended up in this patch series. That will come back when we add the global functionality in. From Thomas Gleixner Update commit messages Add kernel doc for struct irqentry_state_t From Dave Hansen add flags to pks_key_alloc() Changes from RFC V3[3] Rebase to TIP master Update test error output Standardize on 'irq_state' for state variables From Dave Hansen Update commit messages Add/clean up comments Add X86_FEATURE_PKS to disabled-features.h and remove some explicit CONFIG checks Move saved_pkrs member of thread_struct Remove superfluous preempt_disable() s/irq_save_pks/irq_save_set_pks/ Ensure PKRS is not seen in faults if not configured or not supported s/pks_mknoaccess/pks_mk_noaccess/ s/pks_mkread/pks_mk_readonly/ s/pks_mkrdwr/pks_mk_readwrite/ Change pks_key_alloc return to -EOPNOTSUPP when not supported From Peter Zijlstra Clean up Attribution Remove superfluous preempt_disable() Add union to differentiate exit_rcu/lockdep use in irqentry_state_t From Thomas Gleixner Add preliminary clean up patch and adjust series as needed Introduce a new page protection mechanism for supervisor pages, Protection Key Supervisor (PKS). 2 use cases for PKS are being developed, trusted keys and PMEM. Trusted keys is a newer use case which is still being explored. PMEM was submitted as part of the RFC (v2) series[1]. However, since then it was found that some callers of kmap() require a global implementation of PKS. Specifically some users of kmap() expect mappings to be available to all kernel threads. While global use of PKS is rare it needs to be included for correctness. Unfortunately the kmap() updates required a large patch series to make the needed changes at the various kmap() call sites so that patch set has been split out. Because the global PKS feature is only required for that use case it will be deferred to that set as well.[2] This patch set is being submitted as a precursor to both of the use cases. For an overview of the entire PKS ecosystem, a git tree including this series and 2 proposed use cases can be found here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201009195033.3208459-1-ira.weiny@intel.com/ https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201009201410.3209180-1-ira.weiny@intel.com/ PKS enables protections on 'domains' of supervisor pages to limit supervisor mode access to those pages beyond the normal paging protections. PKS works in a similar fashion to user space pkeys, PKU. As with PKU, supervisor pkeys are checked in addition to normal paging protections and Access or Writes can be disabled via a MSR update without TLB flushes when permissions change. Also like PKU, a page mapping is assigned to a domain by setting pkey bits in the page table entry for that mapping. Access is controlled through a PKRS register which is updated via WRMSR/RDMSR. XSAVE is not supported for the PKRS MSR. Therefore the implementation saves/restores the MSR across context switches and during exceptions. Nested exceptions are supported by each exception getting a new PKS state. For consistent behavior with current paging protections, pkey 0 is reserved and configured to allow full access via the pkey mechanism, thus preserving the default paging protections on mappings with the default pkey value of 0. Other keys, (1-15) are allocated by an allocator which prepares us for key contention from day one. Kernel users should be prepared for the allocator to fail either because of key exhaustion or due to PKS not being supported on the arch and/or CPU instance. The following are key attributes of PKS. 1) Fast switching of permissions 1a) Prevents access without page table manipulations 1b) No TLB flushes required 2) Works on a per thread basis PKS is available with 4 and 5 level paging. Like PKRU it consumes 4 bits from the PTE to store the pkey within the entry. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200717072056.73134-1-ira.weiny@intel.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201009195033.3208459-2-ira.weiny@intel.com/ [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201009194258.3207172-1-ira.weiny@intel.com/ [4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201102205320.1458656-1-ira.weiny@intel.com/ Fenghua Yu (2): x86/pks: Add PKS kernel API x86/pks: Enable Protection Keys Supervisor (PKS) Ira Weiny (8): x86/pkeys: Create pkeys_common.h x86/fpu: Refactor arch_set_user_pkey_access() for PKS support x86/pks: Add PKS defines and Kconfig options x86/pks: Preserve the PKRS MSR on context switch x86/entry: Pass irqentry_state_t by reference x86/entry: Preserve PKRS MSR across exceptions x86/fault: Report the PKRS state on fault x86/pks: Add PKS test code Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst | 103 ++- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/common.c | 46 +- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 25 +- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 13 +- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 12 + arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h | 15 + arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h | 40 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 18 +- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 15 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 22 +- arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 6 +- arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 26 + arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 21 +- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 87 ++- arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c | 196 +++++- include/linux/entry-common.h | 31 +- include/linux/pgtable.h | 4 + include/linux/pkeys.h | 24 + kernel/entry/common.c | 44 +- lib/Kconfig.debug | 12 + lib/Makefile | 3 + lib/pks/Makefile | 3 + lib/pks/pks_test.c | 692 ++++++++++++++++++++ mm/Kconfig | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile | 3 +- tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_pks.c | 66 ++ 33 files changed, 1410 insertions(+), 140 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys_common.h create mode 100644 lib/pks/Makefile create mode 100644 lib/pks/pks_test.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_pks.c